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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics

[giving meaning by possible worlds with two separate components]

20 ideas
Rigid designation creates a puzzle - why do some necessary truths appear to be contingent? [Kripke, by MaciÓ/Garcia-Carpentiro]
Indexicals have a 'character' (the standing meaning), and a 'content' (truth-conditions for one context) [Kaplan, by MaciÓ/Garcia-Carpentiro]
'Content' gives the standard modal profile, and 'character' gives rules for a context [Kaplan, by Schroeter]
Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker]
In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker]
Two-dimensionalism reinstates descriptivism, and reconnects necessity and apriority to analyticity [Soames]
Rationalist 2D semantics posits necessary relations between meaning, apriority, and possibility [Chalmers, by Schroeter]
The 'primary intension' is non-empirical, and fixes extensions based on the actual-world reference [Chalmers]
The 'secondary intension' is determined by rigidifying (as H2O) the 'water' picked out in the actual world [Chalmers]
Meaning has split into primary ("watery stuff"), and secondary counterfactual meaning ("H2O") [Chalmers]
Primary and secondary intensions are the a priori (actual) and a posteriori (counterfactual) aspects of meaning [Chalmers]
We have 'primary' truth-conditions for the actual world, and derived 'secondary' ones for counterfactual worlds [Chalmers]
'Water' is two-dimensionally inconstant, with different intensions in different worlds [Chalmers, by Sider]
In 2-D semantics, reference is determined, then singularity by the truth of a predication [Recanati]
Two-D semantics is said to help descriptivism of reference deal with singular objects [Recanati]
Array worlds along the horizontal, and contexts (world,person,time) along the vertical [Schroeter]
If we introduce 'actually' into modal talk, we need possible worlds twice to express this [Schroeter]
Do we know apriori how we refer to names and natural kinds, but their modal profiles only a posteriori? [Schroeter]
2D fans defend it for conceptual analysis, for meaning, and for internalist reference [Schroeter]
2D semantics can't respond to contingent apriori claims, since there is no single proposition involved [Schroeter]