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10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality

[all modal facts are grounded in the actual facts]

15 ideas
Nothing is stronger than necessity, which rules everything [Thales, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Necessity is the strongest of things, for it rules everything.
     From: report of Thales (fragments/reports [c.585 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 01.2.9
A perfect idea of an object shows that the object is possible [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: One mark of a perfect idea is that it shows conclusively that the object is possible.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.31)
     A reaction: Subtle but nice. My favourite example would be that the perfect idea of a bonfire on the Moon shows that it is not possible. Essence reveals necessity, as Aristotle and Kit Fine claim. A perfect idea has a single definition.
Essentialists deny possible worlds, and say possibilities are what is compatible with the actual world [Ellis]
     Full Idea: Essentialists are modal realists; ..what is really possible, they say, is what is compatible with the natures of things in this world (and this does not commit them to the existence of any world other than the actual world).
     From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.7)
     A reaction: This introduces something like 'compatibilities' into our ontology. That must rest on some kind of idea of a 'natural contradiction'. We can discuss the possibilities resulting from essences, but what are the possible variations in the essences?
Modal concepts are central to the actual world, and shouldn't need extravagant metaphysics [Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: Modal concepts are central to our understanding of the world - the actual world - and understanding them should not require extravagant metaphysical commitments.
     From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Mere Possibilities [2012], 1)
     A reaction: I agree. Personally I think powers and dispositions do the job nicely. You just have to embrace Leibniz's emphasis on the active nature of reality, and the implausible metaphysics starts to recede.
Actuality proves possibility, but that doesn't explain how it is possible [Inwagen]
     Full Idea: A proof of actuality is a proof of possibility, but that does not invariably explain the possibility whose existence it demonstrates, for we may know that a certain thing is actual (and hence possible) but have no explanation of how it could be possible.
     From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 12)
     A reaction: I like this, because my project is to see all of philosophy in terms of explanation rather than of description.
Modal realists hold that necessities and possibilities are part of the totality of facts [McFetridge]
     Full Idea: The 'modal realist' holds that part of the totality of what is the case, the totality of facts, are such things as that certain events could have happened, certain propositions are necessarily true, if this happened then that would have been the case.
     From: Ian McFetridge (Logical Necessity: Some Issues [1986], §2)
     A reaction: I am an enthusiastic modal realist. If the aim of philosophy is 'to understand' (and I take that to be the master idea of the subject) then no understanding is possible which excludes the possibilities and necessities in things.
Modality is not objects or properties, but the type of binding of objects to properties [McGinn]
     Full Idea: Modality has a special ontological category: it consists neither in objects (possible worlds theory) nor in properties (predicate modifier view), but items I have called 'modes', ..which can be hard/soft/rigid/pliable binding of objects to properties.
     From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.4)
     A reaction: As so often, McGinn is very persuasive. Essentially he is proposing that modality is adverbial. He associates the middle view with David Wiggins.
Necessity and possibility are not just necessity and possibility according to the actual world [Salmon,N]
     Full Idea: The real meanings of the simple modal terms 'necessary' and 'possible' are not the same as the concepts of actual necessity and actual possibility, necessity and possibility according to the actual world.
     From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], IV)
     A reaction: If you were an 'actualist' (who denies everything except the actual world) then you are unlikely to agree with this. In unrestricted possible worlds, being true in one world makes it possible in all worlds. So actual necessity is possible everywhere.
Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien]
     Full Idea: The possibility of your having been a playwright has nothing to do with how people are on other planets, whether in our own or in some other realm. It is only to do with you and the relevant property.
     From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 1)
     A reaction: I'm inclined to think that this simple point is conclusive disproof of possible worlds as an explanation of modality (apart from Jubien's other nice points). What we need to understand are modal properties, not other worlds.
Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien]
     Full Idea: Typical modal truths are just facts about our world, and generally facts about very small parts of it, not facts about some infinitude of complex, maximal entities.
     From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 1)
     A reaction: I think we should embrace this simple fact immediately, and drop all this nonsense about possible worlds, even if they are useful for the semantics of modal logic.
Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien]
     Full Idea: Where modal propositions may once have seemed to transcend the actual, they now seem only to transcend the concrete.
     From: Michael Jubien (Analyzing Modality [2007], 4)
     A reaction: This is because Jubien has defended a form of platonism. Personally I take modal propositions to be perceptible in the concrete world, by recognising the processes involved, not the mere static stuff.
Science is modally committed, to disposition, causation and law [Oliver]
     Full Idea: Natural science is up to its ears in modal notions because of its use of the concepts of disposition, causation and law.
     From: Alex Oliver (The Metaphysics of Properties [1996], §15)
     A reaction: This is aimed at Quine. It might be possible for an auster physicist to dispense with these concepts, by merely describing patterns of observed behaviour.
The world does not contain necessity and possibility - merely how things are [Sider]
     Full Idea: At bottom, the world is an amodal place. Necessity and possibility do not carve at the joints; ultimate reality is not 'full of threats and promises' (Goodman). The book of the world says how things are, not how they must or might be.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 12)
     A reaction: Nice to see this expressed so clearly. I find it much easier to disagree with as a result. At first blush I would say that if you haven't noticed that the world is full of threats and promises, you should wake up and smell the coffee. Actuality is active.
A state of affairs is only possible if there has been an actual substance to initiate it [Pruss]
     Full Idea: Non-actual states of affairs are possible if there actually was a substance capable of initiating a causal chain, perhaps non-deterministic, that could lead to the state of affairs that we claim is possible.
     From: Alexander R. Pruss (The Actual and the Possible [2002]), quoted by Jonathan D. Jacobs - A Powers Theory of Modality §4.2
     A reaction: This is roughly my view. There are far fewer possibilities in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in your philosophy, Horatio. Logical possibilities and fantasy possibilities are not real possibilities.
All modality is in the properties and relations of the actual world [Jacobs]
     Full Idea: Properties and the relations between them introduce modal connections in the actual world. ..This is a strong form of actualism, since all of modality is part of the fundamental fabric of the actual world.
     From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §4)
     A reaction: This is the view of modality which I find most congenial, with the notion of 'powers' giving us the conceptual framework on which to build an account.