structure for 'Knowledge Sources'    |     alphabetical list of themes    |     unexpand these ideas

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / a. Qualities in perception

[nature of the characteristics we perceive]

8 ideas
Sensible qualities can't be real if they appear different to different creatures [Democritus, by Theophrastus]
     Full Idea: As proof of the fact that sensible qualities have no real existence he points to the fact that they do not appear the same to all creatures.
     From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], A135) by Theophrastus - On the Senses 63
A 'quality' is a power to produce an idea in our minds [Locke]
     Full Idea: The power to produce any idea in our mind I call 'quality' of the subject wherein that power is.
     From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.08.08)
     A reaction: This strikes me as much the most accurate way to think of properties, but then I accept Locke's distinction between primary and secondary properties. Red is a property of brains, not of tomatoes. Tomatoes have power to cause this property.
We examine objects to determine colour; we do not introspect [Jackson]
     Full Idea: We examine objects to determine their colour; we do not introspect.
     From: Frank Jackson (From Metaphysics to Ethics [1998], Ch.3)
     A reaction: Interesting, but the theory of secondary qualities did not arise from experience, but from a theory about what is actually going on. Compare pain appearing to be in your foot.
Some say qualities are parts of things - as repeatable universals, or as particulars [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Some philosophers propose that things have their qualities by having them as parts, either as repeatable universals (Goodman), or as particulars (Donald Williams).
     From: David Lewis (Parts of Classes [1991], 2.1 n2)
     A reaction: He refers to 'qualities' rather than 'properties', presumably because this view makes them all intrinsic to the object. Is being 'handsome' a part of a person?
If properties were qualities without dispositions, they would be undetectable [Heil]
     Full Idea: A pure quality, a property altogether lacking in dispositionality, would be undetectable and would, in one obvious sense, make no difference to its possessor.
     From: John Heil (From an Ontological Point of View [2003], 11.4)
     A reaction: This seems to be a very forceful and simple reason why we cannot view properties simply as qualities of things. Heil wants properties to be dispositions and qualities; personally I would vote for them just being dispositions or powers.
Can we distinguish the way a property is from the property? [Heil]
     Full Idea: It is not clear to me that we easily distinguish ways a property is from the property itself.
     From: John Heil (From an Ontological Point of View [2003], 11.6)
     A reaction: To defend properties as qualities, he is confusing ontology and epistemology. Presumably he means by 'ways a property is' what I would prefer to call 'ways a property seems to be'. I don't believe a smell is simply what it seems to be.
Properties don't possess ways they are, because that just is the property [Heil]
     Full Idea: Objects possess properties, but I am sceptical of the idea that properties possess properties; just as a property is a way some object is, a property of a property would be a way a property is, but that is just the property itself.
     From: John Heil (From an Ontological Point of View [2003], 12.1)
     A reaction: This is quite a good defence of the idea that properties are qualities as well as dispositions. However, if we make the qualities of properties into secondary qualities, and the dispositions into primary qualities, the absurdity melts away.
Properties or qualities are essentially adjectival, not objectual [Lowe]
     Full Idea: I consider properties or qualities to be essentially adjectival rather than objectual in nature (and the same applies to relations, though they are adjectival to more than one object).
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 7.1)
     A reaction: Personally I am inclined to say that properties are either real causal powers (functions of objects?), such as being sharp, or else they are subjective ways of distinguishing things (e.g. colours). Or fictions. 'Adjectival' is too vague.