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19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference

[reference fixed by a causal link to something]

22 ideas
The standard metre in Paris is neither one metre long nor not one metre long [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: There is one thing of which one can say neither that it is one metre long, nor that it is not one metre long, and that is the standard metre in Paris.
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §050)
     A reaction: The remark which inspired Kripke's causal theory. Clearly W. is wrong, because it is one metre long, but why is it that length?
I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam]
     Full Idea: In previous papers I suggested that the reference is fixed by a test known to experts; it now seems to me that this is just a special case of my use being causally connected to an introducing event.
     From: Hilary Putnam (Explanation and Reference [1973], II C)
     A reaction: I think he was probably right the first time, and has now wandered off course.
The causal theory of reference can't distinguish just hearing a name from knowing its use [Dummett]
     Full Idea: The causal theory of reference, in a full-blown form, makes it impossible to distinguish between knowing the use of a proper name and simply having heard the name and recognising it as a name.
     From: Michael Dummett (Frege's Distinction of Sense and Reference [1975], p.254)
     A reaction: None of these things are all-or-nothing. I have an inkling of how to use it once I realise it is a name. Of course you could be causally connected to a name and not even realise that it was a name, so something more is needed.
A realistic view of reference is possible for concrete objects, but not for abstract objects [Dummett, by Hale]
     Full Idea: Dummett claims that a realistic conception of reference can be sustained for concrete objects (possible objects of ostension), but breaks down for (putative) names of (pure) abstract objects.
     From: report of Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) by Bob Hale - Abstract Objects Ch.3.II
     A reaction: An extremely hard claim to evaluate, because a case must first be made for abstract objects which are fundamentally different in kind. Realistic reference must certainly deal with these hard cases. Field rejects Dummett's abstract points.
The important cause is not between dubbing and current use, but between the item and the speaker's information [Evans on Kripke]
     Full Idea: Kripke has mislocated the important causal relation, which lies between the item's states and doings and the speaker's body of information - not between the item's being dubbed with a name and the speaker's contemporary use of it.
     From: comment on Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970]) by Gareth Evans - The Causal Theory of Names §I
     A reaction: This feels sort of right. I sympathise with the much more social view of matters like reference, which grows out of Wittgenstein's anti-private language claims. I'm not sure where 'causation' come into Evans's picture.
We may refer through a causal chain, but still change what is referred to [Kripke]
     Full Idea: There may be a causal chain from our use of the term 'Santa Claus' to a certain historical saint, but still children, when they use this, by this time probably do not refer to that saint.
     From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 2)
     A reaction: This is quite a significant concession to critics of the causal theory. I take it that community agreement is much more significant for reference than the actual causal chain, which may be riddled with errors from beginning to end, and so isn't causal.
The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans]
     Full Idea: A necessary (but not sufficient) condition for x's being the intended referent of S's use of a name is that x should be the source of the causal origin of the body of information that S has associated with the name.
     From: Gareth Evans (The Causal Theory of Names [1973], §I)
     A reaction: This is Evans's adaptation of Kripke's causal theory of names. This cries out for a counterexample. I say something about General Montgomery, having just listened to 'Monty's Double' give a talk, believing it was Montgomery?
Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans]
     Full Idea: In general, a speaker intends to refer to the item that is the dominant source of his associated body of information.
     From: Gareth Evans (The Causal Theory of Names [1973], §II)
     A reaction: This sounds like a theory of reference which fully preserves the spirit of traditional empiricism. Speakers refer to ideas which connect to the source of their underlying impressions.
Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Kaplan notes that the causal theory of reference can be understood in two quite different ways, as part of the semantics (involving descriptions of causal processes), or as metasemantics, explaining why a term has the referent it does.
     From: report of David Kaplan (Dthat [1970]) by Jonathan Schaffer - Deflationary Metaontology of Thomasson 1
     A reaction: [Kaplan 'Afterthought' 1989] The theory tends to be labelled as 'direct' rather than as 'causal' these days, but causal chains are still at the heart of the story (even if more diffused socially). Nice question. Kaplan takes the meta- version as orthodox.
One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: In 'causal descriptivism' the causal story is built into the description that is the content of the name (and also incorporates a rigidifying operator to ensure that the descriptions that names abbreviate have wide scope).
     From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity [2003], 5)
     A reaction: Not very controversial, I would say, since virtually every fact about the world has a 'causal story' built into it. Must we insist on rigidity in order to have wide scope?
In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: The causal theory of reference is criticised for vagueness. Causal connections are ubiquitous, and there are obviously many individuals that are causally implicated in the speaker's use of a name, but they aren't all plausible candidates for the referent.
     From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Reference and Necessity [1997], 4)
     A reaction: This seems to be a very good objection. Among all the causal links back to some baptised object, we have to pick out the referential link, which needs a criterion.
Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard]
     Full Idea: The reference of a name in the actual world is fixed partly by invoking a set of persistence criteria which determine what thing it names.
     From: Allan Gibbard (Contingent Identity [1975], III)
     A reaction: This is offered as a modification to Kripke, to deal with the statue and clay. I fear that the 'persistence criteria' may be too vague, and too subject to possible change after the origin, to do the job required.
Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Whatever happens in special cases, causal theories usually make it easy to be wrong about the thing we refer to.
     From: David Lewis (Putnam's Paradox [1984], 'What Is')
     A reaction: I suppose the point of this is that there are no checks and balances to keep reference in focus, but just a requirement to keep connected to an increasingly attenuated causal chain.
A new usage of a name could arise from a mistaken baptism of nothing [Sainsbury]
     Full Idea: A baptism which, perhaps through some radical mistake, is the baptism of nothing, is as good a propagator of a new use as a baptism of an object.
     From: Mark Sainsbury (The Essence of Reference [2006], 18.3)
     A reaction: An obvious example might be the Loch Ness Monster. There is something intuitively wrong about saying that physical objects are actually part of linguistic meaning or reference. I am not a meaning!
Causal theories of reference (by 'dubbing') don't eliminate meanings in the heads of dubbers [Rey]
     Full Idea: Causal histories may have some role to play in a theory of reference, but the chain of causation requires internal characterisations at each stage, and the original dubber had one thing rather than another in mind when dubbing.
     From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 9.2.1)
     A reaction: The modern view of direct reference seems to prefer social context rather than a complete causal chain.
If meaning and reference are based on causation, then virtually everything has meaning [Rey]
     Full Idea: What is special about meaning? If meaning and reference are just the result of causal chains, almost everything will mean something, since almost everything is reliably caused by something.
     From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 9.2.2)
     A reaction: It would be insane to think that all causal events produced meanings. It is probably better not to mention causation at all when discussing meaning.
Field says reference is a causal physical relation between mental states and objects [Field,H, by Putnam]
     Full Idea: In Field's view reference is a 'physicalistic relation', i.e. a complex causal relation between words or mental representations and objects or sets of objects; it is up to physical science to discover what that physicalistic relation is.
     From: report of Hartry Field (Tarski's Theory of Truth [1972]) by Hilary Putnam - Reason, Truth and History Ch.2
     A reaction: I wouldn't hold your breath while the scientists do their job. If physicalism is right then Field is right, but physics seems no more appropriate for giving a theory of reference than it does for giving a theory of music.
Mathematical entities are causally inert, so the causal theory of reference won't work for them [Chihara]
     Full Idea: Causal theories of reference seem doomed to failure for the case of reference to mathematical entities, since such entities are evidently causally inert.
     From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 01.3)
     A reaction: Presumably you could baptise a fictional entity such as 'Polonius', and initiate a social causal chain, with a tradition of reference. You could baptise a baby in absentia.
Causal reference seems to get directly at the object, thus leaving its nature open [Sidelle]
     Full Idea: The causal theory of reference appears to give us a way to get at an object while leaving it undetermined what its essence or necessary features might be.
     From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.1)
     A reaction: This pinpoints why the direct/causal theory of reference seems to open the doors to scientific essentialism. Sidelle, of course, opposes the whole programme.
Americans are more inclined to refer causally than the Chinese are [Machery]
     Full Idea: Tests suggest that American subjects were significantly more likely than Chinese subjects to have intuitions in line with causal-historical theories of reference.
     From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 8.1.3)
     A reaction: This is an example of 'experimental philosophy' in action (of which Machery is a champion). The underlying idea is that Americans are generally more disposed to think causally than the Chinese are. So more scientific? What do the Hopi do?
How can causal theories of reference handle nonexistence claims? [Thomasson]
     Full Idea: Pure causal theories of reference have problems in handling nonexistence claims
     From: Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 02.3)
     A reaction: This is a very sound reason for shifting from a direct causal baptism view to one in which the baptism takes place by a social consensus. So there is a consensus about 'unicorns', but obviously no baptism. See Evans's 'Madagascar' example.
Pure causal theories of reference have the 'qua problem', of what sort of things is being referred to [Thomasson]
     Full Idea: Pure causal theories of reference face the 'qua problem' - that it may be radically indeterminate what the term refers to unless there is some very basic concept of what sort of thing is being referred to.
     From: Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 02.3)
     A reaction: She cites Dummett and Wiggins on this. There is an obvious problem that when I say 'look at that!' there are all sorts of conventions at work if my reference is to succeed.