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18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / b. Concepts in philosophy

[how philosophers tend to see concepts]

5 ideas
Philosophy should merely give necessary and sufficient conditions for concept possession [Peacocke, by Machery]
     Full Idea: Peacocke's 'Simple Account' says philosophers should determine the necessary and sufficient conditions for possessing a concept, and psychologists should explain how the human mind meets these conditions.
     From: report of Christopher Peacocke (A Study of Concepts [1992]) by Edouard Machery - Doing Without Concepts 2
     A reaction: One can't restrict philosophy so easily. Psychologists could do that job themselves, and dump philosophy. Philosophy is interested in the role of concepts in meaning, experience and judgement. If psychologists can contribute to philosophy, fine.
Peacocke's account of possession of a concept depends on one view of counterfactuals [Peacocke, by Machery]
     Full Idea: Peacocke's method for discovering the possession conditions of concepts is committed to a specific account of counterfactual judgements - the Simulation Model (judgements we'd make if the antecedent were actual).
     From: report of Christopher Peacocke (A Study of Concepts [1992]) by Edouard Machery - Doing Without Concepts 2.3.4
     A reaction: Machery concludes that the Simulation Model is incorrect. This appears to be Edgington's theory of conditionals, though Machery doesn't mention her.
Peacocke's account separates psychology from philosophy, and is very sketchy [Machery on Peacocke]
     Full Idea: Peacocke's Simple Account fails to connect the psychology and philosophy of concepts, it subordinates psychology to specific field of philosophy, it is committed to analytic/synthetic, and (most important) its method is very sketchy.
     From: comment on Christopher Peacocke (A Study of Concepts [1992]) by Edouard Machery - Doing Without Concepts 2.3.5
     A reaction: Machery says Peacocke proposes a research programme, and he is not surprised that no one has every followed. Machery is a well-known champion of 'experimental philosophy', makes philosophy respond to the psychology.
In the philosophy of psychology, concepts are usually introduced as constituents of thoughts [Machery]
     Full Idea: In the philosophy of psychology, concepts are usually introduced as constituents, components, or parts of thoughts.
     From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 1.4.3)
     A reaction: My instincts are against this. I take the fundamentals of concepts to be mental responses to distinct individual items in the world. Thought builds up from that. He says psychologists themselves don't see it this way. Influence of Frege.
In philosophy theories of concepts explain how our propositional attitudes have content [Machery]
     Full Idea: A philosophical theory of concepts is a semantic theory for our propositional attitudes: it explains how our thoughts can have the content they have.
     From: Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 2.1.2)
     A reaction: I suppose this is what I am interested in. I want to know in what way concepts form a bridge between content and world. I am more interested in the propositions, and less interested in our attitudes towards them.