18620
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Combinatorial possibility relies on what actually exists (even over time), but there could be more
[Mumford]
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Full Idea:
Can combinatorial possibility deliver enough possibilities? It uses the existing elements, but there might have been one more particular or one more property. Even extended over time, the elements seem finite, yet there could have been more.
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From:
Stephen Mumford (Metaphysics: a very short introduction [2012], 8)
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A reaction:
[compressed] One objection is that the theory allows too much, and now the objection is that it allows too little. Both objections are correct, so that's the end of that. But I admire the attempt to base modality on actuality.
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18855
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Combinatorial theories of possibility assume the principles of combination don't change across worlds
[Rosen]
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Full Idea:
Combinatorial theories of possibility take it for granted ....that possible worlds in general share a syntax, as it were, differing only in the constituents from which they are generated, or in the particular manner of their arrangements.
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From:
Gideon Rosen (The Limits of Contingency [2006], 08)
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A reaction:
For instance, it might assume that every world has 'objects', to which 'properties' and 'relations' can be attached, or to which 'functions' can apply.
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