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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions

[meaning is the situation making a sentence true]

33 ideas
Frege failed to show when two sets of truth-conditions are equivalent [Frege, by Potter]
     Full Idea: Frege's account suffered from a lack of precision about when two sets of truth-conditions should count as equivalent. (Wittgenstein aimed to rectify this defect).
     From: report of Gottlob Frege (On Sense and Reference [1892]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 50 Intro
The meaning (reference) of a sentence is its truth value - the circumstance of it being true or false [Frege]
     Full Idea: We are driven into accepting the truth-value of a sentence as constituting what it means (refers to). By the truth-value I understand the circumstance that it is true or false.
     From: Gottlob Frege (On Sense and Reference [1892], p.34)
     A reaction: Sounds bizarre, but Black's translation doesn't help. The notion of what the whole sentence refers to (rather than its sense) is a very theoretical notion. 'All true sentences refer to the truth' sounds harmless enough.
A thought is not psychological, but a condition of the world that makes a sentence true [Frege, by Miller,A]
     Full Idea: For Frege, a thought is not something psychological or subjective; rather, it is objective in the sense that it specifies some condition in the world the obtaining of which is necessary and sufficient for the truth of the sentence that expresses it.
     From: report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by Alexander Miller - Philosophy of Language 2.2
     A reaction: It is worth emphasising Russell's anti-Berkeley point about 'ideas', that the idea is in the mind, but its contents are in the world. Since the contents are what matter, this endorses Frege, and also points towards modern externalism.
A proposition draws a line around the facts which agree with it [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: A proposition gives reality a degree of freedom; it draws a line round the facts which agree with it, and distinguishes them from those which do not.
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Lectures 1930-32 (student notes) [1931], B XIII.2)
     A reaction: This seems to be the idea of meaning as the range of truth conditions. Propositions as sets of possible worlds extends this into possible facts which agree with the proposition. Most facts neither agree nor disagree with some proposition.
To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true.
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 4.024)
     A reaction: This established the Frege truth-conditions theory of meaning, which was expanded by Davidson, and then possible worlds semantics. You can't assess truth without knowing meaning. Dummett says the two go together.
If we understand a statement, we know the circumstances of its truth [Quine]
     Full Idea: We understand under what circumstances to say of any given statement that it is true, just as clearly as we understand the statement itself.
     From: Willard Quine (Mr Strawson on Logical Theory [1953], II)
     A reaction: This probably shouldn't be taken as a theory of meaning (in which Quine doesn't really believe) but as a plausible statement of correlated facts. Hypothetical assertions might be a problem case. 'If only I could be in two places at once'?
Truth conditions can't explain understanding a sentence, because that in turn needs explanation [Putnam]
     Full Idea: You can't treat understanding a sentence as knowing its truth conditions, because it then becomes unintelligible what that knowledge in turn consists in.
     From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Four)
     A reaction: The implication, I take it, is circularity; how can you specify truth conditions if you don't understand sentences? Putnam here agrees with Dummett that verification must be involved. Something has to be taken as axiomatic in all this.
We should reject the view that truth is prior to meaning [Putnam]
     Full Idea: I am suggesting that we reject the view that truth (based on the semantic theory) is prior to meaning.
     From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Three)
     A reaction: It is a nice question which of truth or meaning has logical priority. One might start by speculating about how and why animals think. A moth attracted to flame is probably working on truth without much that could be called 'meaning'.
Stating a sentence's truth-conditions is just paraphrasing the sentence [Dummett]
     Full Idea: An ability to state the condition for the truth of a sentence is, in effect, no more than an ability to express the content of the sentence in other words.
     From: Michael Dummett (The philosophical basis of intuitionist logic [1973], p.224)
     A reaction: Alternatively, if you give something other than a paraphrase of the sentence as its meaning (such as a proof of its truth), then you seem to have departed from your target sentence. Can we reduce and eliminate our sentences in this way?
If a sentence is effectively undecidable, we can never know its truth conditions [Dummett]
     Full Idea: If a sentence is effectively undecidable, the condition which must obtain for it to be true is not one which we are capable of recognising whenever it obtains, or of getting ourselves in a position to do so.
     From: Michael Dummett (The philosophical basis of intuitionist logic [1973], p.225)
     A reaction: The instances of 'undecidable' sentences are most clearly seen in mathematics, such as the Continuum Hypothesis or Goldbach's Conjecture, or anything involving vast infinite cardinals. But do you need precise truth-conditions for meaning?
To know the truth-conditions of a sentence, you must already know the meaning [Dummett]
     Full Idea: You can know the condition for a sentence to be true only when you know what the sentence means.
     From: Michael Dummett (Thought and Reality [1997], 3)
     A reaction: This makes the truth-conditions theory of meaning circular, and is Dummett's big objection to Davidson's view. The composition of a sentence creates a model of a world. Truth-conditions may only presuppose knowledge of concepts.
Sentences held true determine the meanings of the words they contain [Davidson]
     Full Idea: Sentences held true (the linguistic representatives of beliefs) determine the meanings of the words they contain.
     From: Donald Davidson (The Method of Truth in Metaphysics [1977], §II)
     A reaction: Maybe. Historically, truth and belief presumably precede words and sentences. But words separate off from beliefs very easily. I'm not convinced. Words initiate language, not beliefs?
A theory of truth tells us how communication by language is possible [Davidson]
     Full Idea: A theory of truth lets us answer the underlying question how communication by language is possible.
     From: Donald Davidson (Reality without Reference [1977], p.137)
     A reaction: If, instead, you explain communication by understood intentions (á la Grice), you have to say more about what sort of intentions are meant. If you use reference, you still have more to say about the meaning of sentences. Davidson looks good.
Davidson rejected ordinary meaning, and just used truth and reference instead [Davidson, by Soames]
     Full Idea: Davidson held that knowledge of truth and reference could give us a notion of meaning. He embraced Quine's rejection of analyticity, synonymy and ordinary meaning, and substituted truth and reference, when there was something genuine to capture.
     From: report of Donald Davidson (Semantics for Natural Languages [1970]) by Scott Soames - Philosophy of Language 2.3
     A reaction: I always get a warm glow when anyone suggests that the concept of meaning involves the concept of truth. I largely reject Quine. Davidson made a helpful suggestion!
Davidson aimed to show that language is structured by first-order logic [Davidson, by Smart]
     Full Idea: Davidson's program was to show the underlying structure of natural languages as that of first-order logic.
     From: report of Donald Davidson (Semantics for Natural Languages [1970], 2) by J.J.C. Smart - The Tenseless Theory of Time 2
     A reaction: First order logic just reasons about a domain of objects with predicates attached to them. Language appears to refer to properties and relations as well as objects.
Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker [Davidson]
     Full Idea: An utterance has certain truth conditions only if the speaker intends it to be interpreted as having those truth conditions.
     From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 3)
     A reaction: This seems to be a concession to the rather sensible things that Grice said about meaning. What about malapropisms? Surely there the speaker does not understand the truth conditions of her own utterance? Truth conditions are in the head?
You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it [Davidson]
     Full Idea: We understand an imperative if and only if we know under what conditions what it orders or commands is obeyed.
     From: Donald Davidson (Truth and Predication [2005], 6)
     A reaction: How could this be wrong? 'Do you understand the order?' 'Yes sir!' 'Well do it then!' 'Do what sir?'
Knowing the potential truth conditions of a sentence is necessary and sufficient for understanding [Davidson]
     Full Idea: It is clear that someone who knows under what conditions a sentence would be true understands that sentence, …and if someone does not know under what conditions it would be true then they do not understand it.
     From: Donald Davidson (Truth Rehabilitated [1997], p.13)
     A reaction: I've always subscribed to this view. Langauge is meaningless if you can't relate it to reality, and I don't think there could be a language without an intuitive notion of truth.
A theory of perspectival de se content gives truth conditions relative to an agent [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever]
     Full Idea: Lewis's theory of a perspectival 'de se' content ...delivers truth conditions not absolutely, but only relative to a choice of agent/center.
     From: report of David Lewis (Attitudes De Dicto and De Se [1979]) by Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh - The Inessential Indexical 05.7
     A reaction: The proposal rests on a theory of 'centred' possible worlds, specifying the viewpoint of some agent within the whole system. It relies on accepting the idea that indexicals are special, which Cappelen and Dever reject.
To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true [Fodor]
     Full Idea: If you know the content of a thought, you thereby know what would make the thought true.
     From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4)
     A reaction: The truthmaker might by physically impossible, and careful thought might show it to be contradictory - but that wouldn't destroy the meaning.
Whatever in the mind delivers falsehood is parasitic on what delivers truth [Fodor]
     Full Idea: The mechanisms that deliver falsehoods are somehow parasitic on the ones that deliver truths.
     From: Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], p.107)
     A reaction: In the case of a sentence and its negation it is not clear which one is 'parasitic', because that can usually be reversed by paraphrasing. Historically, I very much hope that truth-speaking came first.
To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames]
     Full Idea: The systematic study of meaning requires a framework for specifying the truth conditions of sentences on the basis of their syntactic structure, and the representational contents of their parts.
     From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], Intro)
     A reaction: Soames presents this as common sense, on the first page of his book, and it is hard to disagree. Representation will shade off into studying the workings of the mind. Fodor seems a good person to start with.
Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames]
     Full Idea: The truth conditions provided by Tarski's theories (based on references of subsentential constituents) are too weak to determine meanings, because they lacked context-sensitivity and various forms of intensionality.
     From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], Intro)
     A reaction: Interesting. This suggests that stronger modern axiomatic theories of truth might give a sufficient basis for a truth conditions theory of meaning. Soames says possible worlds semantics was an attempt to improve things.
We could know the truth-conditions of a foreign sentence without knowing its meaning [Horwich]
     Full Idea: Someone who does not understand German and is told 'Schnee ist weiss' is true if frozen H2O is white, does not understand the German sentence, even though he knows the truth-conditions.
     From: Paul Horwich (Truth (2nd edn) [1990], Ch.5.22 n1)
     A reaction: This sounds like a powerful objection to Davidson's well-known claim that meaning is truth-conditions. Horwich likes the idea that meaning is use, but I think a similar objection arises - you can use a sentence well without knowing its meaning.
The truth conditions theory sees meaning as representation [Lycan]
     Full Idea: The truth conditions theory sees meaning as representation.
     From: William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch. 9)
     A reaction: This suggests a nice connection to Fodor's account of intentional thinking. The whole package sounds right to me (though the representations need not be 'symbolic', or in mentalese).
Sentence-meaning is the truth-conditions - plus factors responsible for them [Yablo]
     Full Idea: A sentence's meaning is to do with its truth-value in various possible scenarios, AND the factors responsible for that truth-value.
     From: Stephen Yablo (Aboutness [2014], Intro)
     A reaction: The thesis of his book, which I welcome. I'm increasingly struck by the way in which much modern philosophy settles for a theory being complete, when actually further explanation is possible. Exhibit A is functional explanations. Why that function?
Truth-conditions correspond to the idea of 'literal meaning' [Heil]
     Full Idea: I intend the notion of truth-conditions to correspond to what I have called 'literal meaning'.
     From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.5)
     A reaction: Yes. If I identify myself to you by saying "the spam is in the fridge", that always has a literal meaning (which we assemble from the words), as well as connotation in this particular context.
A sentence's truth conditions depend on context [Merricks]
     Full Idea: A sentence has truth conditions only in a context of use. And the truth conditions of many sentences can differ from one context of use to another (as in 'I am a philosopher').
     From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 1.II)
     A reaction: He is building a defence of propositions, because they are eternal, and have their truth conditions essentially. I too am a fan of propositions.
A sentence's truth conditions are all the situations where it would be true [Button]
     Full Idea: A sentence's truth conditions comprise an exhaustive list of the situations in which that sentence would be true.
     From: Tim Button (The Limits of Reason [2013], 03.4)
     A reaction: So to know its meaning you must know those conditions? Compare 'my cat is licking my finger' with 'dramatic events are happening in Ethiopia'. It should take an awful long time to grasp the second sentence.
'Grabby' truth conditions first select their object, unlike 'searchy' truth conditions [Markosian]
     Full Idea: We can talk of 'grabby' truth conditions (where an object is grabbed before predication) and 'searchy' truth conditions (where the object is included in what is being asserted).
     From: Ned Markosian (A Defense of Presentism [2004], 3.8)
     A reaction: [He credits Tom Ryckman with the terminology] I am inclined to think that the whole of language is 'searchy', even when it appears to be blatantly 'grabby'. Even ostensive reference is an act of hope rather than certainty.
Are truth-condtions other propositions (coherence) or features of the world (correspondence)? [Young,JO]
     Full Idea: For the coherence theory of truth, the truth conditions of propositions consist in other propositions. The correspondence theory, in contrast, states that the truth conditions of propositions are ... objective features of the world.
     From: James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], Intro)
     A reaction: It is obviously rather important for your truth-conditions theory of meaning that you are clear about your theory of truth. A correspondence theory is evidently taken for granted, even in possible worlds versions.
Coherence truth suggests truth-condtions are assertion-conditions, which need knowledge of justification [Young,JO]
     Full Idea: Coherence theorists can argue that the truth conditions of a proposition are those under which speakers tend to assert it, ...and that speakers can only make a practice of asserting a proposition under conditions they can recognise as justifying it.
     From: James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §2.2)
     A reaction: [compressed] This sounds rather verificationist, and hence wrong, since if you then asserted anything for which you didn't know the justification, that would remove its truth, and thus make it meaningless.
We understand conditionals, but disagree over their truth-conditions [Rumfitt]
     Full Idea: It is striking that our understanding of conditionals is not greatly impeded by widespread disagreement about their truth-conditions.
     From: Ian Rumfitt (The Boundary Stones of Thought [2015], 4.2)
     A reaction: Compare 'if you dig there you might find gold' with 'if you dig there you will definitely find gold'. The second but not the first invites 'how do you know that?', implying truth. Two different ifs.