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12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts

[a priori knowledge only arises from our concepts]

15 ideas
To name something, you must already have an idea of what it is [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: We could not give names to things, if we had not a preliminary notion of what the things were.
     From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.21
Relations of ideas are known by thought, independently from the world [Hume]
     Full Idea: Relations of Ideas are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe.
     From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], IV.I.20)
For Kant analytic knowledge needs complex concepts, but the a priori can rest on the simple [Coffa on Kant]
     Full Idea: As Kant saw it, analytic knowledge is possible only in the presence of conceptual complexity, but it should have been clear that simple concepts, unaided by intuition, are as apt as their complex counterparts to act as grounds of a priori knowledge.
     From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 1 'Analyt'
     A reaction: The point is that the concept must 'contain' something for Kant's account of what is analytic. This seems to be a very important thought for those who think the a priori is entirely analytic.
With large numbers it is obvious that we could never find the sum by analysing the concepts [Kant]
     Full Idea: It is clearer that all arithmetical propositions are synthetic if we take larger numbers, for it is then clear that, twist and turn our concepts as we will, without help from intuition we could never find the sum by means of the mere analysis of concepts.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B016)
     A reaction: I don't see this. Obviously we may not know the name of the number which is the answer. We must analyse 'plus' as well as the component numbers. How can it be synthetic if no experience is involved?
A priori intuitions can only concern the objects of our senses [Kant]
     Full Idea: Intuitions which are possible a priori can never concern any other things than objects of our senses.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic [1781], 283)
     A reaction: Given the Kantian idea that what is known a priori will also be necessary, we might have had great hopes for big-time metaphysics, but this idea cuts it down to size. Personally, I don't think we are totally imprisoned in the phenomena.
All a priori knowledge deals with the relations of universals [Russell]
     Full Idea: All a priori knowledge deals with the relations of universals.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.10)
     A reaction: A nice bold proposition, and remarkably Platonic for a famous empiricist. But then a priori knowledge of particulars sounds unlikely.
We can know some general propositions by universals, when no instance can be given [Russell]
     Full Idea: The general proposition 'All products of two integers, which never have been and never will be thought of by any human being, are over 100' is undeniably true, and yet we can never give an instance of it; ..only a knowledge of the universals is required.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.10)
     A reaction: A nice example which it seems to be impossible to contradict. But maybe we can explain our knowledge of it in terms of rules, instead of mentioning universals. Can a rule be stated without recourse to universals? Sounds unlikely.
We explain away a priori knowledge, not as directly empirical, but as indirectly holistically empirical [Devitt]
     Full Idea: We have no need to turn to an a priori explanation of our knowledge of mathematics and logic. Our intuitions that this knowledge is not justified in some direct empirical way is preserved. It is justified in an indirect holistic way.
     From: Michael Devitt (There is no a Priori [2005], §2)
     A reaction: I think this is roughly the right story, but the only way it will work is if we have some sort of theory of abstraction, which gets us up the ladder of generalisations to the ones which, it appears, are necessarily true.
A priori knowledge is analytic - the structure of our concepts - and hence unimportant [Papineau]
     Full Idea: I am a fully paid up-naturalist, but I see no reason to deny that a priori knowledge is possible. My view is that a priori knowledge is unimportant (esp to philosophy). If there is a priori knowledge, it is analytic, true by the structure of our concepts.
     From: David Papineau (Philosophical Insignificance of A Priori Knowledge [2010], §1)
     A reaction: It is one thing to say it is the structure of our concepts, and another to infer that it is unimportant. I take the structure of our concepts to be a shadow cast by the structure of the world. E.g. the structure of numbers reveals the world.
Knowledge is a priori if the experience giving you the concepts thus gives you the knowledge [Kitcher]
     Full Idea: Knowledge is independent of experience if any experience which would enable us to acquire the concepts involved would enable us to have the knowledge.
     From: Philip Kitcher (The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge [1984], 01.3)
     A reaction: This is the 'conceptualist' view of a priori knowledge, which Kitcher goes on to attack, preferring a 'constructivist' view. The formula here shows that we can't divorce experience entirely from a priori thought. I find conceptualism a congenial view.
Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich]
     Full Idea: A priori knowledge of logic and mathematics cannot derive from meanings or concepts, because someone may possess such concepts, and yet disagree with us about them.
     From: Paul Horwich (Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority [2000], §12)
     A reaction: A good argument. The thing to focus on is not whether such ideas are a priori, but whether they are knowledge. I think we should employ the word 'intuition' for a priori candidates for knowledge, and demand further justification for actual knowledge.
If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich]
     Full Idea: If we stipulate the meaning of 'the number of x's' so that it makes Hume's Principle true, we must accept Hume's Principle. But a precondition for this stipulation is that Hume's Principle be accepted a priori.
     From: Paul Horwich (Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority [2000], §9)
     A reaction: Yet another modern Quinean argument that all attempts at defining things are circular. I am beginning to think that the only a priori knowledge we have is of when a group of ideas is coherent. Calling it 'intuition' might be more accurate.
Red and green being exclusive colours seems to be rationally graspable but not analytic [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: The proposition that nothing is red and green all over at once is not analytic, but it is rationally graspable, so it seems to be an a priori synthetic proposition.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], IV p.100)
The concepts needed for a priori thought may come from experience [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: I may well need experience to acquire the concepts needed for knowledge of the a priori, such as the concept of a colour.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], IV p.103)
Examining accurate, justified or grounded concepts brings understanding of the world [Jenkins]
     Full Idea: Examining accurate concepts can help us acquire true beliefs about the world, examining justified concepts can help us acquire justified beliefs about the world, and examining grounded concepts can help us acquire knowledge of it.
     From: Carrie Jenkins (Grounding Concepts [2008], 4.4)
     A reaction: This summarises Jenkins's empirical account of concepts, and I love it all to bits. I feel that contemporary philosophy is beginning to produce a coherent naturalistic worldview which can replace religion. Bar the rituals. We can have priests...