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2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason

[general role of reason in mind and living]

34 ideas
Parmenides was much more cautious about accepting ideas than his predecessors [Simplicius on Parmenides]
     Full Idea: Parmenides would not agree with anything unless it seemed necessary, whereas his predecessors used to come up with unsubstantiated assertions.
     From: comment on Parmenides (fragments/reports [c.474 BCE], A28) by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 9.116.2-
     A reaction: from Eudemus
It is foolish to quarrel with the mind's own reasoning processes [Plato]
     Full Idea: When the soul quarrels with knowledge or opinion or reason, its natural ruling principles, you have there what I call 'folly'.
     From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 689b)
When questions are doubtful we should concentrate not on objects but on ideas of the intellect [Plato]
     Full Idea: Doubtful questions should not be discussed in terms of visible objects or in relation to them, but only with reference to ideas conceived by the intellect.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 135e)
There is pure deductive reasoning, and explanatory demonstration reasoning [Aristotle, by Politis]
     Full Idea: Aristotle distinguishes between deductive reasoning (sullogismos) and demonstration (apodeixis). All demonstration is deductive reasoning, but not all deductive reasoning is demonstration.
     From: report of Aristotle (Posterior Analytics [c.327 BCE], Bk I.2) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 5.3
     A reaction: This sounds not far off the distinction between single-turnstile (formal proof) and double-turnstile (semantic consequence). Politis says, though, that the key point is the demonstration is explanatory.
Desired responsible actions result either from rational or from irrational desire [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: And of responsible actions, some are done through habit, some through desire, and of these some through rational and some through irrational desire.
     From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1369a1)
     A reaction: Identified by Michael Frede, to illustrate reason having its own distinctive type of desire ('Boulesis'). I suspect that the rational desires are the morally good desires.
Didactic argument starts from the principles of the subject, not from the opinions of the learner [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Didactic arguments are those which reason from the principles appropriate to each branch of learning and not from the opinions of the answerer (for he who is learning must take things on trust).
     From: Aristotle (Sophistical Refutations [c.331 BCE], 165b01)
We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.10)
Good reasons must give way to better [Shakespeare]
     Full Idea: Good reasons must of force give way to better.
     From: William Shakespeare (Julius Caesar [1599], 4.3.205)
     A reaction: [Brutus to Cassius] This remark is an axiom of rationality. But, of course, reasons can come in groups, and three modest reasons may compete with one very good reason.
A reason is a known truth which leads to assent to some further truth [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: A reason is a known truth whose connection with some less well-known truth leads us to give our assent to the latter.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 4.17)
     A reaction: This is plainly false, because you can have a reason for believing something, but still not give your assent to it, presumably because of counter-reasons. And a false belief could also be a reason, even to believe a truth. Tut tut.
Reason is the faculty for grasping apriori necessary truths [Leibniz, by Burge]
     Full Idea: Leibniz actually characterises reason as the faculty for apprehending priori, necessary truths.
     From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by Tyler Burge - Frege on Apriority (with ps) 2
     A reaction: No wonder it is called the Age of Reason when the claims are this grandiose.
Reason is our power of finding out true propositions [Hutcheson]
     Full Idea: Reason is our power of finding out true propositions.
     From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 4: The Moral Sense [1728], §I)
     A reaction: This strikes me as a very good definition. I don't see how you can define reason without mentioning truth, and you can't believe in reason if you don't believe in truth. The concept of reason entails the concept of a good reason.
In reason things can only begin if they are voluntary [Kant]
     Full Idea: In reason itself nothing begins, but as the unconditioned condition of very voluntary action.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B582/A554)
     A reaction: Kant's way of saying that free will is essential for pure reason. I can't quite digest 'pure' reason, but it is undeniable that rational processes seem to have rules of their own, and to arise entirely from the world of ideas, and not from the physical.
The boundaries of reason can only be determined a priori [Kant]
     Full Idea: The determination of the boundaries of our reason can only take place in accordance with a priori grounds
     From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B786/A758)
     A reaction: I suspect that this is right, and is a truth of huge importance for philosophy. If we experience limitations in our reason (a not unusual experience!) this could never show that the boundary was necessary. This supports a minimal rationalism.
If I know the earth is a sphere, and I am on it, I can work out its area from a small part [Kant]
     Full Idea: If I know that the earth is a sphere, and its surface the surface of a sphere, then from a small part of the latter I can know the diameter, and hence the complete boundary, and in accordance with a priori principles.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B787/A757)
     A reaction: A nice example, though it may be optimistic in its assumption that you can know you are on a sphere rather than an egg-shape. I agree with Kant, but speculative metaphysics should always be accompanied by humility and health warnings.
Philosophers should not offer multiple proofs - suggesting the weakness of each of them [Kant]
     Full Idea: It is a highly unphilosophic expedient to resort to a number of proofs for one and the same proposition, consoling oneself that the multitude of reasons makes up for the inadequacy of any one of them taken by itself.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 403 Intro XIII)
     A reaction: This makes philosophical proofs sound very mathematical in character, whereas I think most reasons for a proposition given in philosophy are more like evidence, which can clearly accumulate in a rational way. Some maths proofs are better than others.
The world seems rational to those who look at it rationally [Hegel]
     Full Idea: To him who looks at the world rationally, the world looks rationally back; the two exist in reciprocal relationship.
     From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Lectures on the Philosophy of (World) History [1837], Intro p.29), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 07.4
     A reaction: This is a nice variation on the stoic idea that nature is essentially rational. If we are capable of rationality, then nature has made us that way. Romantics seem to prefer looking at nature less rationally, so what do they see in nature?
Highest reason is aesthetic, and truth and good are subordinate to beauty [Hegel]
     Full Idea: I am now convinced that the highest act of reason, which embraces all ideas, is an aesthetic act, and that truth and goodness are brothers only in beauty.
     From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Oldest System Prog. of German Idealism [1796]), quoted by Simon Critchley - Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro Append
     A reaction: This seems to be the distinctive value framework of the romantic movement and the nineteenth century, where art is destined to replace religion. However, Plato in the Symposium is an interesting ally. Aim for beauty, and the rest follows?
For clear questions posed by reason, reason can also find clear answers [Gödel]
     Full Idea: I uphold the belief that for clear questions posed by reason, reason can also find clear answers.
     From: Kurt Gödel (works [1930]), quoted by Peter Koellner - On the Question of Absolute Undecidability 1.5
     A reaction: [written in 1961] This contradicts the implication normally taken from his much earlier Incompleteness Theorems.
Reason is actually passions, guided by perspicacious reflection [Solomon]
     Full Idea: What is called 'reason' is the passions enlightened, 'illuminated' by reflection and supported by a perspicacious deliberation that the emotions in their urgency normally excluded.
     From: Robert C. Solomon (The Passions [1976], Intro.4)
     A reaction: To suggest that reason more or less is emotions strikes me as missing the point of 'perspicacious', which takes in facts outside our emotional world. We excitedly climb a cliff, then stop when we see the rocks are crumbling.
Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity [Searle]
     Full Idea: We must distinguish between entailment and validity as logical relations on the one hand, and inferring as a voluntary human activity on the other.
     From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.1.II)
Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason [Searle]
     Full Idea: Theoretical reason is typically a matter of accepting a conclusion or hypothesis on the basis of argument or evidence, and is thus a special case of practical reason.
     From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.VII)
The rules of reasoning are not the rules of logic [Harman]
     Full Idea: Rules of deduction are rules of deductive argument; they are not rules of inference or reasoning.
     From: Gilbert Harman (Change in View: Principles of Reasoning [1986], 1)
     A reaction: And I have often noticed that good philosophing reasoners and good logicians are frequently not the same people.
It is a principle of reasoning not to clutter your mind with trivialities [Harman]
     Full Idea: I am assuming the following principle: Clutter Avoidance - in reasoning, one should not clutter one's mind with trivialities.
     From: Gilbert Harman (Change in View: Principles of Reasoning [1986], 2)
     A reaction: I like Harman's interest in the psychology of reasoning. In the world of Frege, it is taboo to talk about psychology.
If there is a great cost to avoiding inconsistency, we learn to reason our way around it [Harman]
     Full Idea: We sometimes discover our views are inconsistent and do not know how to revise them in order to avoid inconsistency without great cost. The best response may be to keep the inconsistency and try to avoid inferences that exploit it.
     From: Gilbert Harman (Change in View: Principles of Reasoning [1986], 2)
     A reaction: Any decent philosopher should face this dilemma regularly. I assume non-philosophers don't compare the different compartments of their beliefs very much. Students of non-monotonic logics are trying to formalise such thinking.
Logic has little relevance to reasoning, except when logical conclusions are immediate [Harman]
     Full Idea: Although logic does not seem specially relevant to reasoning, immediate implication and immediate inconsistency do seem important for reasoning.
     From: Gilbert Harman (Change in View: Principles of Reasoning [1986], 2)
     A reaction: Ordinary thinkers can't possibly track complex logical implications, so we have obviously developed strategies for coping. I assume formal logic is contructed from the basic ingredients of the immediate and obvious implications, such as modus ponens.
You can be rational with undetected or minor inconsistencies [Harman]
     Full Idea: Rationality doesn't require consistency, because you can be rational despite undetected inconsistencies in beliefs, and it isn't always rational to respond to a discovery of inconsistency by dropping everything in favour of eliminating that inconsistency.
     From: Gilbert Harman (Rationality [1995], 1.2)
     A reaction: This strikes me as being correct, and is (I am beginning to realise) a vital contribution made to our understanding by pragmatism. European thinking has been too keen on logic as the model of good reasoning.
Inference is never a conscious process [Harman]
     Full Idea: Inference is never a conscious process.
     From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 11.2)
The early philosophers thought that reason has its own needs and desires [Frede,M]
     Full Idea: It is part of the notion of reason according to these philosophers [Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Stoics] that reason has its own needs and desires.
     From: Michael Frede (Intro to 'Rationality in Greek Thought' [1996], p.5)
     A reaction: This sounds as if reason is treated as a separate person within a person. Anyone solving a logical puzzle feels that reason has its own compulsion. 'Boulesis' is the desire characteristic of reason.
Many forms of reasoning, such as extrapolation and analogy, are useful but deductively invalid [Mumford]
     Full Idea: There are many forms of reasoning - extrapolation, interpolation, and other arguments from analogy - that are useful but deductively invalid.
     From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 04.4)
     A reaction: [He cites Molnar for this]
Traditionally, rational beliefs are those which are justified by reasons [Psillos]
     Full Idea: The traditional conception of Reason is that all beliefs should be justified (that is, backed up by reasons) in order to be rational.
     From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §1.6)
     A reaction: I think it is the duty of all philosophers to either defend this traditional view, or quit philosophy for some other activity. Rorty suggests hermeneutics. In a democracy, rulers should be continually required to give reasons for their decisions.
Art can make reason more all-inclusive, by articulating what seemed inexpressible [Bowie]
     Full Idea: The early German Romantics argued that art pointed to a more all-inclusive conception of reason, which can offer ways of articulating what is not conceptually accessible.
     From: Andrew Bowie (Introduction to German Philosophy [2003], 5 'Reason')
     A reaction: [This is Novalis, F.Schlegel, Schleiermacher, and Hölderlin] I'm in favour of expanding reason, to include assessment of situations and coherence, rather than just stepwise reasoning. Not sure that art 'articulates' something new.
Consistency is modal, saying propositions are consistent if they could be true together [Melia]
     Full Idea: Consistency is a modal notion: a set of propositions is consistent iff all the members of the set could be true together.
     From: Joseph Melia (Modality [2003], Ch.6)
     A reaction: This shows why Kantian ethics, for example, needs a metaphysical underpinning. Maybe Kant should have believed in the reality of Leibnizian possible worlds? An account of reason requires an account of necessity and possibility.
Rationality is threatened by fear of inconsistency, illusions of absolutes or relativism, and doubt [Fogelin]
     Full Idea: The three main threats to our rational lives are fear of inconsistency, illusions (of absolutism and relativism) and doubt.
     From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.4)
     A reaction: This is a very nice analysis of the forces that can destroy the philosopher's aspiration to the rational life. Personally I still suffer from a few illusions about the possibility of absolutes, but I may grow out of it. The other three don't bother me.
We reach 'reflective equilibrium' when intuitions and theory completely align [Fisher]
     Full Idea: A state of 'reflective equilibrium' is when our theory and our intuitions become completely aligned
     From: Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 12.IV)
     A reaction: [Rawls made this concept famous] This is a helpful concept in trying to spell out the ideal which is the dream of believers in 'pure reason' - that there is a goal in which everything comes right. The problem is when people have different intuitions!