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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value

[what has the highest value or desirablity]

32 ideas
Righteousness is extending the unthinkable, to reveal what must be done [Mengzi (Mencius)]
     Full Idea: People all have things they will not do. To extend this reaction to that which they will do is righteousness.
     From: Mengzi (Mencius) (The Mengzi (Mencius) [c.332 BCE], 7B31), quoted by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 6.IV
     A reaction: Very nice! Kekes points out the enormous importance of unthinkable deeds. Depravity is when the unthinkable gradually begins to look possible, which is probably a social phenomenon, a creeping cancer in a culture.
No one would choose life just for activities not done for their own sake [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: If we put together all the things that are ....not done or undergone for their own sake ...no one would choose, in order to have them, to be alive rather than not.
     From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1215), quoted by Christine M. Korsgaard - Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value 8 'Finality'
     A reaction: Debatable. Roughly his question is whether you would rather be dead than be a slave, since slaves work for means, but have no ends. Aristotle would rather die, but those who surrendered in ancient battles preferred slavery.
The goal is to 'live in agreement', according to one rational consistent principle [Zeno of Citium, by Stobaeus]
     Full Idea: Zeno says the goal of life is 'living in agreement', which means living according to a single and consonant rational principle, since those who live in conflict are unhappy.
     From: report of Zeno (Citium) (fragments/reports [c.294 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 2.06a
     A reaction: If there is a 'single' principle, is it possible to state it? To live by consistent principles sets the bar incredibly high, as any professional philosopher can tell you.
Live in agreement, according to experience of natural events [Chrysippus]
     Full Idea: The goal of life is to live in agreement, which is according to experience of the things which happen by nature.
     From: Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 2.06a
     A reaction: Cleanthes added 'with nature' to Zeno's slogan, and Chyrisppus added this variation. At least it gives you some idea of what the consistent rational principle should be. You still have to assess which aspects of nature should influence us.
The goal is to live consistently with the constitution of a human being [Stoic school, by Clement]
     Full Idea: More recent stoics defined the goal as to live consistently with the constitution of a human being.
     From: report of Stoic school (fragments/reports [c.200 BCE]) by Clement - Stromates 2.21.129.6
     A reaction: This sounds more Aristotelian than the classic stoics. The obvious problem is the nasty side of human nature. At least Aristotle adds something like 'when it is functioning well, particularly in social situations'.
There is no absolute good, for even the goodness of God is goodness to us [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: There is no such thing as absolute goodness, considered without relation: for even the goodness which we apprehend in God Almighty, is his goodness to us.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (Human Nature [1640], Ch.VII.3)
     A reaction: Plato's view of goodness is much more absolute than that of religion, as he proposes the Good as the eternal underpinning of nature. I agree with Hobbes that if God is the source of goodness, that will prevent goodness from being truly absolute.
If there are different ultimate goods, there will be conflicting good actions, which is impossible [Cumberland]
     Full Idea: If there be posited different ultimate ends, whose causes are opposed to each other, then there will be truly good actions likewise opposed to each other, which is impossible.
     From: Richard Cumberland (De Legibus Naturae [1672], Ch.V.XVI)
     A reaction: A very interesting argument for there being one good rather than many, and an argument which I don't recall in any surviving Greek text. A response might be to distinguish between what is 'right' and what is 'good'. See David Ross.
What is contemplated must have a higher value than contemplation [Kant, by Korsgaard]
     Full Idea: Kant objects that the world must have a final purpose in order to be worth contemplating, so contemplation cannot be that final purpose.
     From: report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Judgement II: Teleological [1790]) by Christine M. Korsgaard - Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value 8 'Arist and'
     A reaction: That is a very good objection. If we contemplate the ordered heavens, the ordering of the heavens seems to have a greater value than our contemplation of them. The reply is that the contemplation is the final purpose being contemplated!
Only a good will can give man's being, and hence the world, a final purpose [Kant]
     Full Idea: A good will is that whereby alone [man's] being can have an absolute worth and in reference to which the being of the world can have a final purpose.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Judgement II: Teleological [1790], C3 443), quoted by Christine M. Korsgaard - Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value 8 'Kant'
     A reaction: I wish Kant gave a better account of what a 'good' will consists of. This is an awful burden to bear when you are making decisions.
The love of man is required in order to present the world as a beautiful and perfect moral whole [Kant]
     Full Idea: Love of man is required by itself, in order to present the world as a beautiful moral whole in its full perfection, even if no account is taken of advantages (of happiness).
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 458 I.II)
     A reaction: For me, this illustrates the basic problem with Kant. In the Groundwork he presents morality as arising from pure reason, deriving moral maxims from contradictions, but here we find a totally ungrounded assertion of grand traditional values.
All morality directs the will to love of others' ends, and respect for others' rights [Kant]
     Full Idea: All moral relations of rational beings, which involve a principle of the harmony of the will of one with another, can be reduced to love and respect. Love reduces one's will to another's end, and respect to another's right.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 488 II)
     A reaction: It all comes out too neat and tidy in Kant. Love doesn't merely focus on another person's 'ends', and respect should be for a lot more than another person's mere 'rights'. They'd have to be natural rights, because some societies restrict rights.
Kant may rate two things as finally valuable: having a good will, and deserving happiness [Orsi on Kant]
     Full Idea: In some interpretations it appears that for Kant two things are finally valuable: good will (unconditionally), and deserved happiness (conditionally on the value of good will).
     From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788]) by Francesco Orsi - Value Theory 2.2
     A reaction: It doesn't sound difficult to reconcile these two. Just ask 'what is required of someone to deserve happiness?'.
An autonomous agent has dignity [Würde], which has absolute worth [Kant, by Pinkard]
     Full Idea: For Kant, there is something about beings that can act autonomously that is itself of 'absolute worth', which Kant calls the 'dignity' [Würde] of each such agent.
     From: report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788]) by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 02
     A reaction: This answers my puzzle about where Kant's fundamental values come from. Surely wicked actions can be autonomous? Autonomous actions aren't thereby good actions. A 'good' will, course, whatever that is. Rational? My problem with existentialist ethics.
The good will is unconditionally good, because it is the only possible source of value [Kant, by Korsgaard]
     Full Idea: Kant argues that the good will is unconditionally good because it is the only thing able to be a source of value.
     From: report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788]) by Christine M. Korsgaard - Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value 8 'Kant'
     A reaction: The obvious worry is the circularity of resting a theory of value on identifying a 'good' will as its source.
Good or evil cannot be a thing, but only a maxim of action, making the person good or evil [Kant]
     Full Idea: If something is held to be absolutely good or evil in all respects and without qualification, it could not be a thing but only the manner of acting, i.e., it could only be the maxim of the will, and consequently the acting person himself is good or evil.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Practical Reason [1788], I.1.II)
     A reaction: It goes on to deny that pain is intrinsically evil, but his reason for the claim is not clear. Nevetheless, I think he is right. This remark is an important bridge between Enlightenment concerns with law and Greek concerns with character.
We cannot attain all the ideals of every culture, so there cannot be a perfect life [Herder, by Berlin]
     Full Idea: For Herder, we cannot attain to the highest ideals of all the centuries and all the places at once, and since we cannot do that, the whole notion of the perfect life collapses.
     From: report of Johann Gottfried Herder (works [1784]) by Isaiah Berlin - The Roots of Romanticism Ch.3
     A reaction: Herder seems to be the father of modern cultural relativism. The idea is hard to challenge, but the ideals of some cultures should be ignored, if they diminish rather than enhance the good life for all.
Will casts aside each of its temporary fulfilments, so human life has no ultimate aim [Schopenhauer, by Scruton]
     Full Idea: Since for Schopenhauer will has no intrinsic end, but breaks through all its temporary fulfilments and casts them aside as irrelevant once attained, it becomes impossible to assert that there is any ultimate aim to human activity.
     From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (The World as Will and Idea [1819]) by Roger Scruton - Short History of Modern Philosophy Ch.13
     A reaction: This sums up part of the modern anti-teleological view of life, with its notion of purposes which can only arise out of consciousnesses. Such a view leaves untouched the key question, which is "What should I will?"
All we need are the unity of justice, truth and beauty [Weil]
     Full Idea: Justice, truth, and beauty are sisters and comrades. With three such beautiful words we have no need to look for any others.
     From: Simone Weil (Human Personality [1943], p.93)
     A reaction: The embodiment of platonist values. Without the platonist ontology, I like the identification of a few core values, and have always thought that Beauty, Goodness and Truth were a well chosen trio. Swapping 'justice' for 'goodness' is interesting.
Principles are not ultimate, but arise from the necessities of human life [Foot]
     Full Idea: I don't believe in ultimate principles that must be simply affirmed or denied, but rather in an appeal to the necessities of human life.
     From: Philippa Foot (Interview with Philippa Foot [2003], p.37)
     A reaction: I agree. Humans have a strong tendency to elevate anything which they consider important into an absolute (such as the value of life, or freedom).
Do we have a concept of value, other than wanting something, or making an effort to get it? [Foot]
     Full Idea: Do we know what we mean by saying that anything has value, or even that we value it, as opposed to wanting it or being prepared to go to trouble to get it?
     From: Philippa Foot (Moral Relativism [1979], p.35)
     A reaction: Well, I value Rembrandt paintings, but have no aspiration to own one (and would refuse it if offered, because I couldn't look after it properly). And 'we' don't want to move the Taj Mahal to London. She has not expressed this good point very well.
Our criteria for evaluating how to live offer an answer to the problem [Frankfurt]
     Full Idea: Identifying the criteria to be employed in evaluating various ways of living is also tantamount to providing an answer to the question of how to live.
     From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 1.10)
     A reaction: Presumably critical reflection is still possible about those criteria, even though he implies that they just arise out of you (in a rather Nietzschean way). The fear is that critical reflection on basic criteria kills in infant in its cradle.
What is worthwhile for its own sake alone may be worth very little [Frankfurt]
     Full Idea: What is worth having or worth doing for its own sake alone may nonetheless be worth very little.
     From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 1.5)
     A reaction: That is one of my cherished notions sunk without trace! Aristotle's idea that ends are what matter, not means, always struck me as crucial. But Frankfurt is right. Collecting trivia is done for its own sake. Great tasks are performed as a means.
Maybe the unthinkable is a moral category, and considering some options is dishonourable or absurd [Williams,B]
     Full Idea: One might have the idea that the unthinkable was itself a moral category. ...Regarding certain things even as alternatives is itself something to be regarded as dishonourable or morally absurd.
     From: Bernard Williams (A Critique of Utilitarianism [1973], 2)
     A reaction: He's very tentative about this, but I think it is a powerful moral idea. See Kekes. He is particularly aiming at utilitarians, who happily assess vile possibilities.
Freedom to live according to our own conception of the good is the ultimate value [Nozick, by Kymlicka]
     Full Idea: Nozick says that the freedom to lead our lives in accordance with our own conception of the good is the ultimate value, so important that it cannot be sacrificed for other social ideals (e.g. equality of opportunity).
     From: report of Robert Nozick (Anarchy,State, and Utopia [1974]) by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) 4.2.b.ii
     A reaction: Clearly this ultimate value will not apply to children, so this view needs a sharp dislocation between children and adults. But some adults need a lot of looking after. Maybe we ALL need looking after (by one another)?
Beauty (unlike truth and goodness) is questionable as an ultimate value [Scruton]
     Full Idea: The status of beauty as an ultimate value is questionable, in the way that the status of truth and goodness are not.
     From: Roger Scruton (Beauty: a very short introduction [2011], 1)
     A reaction: We suspect that a love of beauty may be a bit parochial, where it is hard to conceive of living creatures anywhere in the cosmos who don't value the other two.
Our attitudes include what possibilities we value, and also what is allowable, and unthinkable [Kekes]
     Full Idea: The beliefs, emotions, motives, and desires that form our attitudes ...include not only what possibilities we value, but also the limits we should not transgress. ...The strongest limit is what I call 'the unthinkable'.
     From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 03.2)
     A reaction: Another chance to link to my favourite idea from Democritus! Ideally we want a theory which shows how a vision of the possibilities immediately points to the limits, and to what is unthinkable.
Unconditional commitments are our most basic convictions, saying what must never be done [Kekes]
     Full Idea: Unconditional commitments are the most basic convictions we have. They tell us what we must not do no matter what, what we regard as outrageous, horrible, beyond the pale, or, in religious language, as sacrilegious.
     From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 03.3)
     A reaction: The Aztecs should have made rather different unconditional commitments from the ones they ended up with. How do you persuade someone to make such an unconditional commitment. Abortion seems to involve huge clashes here.
Doing the unthinkable damages ourselves, so it is more basic than any value [Kekes]
     Full Idea: Doing the unthinkable causes deep, often irreparable, damage to our sense of ourselves. ...That is why the unthinkable indicates a more basic commitment than what we have to any value.
     From: John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 03.3)
     A reaction: Kekes makes the interesting claim that what is unthinkable is so basic that it doesn't even count as a value - it is more like a fact of your own nature, which is prior to your values. Not sure about that.
An end can't be an ultimate value just because it is useless! [Korsgaard]
     Full Idea: If what is final is whatever is an end but never a means, ...why should something be more valuable just because it is useless?
     From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value [1986], 8 'Finality')
     A reaction: Korsgaard is offering this as a bad reading of what Aristotle intends.
If we can't reason about value, we can reason about the unconditional source of value [Korsgaard]
     Full Idea: If you can only know what is intrinsically valuable through intuition (as Moore claims), you can still argue about what is unconditionally valuable. There must be something unconditionally valuable because there must be a source of value.
     From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value [1986], 8 'Three')
     A reaction: If you only grasped the values through intuition, does that give you enough information to infer the dependence relations between values?
Food first, then ethics [Critchley]
     Full Idea: Food first, then ethics.
     From: Simon Critchley (Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro [2001], 8857)
     A reaction: This is not a dismissal of philosophy, but a key fact which ethical philosophers must face up to. See Mr Doolittle's speech in Shaw's 'Pygmalion. It connects to the debate c.1610 about whether one is entitled to grab someone's plank to avoid drowning.
A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
     Full Idea: Many believe that final values can be extrinsic: objects which are valuable for their own sake partly thanks to their relations to other objects. ...This might depend on the value of other things...or an object's relational properties.
     From: Francesco Orsi (Value Theory [2015], 2.3)
     A reaction: It strikes me that virtually nothing (or even absolutely nothing) has final value in total isolation from other things (Moore's 'isolation test'). Values arise within a tangled network of relations. Your final value is my instrumental value.