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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic

[powers seen as the foundation of physical reality]

33 ideas
Actualities are arranged by priority, going back to what initiates process [Aristotle]
The main characteristic of the source of change is activity [energeia] [Aristotle, by Politis]
The presence of the incorporeal is only known by certain kinds of disposition [Porphyry]
Incorporeal substances are powers or forces [Descartes, by Pasnau]
Things persevere through a force which derives from God [Spinoza]
I suspect that each particle of bodies has attractive or repelling forces [Newton]
As well as extension, bodies contain powers [Leibniz]
All occurrence in the depth of a substance is spontaneous 'action' [Leibniz]
Substances are primary powers; their ways of being are the derivative powers [Leibniz]
A substance contains the laws of its operations, and its actions come from its own depth [Leibniz]
Derivate forces are in phenomena, but primitive forces are in the internal strivings of substances [Leibniz]
The soul is not a substance but a substantial form, the first active faculty [Leibniz]
The most primitive thing in substances is force, which leads to their actions and dispositions [Leibniz]
A 'probability wave' is a quantitative version of Aristotle's potential, a mid-way type of reality [Heisenberg]
Some dispositional properties (such as mental ones) may have no categorical base [Price,HH]
If unmanifested partnerless dispositions are still real, and are not just qualities, they can explain properties [Martin,CB]
Causal powers can't rest on things which lack causal power [Ellis]
Scientists define copper almost entirely (bar atomic number) in terms of its dispositions [Harré/Madden]
We explain powers by the natures of things, but explanations end in inexplicable powers [Harré/Madden]
Maybe a physical field qualifies as ultimate, if its nature is identical with its powers [Harré/Madden]
If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis]
The physical world has a feature very like mental intentionality [Molnar]
Dispositions and external powers arise entirely from intrinsic powers in objects [Molnar]
The Standard Model suggest that particles are entirely dispositional, and hence are powers [Molnar]
Some powers are ungrounded, and others rest on them, and are derivative [Molnar]
Penicillin causes nothing; the cause is what penicillin does [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
Dispositions are attacked as mere regularities of events, or place-holders for unknown properties [Mumford]
Properties are just natural clusters of powers [Mumford]
Powers are claimed to be basic because fundamental particles lack internal structure [Psillos]
A categorical basis could hardly explain a disposition if it had no powers of its own [Hawthorne]
Only real powers are fundamental [Bird, by Mumford/Anjum]
Powers come from concrete particulars, not from the laws of nature [Jacobs]
Powers offer no more explanation of nature than laws do [Mumford/Anjum]