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19. Language / E. Propositions / 2. Nature of Propositions

[what we should take propositions to actually be]

42 ideas
Propositions are abstract structures of concepts, ready for judgement or assertion [Correia/Schnieder on Bolzano]
A 'proposition' is the sense of a linguistic expression, and can be true or false [Bolzano]
Thoughts are not subjective or psychological, because some thoughts are the same for us all [Frege]
The parts of a thought map onto the parts of a sentence [Frege]
A 'thought' something for which the question of truth can arise; thoughts are senses of sentences [Frege]
A sentence is only a thought if it is complete, and has a time-specification [Frege]
Propositions are mainly verbal expressions of true or false, and perhaps also symbolic thoughts [Russell]
Proposition contain entities indicated by words, rather than the words themselves [Russell]
A proposition is a unity, and analysis destroys it [Russell]
Russell said the proposition must explain its own unity - or else objective truth is impossible [Davidson on Russell]
I take Mont Blanc to be an actual part of any assertion about it [Russell]
A proposition is any expression which can be significantly negated [Wittgenstein]
'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle]
A 'proposition' is said to be the timeless cognitive part of the meaning of a sentence [Quine]
A realm of abstract propositions is causally inert, so has no explanatory value [Armstrong]
Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one [Plantinga]
Propositions can't just be in brains, because 'there are no human beings' might be true [Plantinga]
If propositions are concrete they don't have to exist, and so they can't be necessary truths [Plantinga]
A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth [Perry]
'It's raining' makes a different assertion on different occasions, but its meaning remains the same [Cartwright,R]
Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz]
I take propositions to be truth conditions [Stalnaker]
A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis]
A proposition is the property of being a possible world where it holds true [Lewis]
A proposition is a set of entire possible worlds which instantiate a particular property [Lewis]
Propositions can't have syntactic structure if they are just sets of worlds [Lewis]
We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames]
The extreme views on propositions are Frege's Platonism and Quine's extreme nominalism [Jacquette]
A proposition ingredient is 'essential' if changing it would change the truth-value [Fine,K]
Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson]
Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled [Swoyer]
Propositions might be reduced to functions (worlds to truth values), or ordered sets of properties and relations [Bealer]
Propositions are standardly treated as possible worlds, or as structured [Merricks]
Propositions can be 'about' an entity, but that doesn't make the entity a constituent of it [Merricks]
Propositions are necessary existents which essentially (but inexplicably) represent things [Merricks]
True propositions existed prior to their being thought, and might never be thought [Merricks]
'Cicero is an orator' represents the same situation as 'Tully is an orator', so they are one proposition [Merricks]
The standard view of propositions says they never change their truth-value [Merricks]
Early Russell says a proposition is identical with its truthmaking state of affairs [Merricks]
Unity of the proposition questions: what unites them? can the same constituents make different ones? [Merricks]
We want to explain not just what unites the constituents, but what unites them into a proposition [Merricks]
Are propositions all the thoughts and sentences that are possible? [Tallant]