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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts

[possibility of breaking a concept down into elements]

10 ideas
Kant implies that concepts have analysable parts [Kant, by Shapiro]
     Full Idea: Kant's definition of 'analyticity' presupposes that concepts have parts (at least metaphorically).
     From: report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics
     A reaction: The concept of a 'bachelor' seem undeniably to have parts. Others, however, seem to lack components, such as 'one', 'red', 'true'. Hence concepts must fall into two groups: primitive and composite. In any language. In any proposition.
The definition of a concept is just its experimental implications [Peirce]
     Full Idea: If one can define accurately all the conceivable experimental phenomena which the affirmation or denial of a concept could imply, one will have therein a complete definition of the concept, and there is absolutely nothing more in it.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Essentials of Pragmatism [1905], I)
     A reaction: Strictly, I would have thought you could only affirm or deny a complete proposition, rather than a concept. What should I do with the concept of a 'unicorn'? Note that all theories, such as empiricism or pragmatism, begin with an account of our concepts.
We clarify concepts (e.g. numbers) by determining their psychological origin [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol]
     Full Idea: Husserl said that the clarification of any concept is made by determining its psychological origin. He is concerned with the psychological origins of the operation of calculating cardinal numbers.
     From: report of Edmund Husserl (Philosophy of Arithmetic [1894]) by Victor Velarde-Mayol - On Husserl 2.2
     A reaction: This may not be the same as the 'psychologism' that Frege so despised, because Husserl is offering a clarification, rather than the intrinsic nature of number concepts. It is not a theory of the origin of numbers.
Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession [Fodor]
     Full Idea: The definition theory says that concepts are complex structures which entail their constituents. By saying this, it guarantees both the connection between content and necessity, and the connection between concept individuation and concept possession.
     From: Jerry A. Fodor (Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong [1998], Ch.5)
     A reaction: He cites Pinker as a spokesman for the definitional view. This is the view Fodor attacks, in favour of his atomistic account. He adds in a note that his view also offered to reduce conceptual truth to logical truth.
Entities fall under a sortal concept if they can be used to explain identity statements concerning them [Wright,C]
     Full Idea: 'Tree' is not a sortal concept under which directions fall since we cannot adequately explain the truth-conditions of any identity statement involving a pair of tree-denoting singular terms by appealing to facts to do with parallelism between lines.
     From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], 3.xiv)
     A reaction: The idea seems to be that these two fall under 'hedgehog', because that is a respect in which they are identical. I like to notion of explanation as a part of this.
An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized [Peacocke]
     Full Idea: At some point a good account of conceptual mastery must tie the mastery to abilities and relations that do not require conceptualization by the thinker.
     From: Christopher Peacocke (A Study of Concepts [1992], 5.3)
     A reaction: This obviously implies a physicalist commitment. Peacocke seeks, as so many do these days in philosophy of maths, to combine this commitment with some sort of Fregean "platonism without tears" (p.101). I don't buy it.
Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth [Peacocke]
     Full Idea: For some particular concept, we can argue that some of its distinctive features are adequately explained only by a possession-condition that involves reference and truth essentially.
     From: Christopher Peacocke (Truly Understood [2008], Intro)
     A reaction: He reached this view via the earlier assertion that it is the role in judgement which key to understanding concepts. I like any view of such things which says that truth plays a role.
It is always open to a philosopher to claim that some entity or other is unanalysable [Moreland]
     Full Idea: It is always open to a philosopher to claim that some entity or other is unanalysable.
     From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.2)
     A reaction: For example, Davidson on truth. There is an onus to demonstrate why all attempted analyses fail.
To grasp 'two' and 'green', must you know that two is not green? [Magidor]
     Full Idea: Is it a necessary condition on possessing the concepts of 'two' and 'green' that one does not believe that two is green? I think this claim is false.
     From: Ofra Magidor (Category Mistakes [2013], 3.4)
     A reaction: To see that it is false one only has to consider much more sophisticated concepts, which are grasped without knowing their full implications. I might think two is green because I fully grasp 'two', but have not yet mastered 'green'.
The concepts for a class typically include prototypes, and exemplars, and theories [Machery]
     Full Idea: Across domains (such as biology and psychology) classes of physical objects, substances and events are typically represented by a prototype, by a set of exemplars, and by a theory.
     From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 3.2.3)
     A reaction: In other words he thinks that all of the major psychological theories of concepts are partially correct, and he argues for extensive pluralism in the true picture. Bad news for neat philosophy, but real life is a right old mess.