16560 | Galileo introduced geometrico-mechanical explanation, based on Archimedes [Galileo, by Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
15960 | Explanation is deducing a phenomenon from some nature better known to us [Boyle] |
18716 | A machine strikes us as being a rule of movement [Wittgenstein] |
16557 | Salmon's mechanisms are processes and interactions, involving marks, or conserved quantities [Salmon, by Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
13045 | Explanation at the quantum level will probably be by entirely new mechanisms [Salmon] |
13062 | Does an item have a function the first time it occurs? [Salmon] |
13063 | Explanations reveal the mechanisms which produce the facts [Salmon] |
17093 | Causation produces productive mechanisms; to understand the world, understand these mechanisms [Salmon] |
17492 | Salmon's interaction mechanisms needn't be regular, or involving any systems [Glennan on Salmon] |
13601 | Explanations of particular events are not essentialist, as they don't reveal essential structures [Ellis] |
15885 | The necessity of Newton's First Law derives from the nature of material things, not from a mechanism [Harré] |
15254 | If the nature of particulars explains their powers, it also explains their relations and behaviour [Harré/Madden] |
15317 | Powers and natures lead us to hypothesise underlying mechanisms, which may be real [Harré/Madden] |
16842 | We want to know not just the cause, but how the cause operated [Lipton] |
16528 | Mechanisms are not just push-pull systems [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
16529 | Mechanisms are systems organised to produce regular change [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
16530 | A mechanism explains a phenomenon by showing how it was produced [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
16553 | Our account of mechanism combines both entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
16559 | Descriptions of explanatory mechanisms have a bottom level, where going further is irrelevant [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
17493 | Modern mechanism need parts with spatial, temporal and function facts, and diagrams [Glennan] |
17487 | Mechanistic philosophy of science is an alternative to the empiricist law-based tradition [Glennan] |
17489 | Mechanisms are either systems of parts or sequences of activities [Glennan] |
17490 | 17th century mechanists explained everything by the kinetic physical fundamentals [Glennan] |
17491 | Unlike the lawlike approach, mechanistic explanation can allow for exceptions [Glennan] |
17500 | General theories may be too abstract to actually explain the mechanisms [Portides] |
12787 | Mechanisms can't explain on their own, as their models rest on pragmatic regularities [Leuridan] |
14384 | We can show that regularities and pragmatic laws are more basic than mechanisms [Leuridan] |
14386 | Mechanisms are ontologically dependent on regularities [Leuridan] |
14388 | Mechanisms must produce macro-level regularities, but that needs micro-level regularities [Leuridan] |
14568 | A structure won't give a causal explanation unless we know the powers of the structure [Mumford/Anjum] |
17471 | Using mechanisms as explanatory schemes began in chemistry [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry] |
17472 | Thick mechanisms map whole reactions, and thin mechanism chart the steps [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry] |