| 13221 | Existence is either potential or actual [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Some things are-potentially while others are-actually. | |
| From: Aristotle (Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) [c.335 BCE], 327b24) | |
| A reaction: I've read a lot of Aristotle, but am still not quite clear what this distinction means. I like the distinction between a thing's actual being and its 'modal profile', but the latter may extend well beyond what Aristotle means by potential being. |
| 568 | Some things exist as substances, others as properties of substances [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Some things are called things that are because they are substances, other things are called things that are because they are affections of a substance. | |
| From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1003b07) |
| 16588 | I prefer a lack of form to mean non-existence, than to think of some quasi-existence [Augustine] |
| Full Idea: I sooner judged that what lacks all form does not exist, than thought of as something in between form and nothing, neither formed nor nothing, unformed and next to nothing. | |
| From: Augustine (Confessions [c.398], XII.6), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 03.1 | |
| A reaction: Scholastics were struck by the contrast between this remark, and the remark of Averroes (Idea 16587) that prime matter was halfway existence. Their two great authorities disagreed! This sort of thing stimulated the revival of metaphysics. |
| 16664 | Everything that exists is either a substance or an accident [Albert of Saxony] |
| Full Idea: Everything that exists is either a substance or an accident. | |
| From: Albert of Saxony (On 'Physics' [1357], I.18), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 13.2 | |
| A reaction: This seems to be the view of those who base their ontology on first-order classical logic. The more austere reading of that makes the accidents into sets of substances, so it's just substances. All the non-substance stuff cries out for recognition. |
| 17174 | Outside the mind, there are just things and their properties [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: Outside the intellect, there is nothing but substances and their affections. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], I Pr 04) | |
| A reaction: This is pretty close to the very sparse ontology espoused by modern philosophers who take their lead from the logic. |
| 17176 | The more reality a thing has, the more attributes it has [Spinoza] |
| Full Idea: The more reality or being a thing possesses, the more attributes belong to it. | |
| From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], I Pr 09) | |
| A reaction: This commitment to degrees of existence (which I find baffling) is presumably to enable God to be the thing with infinite attributes, and an infinite degree of Being. What percentage of Being would you say you've got (on a good day)? |
| 21291 | There is no medium state between existence and non-existence [Hume] |
| Full Idea: Betwixt unity and number there can be no medium; no more than betwixt existence and non-existence. | |
| From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.IV.2) | |
| A reaction: Just to confirm that, as you would expect, the great empiricist has no time for 'subsistence', or shadows and holes having lower grade existece. |
| 4168 | Matter and intellect are inseparable correlatives which only exist relatively, and for each other [Schopenhauer] |
| Full Idea: In my system matter and intellect are inseparable correlatives which exist only for each other, and so exist only relatively. | |
| From: Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819], I.Supp) | |
| A reaction: A plausible picture, but built from dualist presuppositions. Personally I think intellect is built out of matter, so I am not going down Schopenhauer's road. |
| 19470 | Thoughts in the 'third realm' cannot be sensed, and do not need an owner to exist [Frege] |
| Full Idea: Thoughts are neither things in the external world nor ideas. A third realm must be recognised. Anything in this realm has it in common with ideas that it cannot be perceived by the senses, and does not need an owner to belong with his consciousness. | |
| From: Gottlob Frege (The Thought: a Logical Enquiry [1918], p.337(69)) | |
| A reaction: This important idea is the creed for modern platonists. We don't have to accept Forms, or any particular content, but there is a mode of existence which is distinct from both mental and physical, and is the residence of 'abstracta'. I deny it! |
| 10241 | For Quine, there is only one way to exist [Quine, by Shapiro] |
| Full Idea: Quine takes 'existence' to be univocal, with a single ontology for his entire 'web of belief'. | |
| From: report of Willard Quine (On What There Is [1948]) by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 4.9 | |
| A reaction: Thus, there can be no 'different way of existing' (such as 'subsisting') for abstract objects such as those of mathematics. I presume that Quine's low-key physicalism is behind this. |
| 15535 | We can't accept a use of 'existence' that says only some of the things there are actually exist [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: If 'existence' is understood so that it can be a substantive thesis that only some of the things there are exist, we will have none of it. | |
| From: David Lewis (Noneism or Allism? [1990], p.163) | |
| A reaction: Lewis is a strong advocate, following Quine, of the univocal sense of the word 'exist', and I agree with them. |
| 10470 | There are only two kinds: sets, and possibilia (actual and possible particulars) [Lewis, by Oliver] |
| Full Idea: Lewis's multi-purpose ontology seems to have only two kinds: sets and possibilia (actual and possible particulars). | |
| From: report of David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986]) by Alex Oliver - The Metaphysics of Properties 3 | |
| A reaction: This is awfully like the ontology of his teacher Quine, but with the wicked addition of modal properties. It is no wonder that Lewis was a bit vague about the concrete boundary, as both of his kinds seem to be abstract. His Achilles' Heel? |
| 15520 | Existence doesn't come in degrees; once asserted, it can't then be qualified [Lewis] |
| Full Idea: Existence cannot be a matter of degree. If you say there is something that exists to a diminished degree, once you've said 'there is' your game is up. | |
| From: David Lewis (Parts of Classes [1991], 3.5) | |
| A reaction: You might have thought that this was so obvious as to be not worth saying, but as far as I can see it is a minority view in contemporary philosophy. It was Quine's view, and it is mine. |
| 15789 | Lewis's distinction of 'existing' from 'being actual' is Meinong's between 'existing' and 'subsisting' [Lycan on Lewis] |
| Full Idea: I suggest that Lewis's view in fact is just Meinong's view. ...Meinong distinguishes between 'existing' and merely 'subsisting', Lewis between 'being actual' and merely 'existing'. | |
| From: comment on David Lewis (Possible Worlds [1973]) by William Lycan - The Trouble with Possible Worlds 06 | |
| A reaction: Lewis attempts to make actuality purely 'indexical' in character, like distinguishing the world 'here' from the world 'elsewhere', but Lycan seems right that he is committed to more than that. |
| 12620 | If 'exist' is ambiguous in 'chairs and numbers exist', that mirrors the difference between chairs and numbers [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: People say 'exist' is ambiguous, because of the difference between 'chairs exist' and 'numbers exist'. A reply goes: the difference between the existence of chairs and the existence of numbers is strikingly like the difference between chairs and numbers. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong [1998], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: To say 'numbers are objects which exist' is, to me, either a funny use of 'exist' or a funny use of 'object'. I think I will now vote for the latter. Just as 'real number' was a funny use of 'number', but we seem to have got used to it. |
| 13884 | The idea that 'exist' has multiple senses is not coherent [Wright,C] |
| Full Idea: I have the gravest doubts whether any coherent account could be given of any multiplicity of senses of 'exist'. | |
| From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], 2.x) | |
| A reaction: I thoroughly agree with this thought. Do water and wind exist in different senses of 'exist'? |
| 15078 | There are levels of existence, as well as reality; objects exist at the lowest level in which they can function [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: Just as we recognise different levels of reality, so we should recognise different levels of existence. Each object will exist at the lowest level at which it can enjoy its characteristic form of life. | |
| From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 10) | |
| A reaction: I'm struggling with this claim, despite my sympathy for much of Fine's picture. I'm not sure that the so-called 'levels' of reality have different degrees of reality. |
| 18769 | Do mathematicians use 'existence' differently when they say some entity exists? [Anderson,CA] |
| Full Idea: A cursory examination shows that mathematicians have no aversion to saying that this-or-that mathematical entity exists. But is this a different sense of 'existence'? | |
| From: C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 2.6) | |
| A reaction: For those of us like me and my pal Quine who say that 'exist' is univocal (i.e. only one meaning), this is a nice challenge. Quine solves it by saying maths concerns sets of objects. I, who don't like sets, am puzzled (so I turn to fictionalism...). |