15773 | Actualities are arranged by priority, going back to what initiates process [Aristotle] |
11387 | The main characteristic of the source of change is activity [energeia] [Aristotle, by Politis] |
18451 | The presence of the incorporeal is only known by certain kinds of disposition [Porphyry] |
16635 | Incorporeal substances are powers or forces [Descartes, by Pasnau] |
17195 | Things persevere through a force which derives from God [Spinoza] |
17011 | I suspect that each particle of bodies has attractive or repelling forces [Newton] |
12710 | As well as extension, bodies contain powers [Leibniz] |
12965 | All occurrence in the depth of a substance is spontaneous 'action' [Leibniz] |
12999 | Substances are primary powers; their ways of being are the derivative powers [Leibniz] |
13079 | A substance contains the laws of its operations, and its actions come from its own depth [Leibniz] |
12749 | Derivate forces are in phenomena, but primitive forces are in the internal strivings of substances [Leibniz] |
12708 | The soul is not a substance but a substantial form, the first active faculty [Leibniz] |
12723 | The most primitive thing in substances is force, which leads to their actions and dispositions [Leibniz] |
23664 | Powers are quite distinct and simple, and so cannot be defined [Reid] |
23669 | Thinkers say that matter has intrinsic powers, but is also passive and acted upon [Reid] |
23228 | The principle of activity and generation is found in a self-moving basic force [Fichte] |
17534 | A 'probability wave' is a quantitative version of Aristotle's potential, a mid-way type of reality [Heisenberg] |
14329 | Some dispositional properties (such as mental ones) may have no categorical base [Price,HH] |
15487 | If unmanifested partnerless dispositions are still real, and are not just qualities, they can explain properties [Martin,CB] |
12676 | Causal powers can't rest on things which lack causal power [Ellis] |
15218 | Scientists define copper almost entirely (bar atomic number) in terms of its dispositions [Harré/Madden] |
15302 | We explain powers by the natures of things, but explanations end in inexplicable powers [Harré/Madden] |
15303 | Maybe a physical field qualifies as ultimate, if its nature is identical with its powers [Harré/Madden] |
9476 | If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis] |
11934 | The physical world has a feature very like mental intentionality [Molnar] |
11947 | Dispositions and external powers arise entirely from intrinsic powers in objects [Molnar] |
11952 | The Standard Model suggest that particles are entirely dispositional, and hence are powers [Molnar] |
11953 | Some powers are ungrounded, and others rest on them, and are derivative [Molnar] |
16556 | Penicillin causes nothing; the cause is what penicillin does [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
14294 | Dispositions are attacked as mere regularities of events, or place-holders for unknown properties [Mumford] |
9446 | Properties are just natural clusters of powers [Mumford] |
17996 | Powers are claimed to be basic because fundamental particles lack internal structure [Psillos] |
15127 | A categorical basis could hardly explain a disposition if it had no powers of its own [Hawthorne] |
14540 | Only real powers are fundamental [Bird, by Mumford/Anjum] |
23771 | Fundamental physics describes everything in terms of powers [Williams,NE] |
12467 | Powers come from concrete particulars, not from the laws of nature [Jacobs] |
14555 | Powers offer no more explanation of nature than laws do [Mumford/Anjum] |
22632 | Physics understands the charge of an electron as a power, not as a quality [Ingthorsson] |
23714 | Dispositional essentialism (unlike the grounding view) says only fundamental properties are powers [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |