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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence

[powers as giving the essential nature of each thing]

22 ideas
The hidden harmony is stronger than the visible [Heraclitus]
Sight is the essence of the eye, fitting its definition; the eye itself is just the matter [Aristotle]
Giving the function of a house defines its actuality [Aristotle]
The essence of a thing is its effort to persevere [Spinoza]
What is the texture - the real essence - which makes substances behave in distinct ways? [Locke]
The question is whether force is self-sufficient in bodies, and essential, or dependent on something [Lenfant]
The substantial form is the principle of action or the primitive force of acting [Leibniz]
Material or immaterial substances cannot be conceived without their essential activity [Leibniz]
My formal unifying atoms are substantial forms, which are forces like appetites [Leibniz]
I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz]
Thought terminates in force, rather than extension [Leibniz]
There is active and passive power in the substantial chain and in the essence of a composite [Leibniz]
Primitive force is what gives a composite its reality [Leibniz]
Essence is primitive force, or a law of change [Leibniz]
The essence of a thing is its real possibilities [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne on Leibniz]
Forms have sensation and appetite, the latter being the ability to act on other bodies [Garber on Leibniz]
Substances contain a source of change or principle of activity [Wiggins]
The possible Aristotelian view that forms are real and active principles is clearly wrong [Fine,K]
Essence is the source of a thing's characteristic behaviour [Oderberg]
We need to distinguish the essential from the non-essential powers [Oderberg]
There is no centralised power, but we still need essence for a metaphysical understanding [Pasnau]
Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter]