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3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth

[truth as the aim of enquiry]

24 ideas
Delusion and truth differ in their life functions [Novalis]
Truth is the opinion fated to be ultimately agreed by all investigators [Peirce]
Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us? [Horsten on Peirce]
Independent truth (if there is any) is the ultimate result of sufficient enquiry [Peirce]
'Holding for true' is either practical commitment, or provisional theory [Peirce]
If truth is the end of enquiry, what if it never ends, or ends prematurely? [Atkin on Peirce]
Pragmatic 'truth' is a term to cover the many varied aims of enquiry [Peirce, by Misak]
Peirce did not think a belief was true if it was useful [Peirce, by Misak]
If the hypothesis of God is widely successful, it is true [James]
True ideas are those we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify (and false otherwise) [James]
Truth is an idealisation of rational acceptability [Putnam]
Truth is rational acceptability [Putnam]
For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality [Rorty]
Maybe James was depicting the value of truth, and not its nature [Nozick]
The pragmatist does not really have a theory of truth [Scruton]
Radical pragmatists abandon the notion of truth [Stich, by Lowe]
Does the pragmatic theory of meaning support objective truth, or make it impossible? [Macbeth]
The pragmatic theory of truth is relative; useful for group A can be useless for group B [Horsten]
For pragmatists the loftiest idea of truth is just a feature of what remains forever assertible [Misak]
'True' is used for emphasis, clarity, assertion, comparison, objectivity, meaning, negation, consequence... [Misak]
Truth makes disagreements matter, or worth settling [Misak]
'That's true' doesn't just refer back to a sentence, but implies sustained evidence for it [Misak]
Truth isn't a grand elusive property, if it is just the aim of our assertions and inquiries [Misak]
Truth is proper assertion, but that has varying standards [Misak]