15983 | Locke explains powers, but effectively eliminates them with his talk of internal structure [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
13602 | We cannot form an idea of a 'power', and the word is without meaning [Hume] |
11950 | We have no idea of powers, because we have no impressions of them [Hume] |
11941 | The distinction between a power and its exercise is entirely frivolous [Hume] |
17772 | Kant claims causal powers are relational rather than intrinsic [Kant, by Bayne] |
14300 | No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency [Ryle] |
11946 | Propensities are part of a situation, not part of the objects [Popper] |
18397 | Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result [Armstrong] |
18399 | How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over? [Armstrong] |
17666 | Actualism means that ontology cannot contain what is merely physically possible [Armstrong] |
17667 | Dispositions exist, but their truth-makers are actual or categorical properties [Armstrong] |
17687 | If everything is powers there is a vicious regress, as powers are defined by more powers [Armstrong] |
8573 | Most properties are causally irrelevant, and we can't spot the relevant ones. [Lewis] |
14323 | If every event has a cause, it is easy to invent a power to explain each case [Mumford] |
14328 | Traditional powers initiate change, but are mysterious between those changes [Mumford] |
14331 | Categorical eliminativists say there are no dispositions, just categorical states or mechanisms [Mumford] |
14582 | Might dispositions be reduced to normativity, or to intentionality? [Mumford/Anjum] |
19014 | How can spatiotemporal relations be understood in dispositional terms? [Vetter] |