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2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition

[give the true nature of something, not just a description]

25 ideas
A primary element has only a name, and no logos, but complexes have an account, by weaving the names [Plato]
A definition must be of something primary [Aristotle]
Only substance [ousias] admits of definition [Aristotle]
Definitions need the complex features of form, and don't need to mention the category [Aristotle, by Wedin]
Sometimes parts must be mentioned in definitions of essence, and sometimes not [Aristotle]
Definitions are of what something is, and that is universal [Aristotle]
Definition by division needs predicates, which are well ordered and thorough [Aristotle]
You can define objects by progressively identifying what is the same and what is different [Aristotle]
An Aristotelian definition is causal [Aristotle, by Witt]
Aristotelian definitions aim to give the essential properties of the thing defined [Aristotle]
Essential definitions show the differences that discriminate things, and make them what they are [Boyle]
If our ideas of a thing are imperfect, the thing can have several unconnected definitions [Leibniz]
Real definitions, unlike nominal definitions, display possibilities [Leibniz]
One essence can be expressed by several definitions [Leibniz]
Definitions can only be real if the item is possible [Leibniz]
A real definition gives all the properties that constitute an identity [Molnar]
Chemists aim at real definition of things; lexicographers aim at nominal definition of usage [Gupta]
Definitions formed an abstract hierarchy for Aristotle, as sets do for us [Fine,K]
Modern philosophy has largely abandoned real definitions, apart from sortals [Fine,K]
Maybe two objects might require simultaneous real definitions, as with two simultaneous terms [Fine,K]
'Real' definitions give the essential properties of things under a concept [Mautner]
A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian]
A successful Aristotelian 'definition' is what sciences produces after an investigation [Koslicki]
Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki]
'Nominal' definitions identify things, but fail to give their essence [Jones,J-E]