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14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / f. Necessity in explanations

[explanations as revealing necessities in events]

5 ideas
To understand a phenomenon, we must understand why it is necessary, not merely contingent [Spinoza, by Cottingham]
     Full Idea: Adequate understanding of a phenomenon, for Spinoza, involves a complete understanding of its causes, and this in turn involves a dissolving of the illusion of contingency and a recognition of the necessity of its being thus and not otherwise.
     From: report of Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675]) by John Cottingham - The Rationalists p.168
     A reaction: This is the appeal of the rationalist dream. We want a god-like grasp of things, not a superficial perception of what seems to be going on.
Essentialists don't infer from some to all, but from essences to necessary behaviour [Ellis]
     Full Idea: For essentialists the problem of induction reduces to discovering what natural kinds there are, and identifying their essential problems and structures. We then know how they must behave in any world, and there is no inference from some to all.
     From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.7)
     A reaction: The obvious question is how you would determine the essences if you are not allowed to infer 'from some to all'. Personally I don't see induction as a problem, because it is self-evidently rational in a stable world. Hume was right to recommend caution.
A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen [Lewis]
     Full Idea: It is said that a good explanation ought to show that the explanandum event had to happen, given the laws and circumstances.
     From: David Lewis (Causal Explanation [1986], V)
     A reaction: I cautiously go along with this view. Given that there are necessities in nature (a long story), we should aim to reveal them. There is no higher aspiration open to us than successful explanation. Lewis says good explanations can reveal falsehoods.
An explanation shows why it was necessary that the effect occurred [Lipton]
     Full Idea: According to the 'necessity' model of explanation, an explanation shows that the phenomenon in question had to occur.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 02 'Reason')
     A reaction: [He cites Glymour 1980] Lipton objects that the sort of necessity involved is too uncertain, can't account for the 'why-regress', and doesn't fit everyday explanation, like why we abandoned the football match.
Mathematics can show why some surprising events have to occur [Colyvan]
     Full Idea: Mathematics can show that under a broad range of conditions, something initially surprising must occur (e.g. the hexagonal structure of honeycomb).
     From: Mark Colyvan (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics [2012], 6.3.2)