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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning

[whole sentences are the main units of meaning]

11 ideas
A sentence always has signification, but a word by itself never does [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: A sentence is always significative of something, but a word by itself has no signification.
     From: report of Zeno (Citium) (fragments/reports [c.294 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.Ze.28
     A reaction: This is the Fregean dogma. Words obviously can signify, but that is said to be parasitic on their use in sentences. It feels like a false dichotomy to me. Much sentence meaning is compositional.
Leibniz was the first modern to focus on sentence-sized units (where empiricists preferred word-size) [Leibniz, by Hart,WD]
     Full Idea: Leibniz seems to be the first modern philosopher to focus on sentence-sized units that he called propositions. The Empiricists among the moderns focused on word-sized units like ideas.
     From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by William D. Hart - The Evolution of Logic 2
     A reaction: Historically, the sentential logic of the Stoics has a claim to have started this one. I find my initial sympathies to be with the empiricists.
Words in isolation seem to have ideas as meanings, but words have meaning in propositions [Frege]
     Full Idea: We consider the meanings of words in isolation, which leads us to accept an idea as the meaning, and words with no mental picture appear to have no mental content. But only in a proposition have the words really a meaning.
     From: Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], §60)
     A reaction: Frege (later) sees concepts as functions, which need input and output to be understood. It points to the idea that meaning is nothing more than usage. Something, though, is missing. As ever, WHY does something have a particular function?
Never ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition [Frege]
     Full Idea: Never ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition.
     From: Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], p.x)
     A reaction: [Called the 'Contextual Principle']. But surely the word 'pig' has a known meaning, even if I don't give it a context? A word like 'the' seems to need a context, though. One might demand the context of the proposition as well.
We understand new propositions by constructing their sense from the words [Frege]
     Full Idea: The possibility of our understanding propositions which we have never heard before rests on the fact that we construct the sense of a proposition out of parts that correspond to words.
     From: Gottlob Frege (Letters to Jourdain [1910], p.43)
     A reaction: This is the classic statement of the principle of compositionality, which seems to me so obviously correct that I cannot understand anyone opposing it. Which comes first, the thought or the word, may be a futile debate.
Words function only in propositions, like levers in a machine [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: Words function only in propositions, like the levers in a machine.
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Lectures 1930-32 (student notes) [1931], A I.4)
     A reaction: Hm. Consider the word 'tree'. Did you manage to do it? Was it just a noise?
Taking sentences as the unit of meaning makes useful paraphrasing possible [Quine]
     Full Idea: The new freedom that Russell confers by paraphrasis (of definite descriptions) is our reward for recognising that the unit of communication is the sentence and not the word.
     From: Willard Quine (Russell's Ontological Development [1966], p.75)
     A reaction: Since many people hardly ever speak a properly formed sentence, I take propositions to be better candidates for this. However, I don't see how we can reject the compositional view (the meanings are assembled).
Knowing a word is knowing the meanings of sentences which contain it [Quine]
     Full Idea: We can say that knowing words is knowing how to work out the meanings of sentences containing them. Dictionary definitions are mere clauses in a recursive definition of the meanings of sentences.
     From: Willard Quine (Russell's Ontological Development [1966], p.76)
     A reaction: Do you have to recursively define all the sentences that might contain the word, before you can fully know the meaning of the word? He seems to credit Russell with the holistic view of sentences (though I think that starts with Frege).
Sentences are the primary semantic units, because they can say something [Dummett]
     Full Idea: While words are semantic atoms, sentences remain the primary semantic units, in the sense of the smallest bits of language by means of which it is possible to say anything.
     From: Michael Dummett (Thought and Reality [1997], 3)
     A reaction: Syncategorematic terms (look it up!) may need sentences, but most nouns and verbs can communicate quite a lot on their own. Whether words or sentences come first may not be a true/false issue.
We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts [Davidson]
     Full Idea: Our interest in the parts of sentences is derivative; we recognise at once that sentences are effective linguistic units, while we must figure out or decide what constitutes the meaningful words and particles.
     From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], Intro)
     A reaction: It depends on whether linguistic priority goes to complete thoughts that require expression, or to naming and ostensive definition to relate to elements of the environment. I find it hard to have a strong view on this one. Just So stories?
Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences [Williams,M]
     Full Idea: In the foundationalist picture the meaning of individual words (defined ostensively) is primary, and that of sentences is derivative. For coherentists sentences come first, with meaning understood functionally or inferentially.
     From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.10)
     A reaction: Coherentism about language doesn't imply coherentism about justification. On language I vote for foundationalism, because I am impressed by the phenomenon of compositionality.