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19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions

[propositions as made of real objects]

14 ideas
In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance [Russell]
In 1918 still believes in nonlinguistic analogues of sentences, but he now calls them 'facts' [Russell, by Quine]
Propositions as objects of judgement don't exist, because we judge several objects, not one [Russell/Whitehead]
If propositions are facts, then false and true propositions are indistinguishable [Davidson on Russell]
Moor bypassed problems of correspondence by saying true propositions ARE facts [Moore,GE, by Potter]
If propositions are concrete they don't have to exist, and so they can't be necessary truths [Plantinga]
Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist [Stalnaker]
A 'Russellian proposition' is an ordered sequence of individual, properties and relations [Stalnaker]
Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson]
Unstructured propositions are sets of possible worlds; structured ones have components [Mares]
Propositions can be 'about' an entity, but that doesn't make the entity a constituent of it [Merricks]
Early Russell says a proposition is identical with its truthmaking state of affairs [Merricks]
Do there exist thoughts which we are incapable of thinking? [Hofweber]
Russellian propositions are better than Fregean thoughts, by being constant through communication [Recanati]