12182
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We assert epistemic possibility without commitment to logical possibility
[McFetridge]
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Full Idea:
Time- and person-relative epistemic possibility can be asserted even when logical possibility cannot, such as undecided mathematical propositions. 'It may be that p' just comes to 'For all I know, not-p'.
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From:
Ian McFetridge (Logical Necessity: Some Issues [1986], §1)
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A reaction:
If it is possible 'for all I know', then it could be actual for all I know, and if we accept that it might be actual, we could hardly deny that it is logically possible. Logical and epistemic possibilities of mathematical p stand or fall together.
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10932
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If it is possible 'for all I know' then it is 'epistemically possible'
[Rami]
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Full Idea:
There is 'epistemic possibility' when it is 'for all I know'. That is, P is epistemically possible for agent A just in case P is consistent with what A knows.
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From:
Adolph Rami (Essential vs Accidental Properties [2008], §1)
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A reaction:
Two problems: maybe 'we' know, and A knows we know, but A doesn't know. And maybe someone knows, but we are not sure about that, which seems to introduce a modal element into the knowing. If someone knows it's impossible, it's impossible.
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