structure for 'Modality'    |     alphabetical list of themes    |     unexpand these ideas

10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts

[necessity based on relations of concepts]

13 ideas
3+4=7 is necessary because we cannot conceive of seven without including three and four [Descartes]
     Full Idea: When I say that four and three make seven, this connection is necessary, because one cannot conceive the number seven distinctly without including in it in a confused way the number four and the number three.
     From: René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 12)
     A reaction: This seems to make the truths of arithmetic conceptual, and hence analytic.
Formal experience conditions show what is possible, and general conditions what is necessary [Kant]
     Full Idea: Whatever agrees with the formal conditions of experience is possible, ...and that whose connection with the actual is determined in accordance with general conditions of experience is (exists) necessarily.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B266/A218)
     A reaction: This is the Kantian view of necessity, as more concerned with how we think than with how the world is. I think there are necessities in reality, and philosophy endeavours to discern what they are (despite the mockery of scientists).
Necessary truths derive from basic assertion and negation [Fichte, by Pinkard]
     Full Idea: Fichte thought that everything that involves necessary truths - even mathematics and logic - should be shown to follow from the more basic principles involved in assertion and negation.
     From: report of Johann Fichte (The Science of Knowing (Wissenschaftslehre) [1st ed] [1794]) by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 05
     A reaction: An interesting proposal, though I am struggling to see how it works. Fichte sees assertion and negation as foundational (Idea 22017), but I take them to be responses to the real world.
Is conceptual necessity just conventional, or does it mirror something about nature? [Harré/Madden]
     Full Idea: The question about conceptual necessity is whether it is only stipulative and conventional in character or whether it mirrors something about the nature of physical systems.
     From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.II.A)
     A reaction: This is the key question, which fans of conventionalism (such as Sidelle) don't seem to face up to. I take it to be important that our concepts are not created by a committee of fools, but by people constantly relating to the world.
There is a conceptual necessity when properties become a standard part of a nominal essence [Harré/Madden]
     Full Idea: When discoveries about the nature of a thing or substance explain or justify our holding that certain properties are its nominal essence, then the diachronic process of meaning development creates a genuine conceptual necessity.
     From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.VI)
     A reaction: This sounds like a pretty good account of one of the bases for conceptual necessity. They seem to think that conceptual necessity rests on a mixture of real and nominal essence (but then some of the nominal features are also real).
The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: The necessity or contingency of a proposition has nothing to do with our concepts or the meanings of our words. The possibilities would have been the same even if we had never conceived of them.
     From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity [2003], 1)
     A reaction: This sounds in need of qualification, since some of the propositions will be explicitly about words and concepts. Still, I like this idea.
Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: Conceptual possibilities are just (metaphysical) possibilities that we can conceive of.
     From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity [2003], 1)
The source of de dicto necessity is not concepts, but the actual properties of the thing [Forbes,G]
     Full Idea: It is widely held that the source of de dicto necessity is in concepts, ..but I deny this... even with simple de dicto necessities, the source of the necessity is to be found in the properties to which the predicates of the de dicto truth refer.
     From: Graeme Forbes (In Defense of Absolute Essentialism [1986], 3)
     A reaction: It is normal nowadays to say this about de re necessities, but this is more unusual.
De re necessity is a form of conceptual necessity, just as de dicto necessity is [Forbes,G]
     Full Idea: De re necessity does not differ from de dicto necessity in respect of how it arises: it is still a form of conceptual necessity.
     From: Graeme Forbes (The Metaphysics of Modality [1985], 9.4)
     A reaction: [Forbes proceeds to argue for this claim] Forbes defends a form of essentialism, but takes the necessity to arise from a posteriori truths because of the a priori involvement of other concepts (rather as Kripke argues).
Conceptual necessities rest on the nature of all concepts [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: Conceptual (and logical) necessities can be taken to be the propositions which are true in virtue of the nature of all concepts (or just the logical concepts).
     From: Kit Fine (Essence and Modality [1994], p. 9-10)
     A reaction: The idea that something might be true simply because of the nature of a concept sounds good, and a slightly better formulation than traditional accounts of analytic truth.
Conceptual necessities are made true by all concepts [Hale]
     Full Idea: Conceptual necessities can be taken to be propositions which are true in virtue of the nature of all concepts.
     From: Bob Hale (Absolute Necessities [1996], p.9)
     A reaction: Fine endorse essences for these concepts. Could we then come up with a new concept which contradicted all the others, and destroyed the necessity? Yes, presumably. Presumably witchcraft and astrology are full of 'conceptual necessities'.
Concept-identities explain how we know necessities, not why they are necessary [Hale]
     Full Idea: It seems to me that identity-relations among concepts have more to do with explaining how we know that vixens are female foxes etc., than with explaining why it is necessary, and, more generally, with explaining why some necessities are knowable a priori.
     From: Bob Hale (The Source of Necessity [2002], P.313)
     A reaction: Hale rejects the conceptual and conventional accounts of necessity, in favour of the essentialist view. This strikes me as a good suggestion of Hale's, since I agree with him about the essentialism.
Humeans says mathematics and logic are necessary because that is how our concept of necessity works [Sider]
     Full Idea: Why are logical (or mathematical, or analytic...) truths necessary? The Humean's answer is that this is just how our concept of necessity works.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12.11)
     A reaction: This is why I (unlike Sider) am not a Humean. If we agreed that 'necessary' meant 'whatever is decreed by the Pope', that would so obviously not be necessary that we would have to start searching nature for true necessities.