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14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation

[possibility of completely explaining anything]

12 ideas
16737 The best explanations get down to primary basics, but others go less deep [Boyle]
     Full Idea: Explications be most satisfactory that show how the effect is produced by the more primitive affects of matter (bulk, shape and motion) but are not to be despised that deduce them from more familiar qualities such as heat, weight, fluidity, fermentation.
     From: Robert Boyle (Certain Physical Essays [1672], II:22), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.4
     A reaction: [Compressed, and continued from Idea 16736] So there is a causal structure, and the best explanations go to the bottom of it, but lesser explanations only go half way down. So a very skimpy explanation ('dormative power') is still an explanation.
12737 Nature can be fully explained by final causes alone, or by efficient causes alone [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: All the phenomena of nature can be explained solely by final causes, exactly as if there were no efficient causes; and all the phenomena of nature can be explained solely by efficient causes, as if there were no final causes.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Definitiones cogitationesque metaphysicae [1678], A6.4.1403), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 6
     A reaction: Somewhat speculative (a virtue!), but it is interesting to see him suggesting that there might be two complete and satisfactory explanations, which never touched one another. I can't see Aristotle agreeing with that.
14873 If we find a hypothesis that explains many things, we conclude that it explains everything [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: The feeling of certainty is the most difficult to develop. Initially one seeks explanation: if a hypothesis explains many things, we draw the conclusion that it explains everything.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 19 [238])
     A reaction: As so often, a wonderful warning from Nietzsche to other philosophers. They love to latch onto a Big Idea, and offer it as the answer to everything (especially, dare I say it, continental philosophers).
12176 Science does not aim at ultimate explanations [Popper]
     Full Idea: I contest the essentialist doctrine that science aims at ultimate explanations, one which cannot be further explained, and which is in no need of any further explanation.
     From: Karl Popper (Conjectures and Refutations [1963], 3.3)
     A reaction: If explanations are causal, this seems to a plea for an infinite regress of causes, which is an odd thing to espouse. Are the explanations verbal descriptions or things in the world. There can be no perfect descriptions, but there may be ultimate things.
3128 It's not at all clear that explanation needs to stop anywhere [Rey]
     Full Idea: It's not at all clear that explanation needs to stop anywhere.
     From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], Int.2)
15057 Ultimate explanations are in 'grounds', which account for other truths, which hold in virtue of the grounding [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: We take ground to be an explanatory relation: if the truth that P is grounded in other truths, then they account for its truth; P's being the case holds in virtue of the other truths' being the case. ...It is the ultimate form of explanation.
     From: Kit Fine (The Question of Realism [2001], 5)
     A reaction: To be 'ultimate' that which grounds would have to be something which thwarted all further explanation. Popper, for example, got quite angry at the suggestion that we should put a block on further investigation in this way.
16564 There are four types of bottom-level activities which will explain phenomena [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
     Full Idea: There are four bottom-out kinds of activities: geometrico-mechanical, electro-chemical, electro-magnetic and energetic. These are abstract means of production that can be fruitfully applied in particular cases to explain phenomena.
     From: Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C (Thinking About Mechanisms [2000], 7)
     A reaction: I like that. It gives a nice core for a metaphysics for physicalists. I suspect that 'mechanical' can be reduced to something else, and that 'energetic' will disappear in the final story.
14320 Subatomic particles may terminate explanation, if they lack structure [Mumford]
     Full Idea: The behaviour of subatomic particles cannot be further analysed into structures and this may tempt us to regard these as instances of 'brute' ungrounded dispositions which end any possible regress of explanation.
     From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 06.4)
     A reaction: This seems right, if it is 'structural' explanations we are after (as I think we are) which look for mechanisms. An electron seems to be just three dispositions and no structure, so there is nothing more to say. Ladyman scorns this account.
14337 Maybe dispositions can replace the 'laws of nature' as the basis of explanation [Mumford]
     Full Idea: I will consider the case for an ontology of real dispositions replacing the so-called laws of nature as the basic building blocks of explanation.
     From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 10.1)
     A reaction: This precisely summarises the view I am exploring, with a particular focus on real essences. I certainly think the 'laws of nature' must go. See Mumford's second book on this.
14343 To avoid a regress in explanations, ungrounded dispositions will always have to be posited [Mumford]
     Full Idea: The nature of explanation is such that ungrounded dispositions will always have to be posited in order to avoid a regress of explanation.
     From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 10.6)
     A reaction: This seems to be right, but leaves it open to mock the proposals as 'virtus dormitiva' - empty place-holders that ground explanations but do no explanatory work. What else can be done, though?
15011 If the ultimate explanation is a list of entities, no laws, patterns or mechanisms can be cited [Sider]
     Full Idea: Ultimate explanations always terminate in the citation of entities; but since a mere list of entities is so unstructured, these 'explanations' cannot be systematized with detailed general laws, patterns, or mechanisms.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 08.5)
     A reaction: We just need to distinguish between ultimate ontology and ultimate explanations. I think explanations peter out at the point where we descend below the mechanisms. Patterns or laws don't explain on their own. Causal mechanisms are the thing.
14389 There is nothing wrong with an infinite regress of mechanisms and regularities [Leuridan]
     Full Idea: I see nothing metaphysically wrong in an infinite ontological regress of mechanisms and regularities.
     From: Bert Leuridan (Can Mechanisms Replace Laws of Nature? [2010], §5)
     A reaction: This is a pretty unusual view, and I can't accept it. My revulsion at this regress is precisely the reason why I believe in powers, as the bottom level of explanation.