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3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers

[supporting the idea that all truths have truthmakers]

8 ideas
Truth-thinking does not make it so; it being so is what makes it true [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It is not on account of our truly thinking that you are white that you are white; rather it is on account of your being white that we who assert as much are telling the truth.
     From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1051b10)
     A reaction: Some philosophers say this makes truth a derivative property, and is central to truth-maker theories. Kit Fine claims the reverse - that things exist because of the truths - but I don't really understand that (or agree with it).
The truth or falsehood of a belief depends upon a fact to which the belief 'refers' [Russell]
     Full Idea: I take it as evident that the truth or falsehood of a belief depends upon a fact to which the belief 'refers'.
     From: Bertrand Russell (On Propositions: What they are, and Meaning [1919], p.285)
     A reaction: A nice bold commitment to a controversial idea. The traditional objection is to ask how you are going to formulate the 'facts' except in terms of more beliefs, so you ending up comparing beliefs. Facts are a metaphysical commitment, not an acquaintance.
We want to know what makes sentences true, rather than defining 'true' [McFetridge]
     Full Idea: The generalisation 'What makes a (any) sentence true?' is not a request for definitions of 'true' (the concept), but rather requests for (partial) explanations of why certain particular sentences are true.
     From: Ian McFetridge (Truth, Correspondence, Explanation and Knowledge [1977], II)
     A reaction: McFetridge is responding to the shortcomings of Tarski's account of truth. The mystery seems to be why some of our representations of the world are 'successful', and others are not.
Philosophers of the past took the truthmaking idea for granted [Heil]
     Full Idea: For millenia, philosophers operated with an implicit conception of truthmaking, a conception that remained unarticulated only because it was part of the very fabric of philosophy.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 07.2)
     A reaction: Presumably it is an advance that we have brought it out into the open, and subjected it to critical study. Does Heil want us to return to it being unquestioned? I like truthmaking, but that can't be right.
Truth and falsehood must track what does or doesn't exist [Bigelow]
     Full Idea: If something is true, then it would not be possible for it to be false unless either certain things were to exist which don't, or else certain things had not existed which do.
     From: John Bigelow (The Reality of Numbers [1988], 19)
     A reaction: This is described by Rami as Bigelow's 'famous' formulation of the idea that 'truth supervenes on being' in a general way. An immediate question would be about fictions. Is Malvolio a stupid man, given that he doesn't exist? We must stretch 'exist'.
Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truth-makers [MacBride]
     Full Idea: For Martin the fatal error of phenomenalists was their inability to supply credible truth-makers for truths about unobserved objects; the same error afflicted Ryle's behaviourism, ...and Prior's Presentism (for past-tensed and future-tensed truths).
     From: Fraser MacBride (Truthmakers [2013], 3.1)
     A reaction: This seems to be the original motivation for the modern rise of the truthmaker idea. Personally I find 'Napoleon won at Austerlitz' is a perfectly good past-tensed truthmaker which is compatible with presentism. Truth-making is an excellent challenge.
There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve [Rami]
     Full Idea: It is claimed that truth-makers explain universals, or ontological commitment, or commitment to realism, or to the correspondence theory of truth, or to falsify behaviourism or phenomenalism.
     From: Adolph Rami (Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making [2009], 04)
     A reaction: [compressed] This expands the view that truth-making is based on its explanatory power, rather than on its intuitive correctness. I take the theory to presuppose realism. I don't believe in universals. It marginalises correspondence. Commitment is good!
The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal [Rami]
     Full Idea: The two strategies for justifying the truth-maker principle are that it has an explanatory role (for certain philosophical problems and theses), or that it captures the best philosophical intuition of the situation.
     From: Adolph Rami (Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making [2009], 04)
     A reaction: I would go for 'intuitive', but not in the sense of a pure intuition, but with 'intuitive' as a shorthand for overall coherence. To me the appeal of truth-maker is its place in a naturalistic view of reality. I love explanation, but not here.