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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds

[overview of what we take possible worlds to be]

30 ideas
Commitment to possible worlds is part of our ideology, not part of our ontology [Hintikka]
Possible worlds aren't puzzling places to learn about, but places we ourselves describe [Kripke]
Probability with dice uses possible worlds, abstractions which fictionally simplify things [Kripke]
A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs [Plantinga]
Possible worlds could be concrete, abstract, universals, sentences, or properties [Jackson]
Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities [Perry]
Are possible worlds just qualities, or do they include primitive identities as well? [Adams,RM]
Possible worlds are properties [Stalnaker]
Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure [Stalnaker]
I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space [Stalnaker]
We can take 'ways things might have been' as irreducible elements in our ontology [Stalnaker]
Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker]
A possible world is the ontological analogue of hypothetical beliefs [Stalnaker]
Ersatz worlds represent either through language, or by models, or magically [Lewis]
Kripkean possible worlds are abstract maximal states in which the real world could have been [Soames]
Possible worlds just have to be 'maximal', but they don't have to be consistent [Salmon,N]
Possible worlds are maximal abstract ways that things might have been [Salmon,N]
Treating possible worlds as mental needs more actual mental events [Lycan]
Possible worlds must be made of intensional objects like propositions or properties [Lycan]
Possible worlds are points of logical space, rather like other times than our own [Forbes,G]
The actual world is a maximally consistent combination of actual states of affairs [Jacquette]
The actual world is a totality of facts, so we also think of possible worlds as totalities [Fine,K]
Possible worlds may be more limited, to how things might actually turn out [Fine,K]
The actual world is a possible world, so we can't define possible worlds as 'what might have been' [Fine,K]
Four theories of possible worlds: conceptualist, combinatorial, abstract, or concrete [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz]
Maybe possible worlds are just sets of possible tropes [Bacon,John]
'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA]
Possible worlds must be abstract, because two qualitatively identical worlds are just one world [Markosian]
We should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds [Cameron]
Structural universals might serve as possible worlds [Forrest ,by Lewis]