18563
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By 'concept' psychologists mean various sorts of representation or structure
[Machery]
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Full Idea:
Psychologists use 'concept' interchangeably with 'mental representation', 'category representation', 'knowledge representation', 'knowledge structure', 'semantic representation', and 'conceptual structures'.
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From:
Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], 1.1)
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A reaction:
[Machery gives references for each of these] Machery is moving in to attack these, but we look to psychologists to give some sort of account of what a concept might consist of, such that it could be implemented by neurons.
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18558
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Concept theorists examine their knowledge, format, processes, acquisition and location
[Machery]
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Full Idea:
Psychological theories of concepts try to describe the knowledge stored in concepts, the format of concepts, the cognitive processes that use the concepts, the acquisition of concepts, and the localization of concepts in the brain.
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From:
Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], Intro)
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A reaction:
I suppose it would the first two that are of central interest. What individuates a concept (its 'format') and what are the contents of a concept. The word 'stored' seems to imply a mental files view.
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18557
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Psychologists treat concepts as long-term knowledge bodies which lead to judgements
[Machery]
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Full Idea:
In psychology, concepts are characterized as those bodies of knowledge that are stored in long-term memory and used most higher cognitive competences when these processes result in judgements.
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From:
Edouard Machery (Doing Without Concepts [2009], Intro)
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A reaction:
Machery mounts an attack on this idea. I like the 'mental files' idea, where a concept starts as a label, and then acquires core knowledge, and then further information. The 'concept' is probably no more than a label, and minimal starter information.
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