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1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 2. Positivism

[belief in science as the only route to truth]

8 ideas
Positivism gives up absolute truth, and seeks phenomenal laws, by reason and observation [Comte]
     Full Idea: In the positive state, the human mind, recognizing the impossibility of obtaining absolute truth, gives up the search for hidden and final causes. It endeavours to discover, by well-combined reasoning and observation, the actual laws of phenomena.
     From: Auguste Comte (Intro to Positive Philosophy [1830], Ch.1)
     A reaction: [compressed] Positivism attempted to turn the Humean regularity view of laws into a semi-religion. It is striking how pessimistic Comte was (as was Hume) about the chances of science revealing deep explanations. He would be astoundeds.
Positivism is the final state of human intelligence [Comte]
     Full Idea: The positive philosophy represents the true final state of human intelligence.
     From: Auguste Comte (Intro to Positive Philosophy [1830], Ch.1)
     A reaction: This is the sort of remark which made Comte notorious, and it looks a bit extravagant now, but the debate about his view is still ongoing. I am certainly sympathetic to his general drift.
The phases of human thought are theological, then metaphysical, then positivist [Comte, by Watson]
     Full Idea: The first phase of humanity was theological, attributing phenomena to a deity, the second metaphysical stage attributed them to abstract forms, the third positive stage abandons ultimate causes and just searches for regularities.
     From: report of Auguste Comte (Course of Positive Philosophy [1846]) by Peter Watson - Ideas Ch.32
     A reaction: This is obviously a highly empirical programme, which reasserts Hume's view of the laws of nature. Effectively, positivism just is the rejection of metaphysics.
Laws of nature are just records of regularities and correlations, with concepts to make recording them easier [Mach, by Harré]
     Full Idea: For Mach, the laws of nature are simply the compendious record of sensory regularities, correlations of elements. Any additional concepts are no more than symbols or devices for the convenient recording of general sensory patterns.
     From: report of Ernst Mach (Popular Scientific Lectures [1894], pp.201-5) by Rom Harré - Laws of Nature 2
     A reaction: Mach is the high priest of scientific positivism, which is really just hard-line empiricism.
Positivism says science only refers to immediate experiences [Harré/Madden]
     Full Idea: Positivism is the doctrine that the content of scientific propositions is exhausted by what can be immediately experienced.
     From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 2.I)
     A reaction: The simple thing missing from positivism is inference to the best explanation. Also, if you actually rule out other propositions as 'meaningless', you rule out speculation, which would certainly cripple science.
Positivists hold that theoretical terms change, but observation terms don't [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: For positivists it was taken that while theory change meant change in the meaning of theoretical terms, the meaning of observational terms was invariant under theory change.
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], I.4)
Critics attack positivist division between theory and observation [Newton-Smith]
     Full Idea: The critics of positivism attacked the conception of a dichotomy between theory and observation.
     From: W.H. Newton-Smith (The Rationality of Science [1981], I.4)
If all that exists is what is being measured, what about the people and instruments doing the measuring? [Lowe]
     Full Idea: If we think, in a positivistic spirit, that only measurements and observations exist, this is strikingly naïve. The scientists and their instruments can't be composed merely of measurements.
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.234)
     A reaction: A strong rebuff to crude positivism and 'operationalism'. Such mistakes are the usual confusion of epistemology and ontology.