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8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals

[universals existing apart from their actual instances]

13 ideas
Duns Scotus was a realist about universals [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
     Full Idea: Duns Scotus was a realist on the issue of universals and one of the main adversaries of Ockham's programme of nominalism.
     From: report of John Duns Scotus (works [1301]) by Stephen D. Dumont - Duns Scotus p.206
     A reaction: The view of Scotus seems to be the minority view. It is hard to find thinkers who really believe that universals have an independent existence. My interest in Duns Scotus waned when I read this. How does he imagine universals?
Normal existence is in time, so we must say that universals 'subsist' [Russell]
     Full Idea: We think of things existing when they are in time (though possibly at all times), but universals do not exist in this sense, so we shall say that they 'subsist' or 'have being'.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 9)
     A reaction: Russell picked up the word 'subsist' from medieval philosophy. This idea brings the full Platonic metaphysics with it, which is tricky, to say the least. But what can you do? Admitting the content of thought brings baggage with it.
It is claimed that some universals are not exemplified by any particular, so must exist separately [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: There are some who claim that there can be uninstantiated universals, which are not exemplified by any particular, past, present or future; this would certainly imply that those universals have a Platonic transcendent existence outside time and space.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Universals [1995], p.504)
     A reaction: Presumably this is potentially circular or defeasible, because one can deny the universal simply because there is no particular.
Uninstantiated properties must be defined using the instantiated ones [Quinton]
     Full Idea: Properties that have no concrete instances must be defined in terms of those that have.
     From: Anthony Quinton (The Nature of Things [1973], 9 'Nat')
     A reaction: I wonder what the dodo used to smell like?
Nominalists cannot translate 'red resembles pink more than blue' into particulars [Jackson]
     Full Idea: It is not always possible for nominalists to translate all statements putatively about universals as statements about particulars. It is not possible for 'red is a colour' and 'red resembles pink more than blue'
     From: Frank Jackson (Statements about Universals [1977], p.89)
     A reaction: His second example strikes me as the biggest challenge facing nominalism. I wish they wouldn't use secondary qualities as examples. I am unconvinced that the existence of universals will improve the explanation. It's a mystery.
Uninstantiated properties are useful in philosophy [Oliver]
     Full Idea: Uninstantiated properties and relations may do some useful philosophical work.
     From: Alex Oliver (The Metaphysics of Properties [1996], §11), quoted by Cynthia Macdonald - Varieties of Things
     A reaction: Their value isn't just philosophical; hopes and speculations depend on them. This doesn't make universals mind-independent. I think the secret is a clear understanding of the word 'abstract' (which I don't have).
Uninstantiated universals seem to exist if they themselves have properties [Oliver]
     Full Idea: We may have to accept uninstantiated universals because the properties and relations of abstract objects may need to be acknowledged.
     From: Alex Oliver (The Metaphysics of Properties [1996], §11)
     A reaction: This is the problem of 'abstract reference'. 'Courage matters more than kindness'; 'Pink is more like red than like yellow'. Not an impressive argument. All you need is second-level abstraction.
'There are shapes which are never exemplified' is the toughest example for nominalists [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz]
     Full Idea: The example which presents the most serious challenge to nominalism is 'there are shapes which are never exemplified'.
     From: J Hoffman/G Rosenkrantz (Platonistic Theories of Universals [2003], 3)
     A reaction: To 'exemplify' a shape must it be a physical object, or a drawing of such an object, or a description? If none of those have ever existed, I'm not sure what 'are' is supposed to mean. They seem to be possibilia (with all the associated problems).
Particulars are instantiations, and universals are instantiables [Lowe]
     Full Idea: A particular is something (not necessarily an object) which instantiates but is not itself instantiated. Universals, on the other hand, necessarily have instances (or, at least, are instantiable).
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.4)
     A reaction: This is Lowe's proposal for distinction. It at least establishes the direction of dependency, but I find the notion of 'instantiation' to be as obscure and problematic as the Platonic notion of 'partaking' (see in Ontology|Universals|Platonic Forms).
Maybe universals are real, if properties themselves have properties, and relate to other properties [Moreland]
     Full Idea: Realism about universals is supported by the phenomenon of abstract reference - that is the fact that properties themselves have properties ('red is a colour'), and stand in relation to other properties ('red is more like orange than like blue').
     From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.1)
     A reaction: While a property may be an obviously natural feature, properties of properties seem more likely to be the produce of human perception and convention. It is a good argument, though.
How could 'being even', or 'being a father', or a musical interval, exist naturally in space? [Moreland]
     Full Idea: Many properties (being even) and relations (musical intervals, being a father) are such that it is not clear what it would mean to take them as natural things existing in space.
     From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.4)
     A reaction: 'Being even' certainly seems to be a property, and it is a struggle to see how it could exist in space, unless it is a set of actual or potential brain states.
A naturalist and realist about universals is forced to say redness can be both moving and stationary [Moreland]
     Full Idea: If a property is held to be at the location of the particular, then if there are two objects having the same property, and one object is stationary and the other is moving, the realist is forced to say that the universal is both moving and at rest.
     From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.4)
     A reaction: The target of this comment is D.M.Armstrong. The example nicely illustrates the problem of trying to combine science and metaphysics. It pushes you back to Platonism, but that seems wrong too…
There are spatial facts about red particulars, but not about redness itself [Moreland]
     Full Idea: When one attends to something existing in space, one attends to an instance of redness, not to redness itself (which is a colour, which resembles orange). The facts about red itself are not spatial facts, but are traditionally seen as a priori synthetic.
     From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.4)
     A reaction: This is the fact that properties can themselves have properties (and so on?), which seems to take us further and further from the natural world.