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10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals

[practical conventions for uttering conditional statements]

6 ideas
A person can be justified in believing a proposition, though it is unreasonable to actually say it [Grice, by Edgington]
Conditionals are truth-functional, but unassertable in tricky cases? [Grice, by Read]
Sentences with 'if' are only conditionals if they can read as A-implies-B [Enderton]
We can't insist that A is relevant to B, as conditionals can express lack of relevance [Jackson]
Truth-functionalists support some conditionals which we assert, but should not actually believe [Edgington]
Does 'If A,B' say something different in each context, because of the possibiites there? [Edgington]