23507 | Unlike the modern view of a set of worlds, Wittgenstein thinks of a structured manifold of them [Wittgenstein, by White,RM] |
23469 | An imagined world must have something in common with the real world [Wittgenstein] |
15786 | Commitment to possible worlds is part of our ideology, not part of our ontology [Hintikka] |
16992 | Possible worlds aren't puzzling places to learn about, but places we ourselves describe [Kripke] |
16983 | Probability with dice uses possible worlds, abstractions which fictionally simplify things [Kripke] |
11980 | A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs [Plantinga] |
6975 | Possible worlds could be concrete, abstract, universals, sentences, or properties [Jackson] |
4898 | Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities [Perry] |
14507 | Are possible worlds just qualities, or do they include primitive identities as well? [Adams,RM] |
16437 | Possible worlds are properties [Stalnaker] |
16444 | Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure [Stalnaker] |
16445 | I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space [Stalnaker] |
15793 | We can take 'ways things might have been' as irreducible elements in our ontology [Stalnaker, by Lycan] |
16396 | Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker] |
14285 | A possible world is the ontological analogue of hypothetical beliefs [Stalnaker] |
16284 | Ersatz worlds represent either through language, or by models, or magically [Lewis] |
13968 | Kripkean possible worlds are abstract maximal states in which the real world could have been [Soames] |
14672 | Possible worlds are maximal abstract ways that things might have been [Salmon,N] |
14675 | Possible worlds just have to be 'maximal', but they don't have to be consistent [Salmon,N] |
15795 | Treating possible worlds as mental needs more actual mental events [Lycan] |
15796 | Possible worlds must be made of intensional objects like propositions or properties [Lycan] |
12007 | Possible worlds are points of logical space, rather like other times than our own [Forbes,G] |
7688 | The actual world is a maximally consistent combination of actual states of affairs [Jacquette] |
15068 | The actual world is a totality of facts, so we also think of possible worlds as totalities [Fine,K] |
15069 | Possible worlds may be more limited, to how things might actually turn out [Fine,K] |
9213 | The actual world is a possible world, so we can't define possible worlds as 'what might have been' [Fine,K] |
8963 | Four theories of possible worlds: conceptualist, combinatorial, abstract, or concrete [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz] |
10466 | Maybe possible worlds are just sets of possible tropes [Bacon,John] |
14189 | 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA] |
14002 | Possible worlds must be abstract, because two qualitatively identical worlds are just one world [Markosian] |
18872 | We should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds [Cameron] |
15432 | Structural universals might serve as possible worlds [Forrest, by Lewis] |