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22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / c. Life

[how and why we might value life itself]

10 ideas
Human beings are not majestic, either through divine origins, or through grand aims [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Formerly one tried to get a feel for the majesty of human beings by pointing backward toward their divine descent: this has now become a forbidden path. ...So now the path humanity pursues is proof of its majesty. Alas, this too leads nowhere!
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 049)
     A reaction: I love the breadth of Nietzsche's vision, both across history, and in the great scheme. He goes on to say that we are no more a 'higher order' than ants and earwigs.
In every age the wisest people have judged life to be worthless [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: In every age the wisest have passed the identical judgement on life: it is worthless.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 1.01)
     A reaction: I guess he was having a bad day. Since the whole universe is clearly 'worthless', this judgement must in some sense be correct. But I love my books.
The value of life cannot be estimated [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: The value of life cannot be estimated.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 1.02)
     A reaction: Military leaders apparently judge that the death of one of their own soldiers is worth between 12 and 20 enemy deaths (so history suggests). How about ransom money?
A philosopher fails in wisdom if he thinks the value of life is a problem [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: For a philosopher to see a problem in the value of life thus even constitutes an objection to him, a question-mark as to his wisdom, a piece of unwisdom.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 1.02)
Value judgements about life can never be true [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Judgements, value judgements concerning life, for or against it, can in the last resort never be true.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 1.02)
     A reaction: I suppose this is in the same spirit as judging whether celery tastes nice. Are you for or against the Moon?
To evaluate life one must know it, but also be situated outside of it [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: One would have to be situated outside life ....[and yet know it thoroughly] ....to be permitted to touch on the problem of the value of life at all.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 4.5)
When we establish values, that is life itself establishing them, through us [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: When we speak of values we do so under the inspiration and from the perspective of life: life itself evalutes through us when we establish values
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 4.5)
     A reaction: I love Nietzsche's ideas about the source of values, and his remarks about the value of life. Other thinkers sound so simplistic in comparison.
The sacred in every human is their expectation of good rather than evil [Weil]
     Full Idea: At the bottom of every human heart …there is something that goes on indomitably expecting, in the teeth of all crimes committed, suffered and witnessed, that good and not evil will be done to him. It is this above all that is sacred in every human being.
     From: Simone Weil (Human Personality [1943], p.71)
     A reaction: I'm thinking that this expectation may come from having at least one loving parent, and failing that there are people who have no such expectation as adults. Simone obviously thinks the hope runs deeper than that.
The sanctity of a human life depends either on being of our species, or on being a person [Singer]
     Full Idea: The doctrine of the sanctity of human life has two separate claims, one that there is a special value in the life of a member of our species, and the other that there is a special value in the life of a person.
     From: Peter Singer (Practical Ethics [1979], 04)
What matters is not intrinsic value of life or rights, but worthwhile and desired life, and avoidance of pain [Glover]
     Full Idea: It is not wrong to kill because of the intrinsic value of life or consciousness, or because people have a right to life, but because we shouldn't reduce worthwhile life, or thwart someone's desire to live, or inflict fear or pain.
     From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §8.1)
     A reaction: This is a utilitarian view. It is not clear how we decide 'worthwhile' without a notion of intrinsic value. It is unclear why this desire is respected if many other desires are not.