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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 2. Epistemic possibility

[what seems to be possible, given what is known]

3 ideas
We assert epistemic possibility without commitment to logical possibility [McFetridge]
     Full Idea: Time- and person-relative epistemic possibility can be asserted even when logical possibility cannot, such as undecided mathematical propositions. 'It may be that p' just comes to 'For all I know, not-p'.
     From: Ian McFetridge (Logical Necessity: Some Issues [1986], §1)
     A reaction: If it is possible 'for all I know', then it could be actual for all I know, and if we accept that it might be actual, we could hardly deny that it is logically possible. Logical and epistemic possibilities of mathematical p stand or fall together.
'Epistemic' necessity is better called 'certainty' [Lowe]
     Full Idea: 'Epistemic' necessity is more properly to be called 'certainty'.
     From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 1)
     A reaction: Sounds wrong. Surely I can be totally certain of a contingent truth?
If it is possible 'for all I know' then it is 'epistemically possible' [Rami]
     Full Idea: There is 'epistemic possibility' when it is 'for all I know'. That is, P is epistemically possible for agent A just in case P is consistent with what A knows.
     From: Adolph Rami (Essential vs Accidental Properties [2008], §1)
     A reaction: Two problems: maybe 'we' know, and A knows we know, but A doesn't know. And maybe someone knows, but we are not sure about that, which seems to introduce a modal element into the knowing. If someone knows it's impossible, it's impossible.