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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism

[objections to essences in scientific investigation]

17 ideas
The cosmos has two elements - passive matter, and active cause (or reason) which shapes it [Stoic school, by Seneca]
     Full Idea: Stoics say there are two elements in the cosmos, cause and matter. Matter lies inert and inactive, a substance of unlimited potential, but destined to remain idle if no one sets it in motion; it is cause (the same as reason) that fashions matter.
     From: report of Stoic school (fragments/reports [c.200 BCE]) by Seneca the Younger - Letters from a Stoic 065
     A reaction: [compressed] It take this to be anti-essentialist, because the point of a scientific essence is to be the source of the activities and structures of the matter. Seneca must think matter lacks essence, in order to be moulded like this. Note 'unlimited'.
The motions of the planets could only derive from an intelligent agent [Newton]
     Full Idea: The motions which the planets now have could not spring from any natural cause alone, but were impressed by an intelligent agent.
     From: Isaac Newton (Letters to Bentley [1692], 1692.12.10)
     A reaction: He is writing to a cleric, but seems to be quite sincere about this. Elsewhere he just says he doesn't know what causes gravity.
That gravity should be innate and essential to matter is absurd [Newton]
     Full Idea: That gravity should be innate, inherent and essential to matter ...is to me so great an absurdity that I believe no man who has in philosophical matters a competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it.
     From: Isaac Newton (Letters to Bentley [1692], 1693.02.25)
     A reaction: He is replying to some sermons, and he pays vague lip service to a possible divine force. Nevertheless, this is thoroughgoing anti-essentialism, and he talks of external 'laws' in the next sentence. Newton still sought the cause of gravity.
If properties and qualities arise from an inward essence, we will remain ignorant of nature [Berkeley]
     Full Idea: An inducement to pronouncing ourselves ignorant of the nature of things is the opinion that everything includes within itself the cause of its properties; or that there is in each object an inward essence which is the source whence its qualities flow.
     From: George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], §102)
     A reaction: This remains a good objection to essentialism - that while it remains quite a plausible picture of how nature operates, it makes the task of understanding nature hopeless. We can grasp imposed regular laws, but not secret inner essences.
We can never know origins, purposes or inner natures [Comte]
     Full Idea: The inner nature of objects, or the origin and purpose of all phenomena, are the most insoluble questions.
     From: Auguste Comte (Intro to Positive Philosophy [1830], Ch.1)
     A reaction: I take it that this Humean pessimism about science ever penetrating below the surface is precisely what is challenged by modern science, and that 'scientific essentialism' is catching up with what has happened. 'Inner' is knowable, bottom level isn't.
The limit of science is isomorphism of theories, with essences a matter of indifference [Weyl]
     Full Idea: A science can determine its domain of investigation up to an isomorphic mapping. It remains quite indifferent as to the 'essence' of its objects. The idea of isomorphism demarcates the self-evident boundary of cognition.
     From: Hermann Weyl (Phil of Mathematics and Natural Science [1949], 25-7), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics
     A reaction: Shapiro quotes this in support of his structuralism, but it is a striking expression of the idea that if there are such things as essences, they are beyond science. I take Weyl to be wrong. Best explanation reaches out beyond models to essences.
We can't say 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves' if we can't quantify modally [Quine]
     Full Idea: To say an object is soluble in water is to say that it would dissolve if it were in water,..which implies that 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves'. Yet we do not know if there is a suitable sense of 'necessarily' into which we can so quantify.
     From: Willard Quine (Reference and Modality [1953], §4)
     A reaction: This is why there has been a huge revival of scientific essentialism - because Krike seems to offer exacty the account which Quine said was missing. So can you have modal logic without rigid designation?
Essence gives an illusion of understanding [Quine, by Almog]
     Full Idea: Essence engenders a mere illusion of understanding
     From: report of Willard Quine (works [1961]) by Joseph Almog - Nature Without Essence Intro
     A reaction: [Almog quotes Quine, but doesn't give a reference] This is roughly the same as Popper's criticism of essentialism.
Essentialist views of science prevent further questions from being raised [Popper]
     Full Idea: The essentialist view of Newton (due to Roger Cotes) ...prevented fruitful questions from being raised, such as, 'What is the cause of gravity?' or 'Can we deduce Newton's theory from a more general independent theory?'
     From: Karl Popper (Conjectures and Refutations [1963], 3.3)
     A reaction: This is Popper's main (and only) objection to essentialism - that it is committed to ultimate explanations, and smugly terminates science when it thinks it has found them. This does not strike me as a problem with scientific essentialism.
How can essences generate the right powers to vary with distance between objects? [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: In Newtonian physics the distance between two objects determines the attractive forces between them, but then the objects will have to be sensitive to the distance, in order to 'know' what forces to generate; but distance isn't a causal power.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Two Problems for Essentialism [2001], p.170)
     A reaction: Ellis replies that he is not troubled, because he believes in essential properties which are separate from their causal roles. Indeed, how else could you explain their causal roles? Still, distance must be mentioned when explaining gravity.
H2O isn't necessary, because different laws of nature might affect how O and H combine [Lowe]
     Full Idea: It is not metaphysically necessary that water is composed of H2O molecules, because the natural laws governing the chemical behaviour of hydrogen and oxygen atoms could have been significantly different, so they might not have composed that substance.
     From: E.J. Lowe (What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? [2013], 6)
     A reaction: I fear this may be incoherent, as science. See Bird on why salt must dissolve in water. There can't (I suspect) be a law which keeps O and H the same, and yet makes them combine differently.
The reductionism found in scientific essentialism is mistaken [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: The reductionism found in scientific essentialism is mistaken.
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.4)
     A reaction: Oderberg's point is that essence doesn't just occur at the bottom of the hierarchy of kinds, but can exist on a macro-level, and need not be a concealed structure, as we see in the essence of a pile of stones.
Dispositional essentialism can't explain its key distinction between essential and non-essential properties [Psillos]
     Full Idea: Many philosophers will find dispositional essentialism unappealing, not least because it seems to fail to explain how (and in virtue of what) there is this supposed fundamental distinction between essential and non-essential properties.
     From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002])
     A reaction: Maybe there is no precise definition, but any idiot can see that some properties of gold are essential (mass) and others non-essential (attractive to jackdaws). It's a fair question, but is this the strongest objection to essentialism?
Can anything in science reveal the necessity of what it discovers? [Sidelle]
     Full Idea: Is there anything in the procedures of scientists that could reveal to them that water is necessarily H2O or that gold necessarily has atomic number 79.
     From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.4)
     A reaction: This is Leibniz's is view, that empirical evidence can never reveal necessities. Given that we know some necessities, you have an argument for rationalism.
A major objection to real essences is the essentialising of social categories like race, caste and occupation [Gelman]
     Full Idea: One major argument against the view that essences are real is the rampant essentializing of categories that are socially constructed (such as race, caste and occupation).
     From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 11 'Is essentialism')
     A reaction: You can't argue with that. It raises the question of whether the approach of scientific essentialism has any value in the social, rather than physical, sciences. We jokingly essentialise groups of people such as referees or Oxonians.
Defining an essence comes no where near giving a thing's nature [Almog]
     Full Idea: The natures of things are neither exhausted nor even partially given by 'defining essences'.
     From: Joseph Almog (Nature Without Essence [2010], Intro)
     A reaction: A better criticism of essentialism. 'Natures' is a much vaguer word than 'essences', however, because the latter refers to what is stable and important, whereas natures could include any aspect. Being ticklish is in my nature, but not in my essence.
Essences promise to reveal reality, but actually drive us away from it [Almog]
     Full Idea: The essentialist line (one I trace to Aristotle, Descartes and Kripke) is driving us away from, not closer to, the real nature of things. It promised a sort of Hubble telescope - essences - able to reveal the deep structure of reality.
     From: Joseph Almog (Nature Without Essence [2010], Intro)
     A reaction: I suspect this is tilting at a straw man. No one thinks we should hunt for essences instead of doing normal science. 'Essence' just labels what you've got when you succeed.