| 16794 | As an infant, Socrates was not the same body, but he was the same human being [Hobbes] |
| 16795 | Same person, man or substance are different identities, belonging to different ideas [Locke] |
| 12153 | Geach denies Frege's view, that 'being the same F' splits into being the same and being F [Perry on Frege] |
| 17653 | Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman] |
| 16075 | Denial of absolute identity has drastic implications for logic, semantics and set theory [Wasserman on Geach] |
| 12152 | Identity is relative. One must not say things are 'the same', but 'the same A as' [Geach] |
| 17512 | If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers] |
| 13953 | An act of ostension doesn't seem to need a 'sort' of thing, even of a very broad kind [Cartwright,R] |
| 12155 | Statements of 'relative identity' are really statements of resemblance [Perry] |
| 14362 | Relative Identity is incompatible with the Indiscernibility of Identicals [Wiggins, by Strawson,P] |
| 11838 | Relativity of Identity makes identity entirely depend on a category [Wiggins] |
| 11847 | To identify two items, we must have a common sort for them [Wiggins] |
| 14755 | Gallois is committed to identity with respect to times, and denial of simple identity [Gallois, by Sider] |
| 8305 | A clear idea of the kind of an object must precede a criterion of identity for it [Lowe] |
| 10321 | We sometimes apply identity without having a real criterion [Hale] |
| 15185 | We aren't clear about 'same stuff as this', so a principle of individuation is needed to identify it [Sidelle] |
| 4640 | If identity is based on 'true of X' instead of 'property of X' we get the Masked Man fallacy ('I know X but not Y') [Baggini /Fosl, by PG] |
| 16074 | Relative identity may reject transitivity, but that suggests that it isn't about 'identity' [Wasserman] |