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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts

[concepts as meanings, distinct from a word's reference]

20 ideas
Frege equated the concepts under which an object falls with its properties [Frege, by Dummett]
Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman]
An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale]
A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege]
A concept is a function mapping objects onto truth-values, if they fall under the concept [Frege, by Dummett]
Frege took the study of concepts to be part of logic [Frege, by Shapiro]
Concepts are, precisely, the references of predicates [Frege, by Wright,C]
A concept is a non-psychological one-place function asserting something of an object [Frege, by Weiner]
Fregean concepts have precise boundaries and universal applicability [Frege, by Koslicki]
Psychological accounts of concepts are subjective, and ultimately destroy truth [Frege]
'The concept "horse"' denotes a concept, yet seems also to denote an object [Frege, by McGee]
Concepts only have a 'functional character', because they map to truth values, not objects [Dummett, by Davidson]
We can use 'concept' for the reference, and 'conception' for sense [Wiggins]
Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference [Fodor]
If concepts have sense, we can't see the connection to their causal powers [Fodor]
Belief in 'senses' may explain intentionality, but not mental processes [Fodor]
A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference [Peacocke]
Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions [Peacocke]
The Fregean concept of GREEN is a function assigning true to green things, and false to the rest [Hart,WD]
The phrase 'the concept "horse"' can't refer to a concept, because it is saturated [Potter]