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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts

[concepts as meanings, distinct from a word's reference]

21 ideas
We don't judge by combining subject and concept; we get a concept by splitting up a judgement [Frege]
Frege equated the concepts under which an object falls with its properties [Dummett on Frege]
Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [George/Velleman on Frege]
An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Hale on Frege]
A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege]
A concept is a function mapping objects onto truth-values, if they fall under the concept [Dummett on Frege]
Frege took the study of concepts to be part of logic [Shapiro on Frege]
A concept is a non-psychological one-place function asserting something of an object [Weiner on Frege]
Fregean concepts have precise boundaries and universal applicability [Koslicki on Frege]
Concepts are, precisely, the references of predicates [Wright,C on Frege]
Psychological accounts of concepts are subjective, and ultimately destroy truth [Frege]
'The concept "horse"' denotes a concept, yet seems also to denote an object [McGee on Frege]
Concepts only have a 'functional character', because they map to truth values, not objects [Davidson on Dummett]
We can use 'concept' for the reference, and 'conception' for sense [Wiggins]
Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference [Fodor]
If concepts have sense, we can't see the connection to their causal powers [Fodor]
Belief in 'senses' may explain intentionality, but not mental processes [Fodor]
A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference [Peacocke]
Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions [Peacocke]
Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality [Peacocke]
The Fregean concept of GREEN is a function assigning true to green things, and false to the rest [Hart,WD]