21673
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There are simple and complex facts; the latter depend on further facts
[Chrysippus, by Cicero]
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Full Idea:
Chrysippus says there are two classes of facts, simple and complex. An instance of a simple fact is 'Socrates will die at a given date', ...but 'Milo will wrestle at Olympia' is a complex statement, because there can be no wrestling without an opponent.
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From:
report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 13.30
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A reaction:
We might say that there are atomic and complex facts, but our atomic facts tend to be much simpler, usually just saying some object has some property.
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18376
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Russell asserts atomic, existential, negative and general facts
[Russell, by Armstrong]
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Full Idea:
Russell argues for atomic facts, and also for existential facts, negative facts and general facts.
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From:
report of Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918]) by David M. Armstrong - Truth and Truthmakers 05.1
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A reaction:
Armstrong says he overdoes it. I would even add disjunctive facts, which Russell rejects. 'Rain or snow will ruin the cricket match'. Rain can make that true, but it is a disjunctive fact about the match.
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15201
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That Queen Anne is dead is a 'general fact', not a fact about Queen Anne
[Prior,AN]
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Full Idea:
The fact that Queen Anne has been dead for some years is not, in the strict sense of 'about', a fact about Queen Anne; it is not a fact about anyone or anything - it is a general fact.
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From:
Arthur N. Prior (Changes in Events and Changes in Things [1968], p.13), quoted by Robin Le Poidevin - Past, Present and Future of Debate about Tense 1 b
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A reaction:
He distinguishes 'general facts' (states of affairs, I think) from 'individual facts', involving some specific object. General facts seem to be what are expressed by negative existential truths, such as 'there is no Loch Ness Monster'. Useful.
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8163
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Since 'no bird here' and 'no squirrel here' seem the same, we must talk of 'atomic' facts
[Dummett]
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Full Idea:
What complex of objects constitutes the fact that there is no bird on the bough, and how is that distinct from no squirrel on the bough? This drives us to see the world as composed of 'atomic' facts, making complexes into compounds, not reality itself.
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From:
Michael Dummett (Thought and Reality [1997], 1)
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A reaction:
[He cites early Wittgenstein as an example] But 'no patch of red here' (or sense-datum) seems identical to 'no patch of green here'. I suppose you could catalogue all the atomic facts, and note that red wasn't among them. But you could do that for birds.
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6075
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Facts are object-plus-extension, or property-plus-set-of-properties, or object-plus-property
[McGinn]
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Full Idea:
A fact may be an object and an extension (Quine's view), or a property and a set of properties, or an object and a property; the view I favour is the third one, which seems the most natural.
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From:
Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.3)
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A reaction:
Personally I tend to use the word 'fact' in a realist and non-linguistic way. There must be innumerable inexpressible facts, such as the single pattern made by all the particles of the universe. McGinn seems to be talking of 'atomic facts'. See Idea 6111.
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15071
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Tensed and tenseless sentences state two sorts of fact, which belong to two different 'realms' of reality
[Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
A tensed fact is stated by a tensed sentence while a tenseless fact is stated by a tenseless sentence, and they belong to two 'realms' of reality. That Socrates drank hemlock is in the temporal realm, while 2+2=4 is presumably in the timeless realm.
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From:
Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 07)
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A reaction:
Put so strongly, I suddenly find sales resistance to his proposal. All my instincts favour one realm, and I take 2+2=4 to be a highly general truth about that realm. It may be a truth of any possible realm, which would distinguish it.
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