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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact

[possible different types of fact]

12 ideas
There are simple and complex facts; the latter depend on further facts [Chrysippus, by Cicero]
     Full Idea: Chrysippus says there are two classes of facts, simple and complex. An instance of a simple fact is 'Socrates will die at a given date', ...but 'Milo will wrestle at Olympia' is a complex statement, because there can be no wrestling without an opponent.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by M. Tullius Cicero - On Fate ('De fato') 13.30
     A reaction: We might say that there are atomic and complex facts, but our atomic facts tend to be much simpler, usually just saying some object has some property.
Russell asserts atomic, existential, negative and general facts [Russell, by Armstrong]
     Full Idea: Russell argues for atomic facts, and also for existential facts, negative facts and general facts.
     From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918]) by David M. Armstrong - Truth and Truthmakers 05.1
     A reaction: Armstrong says he overdoes it. I would even add disjunctive facts, which Russell rejects. 'Rain or snow will ruin the cricket match'. Rain can make that true, but it is a disjunctive fact about the match.
There are no positive or negative facts; these are just the forms of propositions [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: There are no positive or negative facts. 'Positive' and 'negative' refer to the form of propositions, and not to the facts which verify or falsify them.
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Lectures 1930-32 (student notes) [1931], C XIII)
     A reaction: Personally I think if we are going to allow the world to be full of 'facts', then there are negative, conjunctive, disjunctive and hypothetical facts.
That Queen Anne is dead is a 'general fact', not a fact about Queen Anne [Prior,AN]
     Full Idea: The fact that Queen Anne has been dead for some years is not, in the strict sense of 'about', a fact about Queen Anne; it is not a fact about anyone or anything - it is a general fact.
     From: Arthur N. Prior (Changes in Events and Changes in Things [1968], p.13), quoted by Robin Le Poidevin - Past, Present and Future of Debate about Tense 1 b
     A reaction: He distinguishes 'general facts' (states of affairs, I think) from 'individual facts', involving some specific object. General facts seem to be what are expressed by negative existential truths, such as 'there is no Loch Ness Monster'. Useful.
Negative facts are supervenient on positive facts, suggesting they are positive facts [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: Negative facts appear to be supervenient upon the positive facts, which suggests that they are nothing more than the positive facts.
     From: David M. Armstrong (What is a Law of Nature? [1983], 10.3)
Since 'no bird here' and 'no squirrel here' seem the same, we must talk of 'atomic' facts [Dummett]
     Full Idea: What complex of objects constitutes the fact that there is no bird on the bough, and how is that distinct from no squirrel on the bough? This drives us to see the world as composed of 'atomic' facts, making complexes into compounds, not reality itself.
     From: Michael Dummett (Thought and Reality [1997], 1)
     A reaction: [He cites early Wittgenstein as an example] But 'no patch of red here' (or sense-datum) seems identical to 'no patch of green here'. I suppose you could catalogue all the atomic facts, and note that red wasn't among them. But you could do that for birds.
Facts are object-plus-extension, or property-plus-set-of-properties, or object-plus-property [McGinn]
     Full Idea: A fact may be an object and an extension (Quine's view), or a property and a set of properties, or an object and a property; the view I favour is the third one, which seems the most natural.
     From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.3)
     A reaction: Personally I tend to use the word 'fact' in a realist and non-linguistic way. There must be innumerable inexpressible facts, such as the single pattern made by all the particles of the universe. McGinn seems to be talking of 'atomic facts'. See Idea 6111.
Why can there not be disjunctive, conditional and negative facts? [Kirkham]
     Full Idea: It has been said that there are no disjunctive facts, conditional facts, or negative facts. ...but it is not at all clear why there cannot be facts of this sort.
     From: Richard L. Kirkham (Theories of Truth: a Critical Introduction [1992], 5.6)
     A reaction: I love these sorts of facts, and offer them as a naturalistic basis for logic. You probably need the world to have modal features, but I have those in the form of powers and dispositions.
Tensed and tenseless sentences state two sorts of fact, which belong to two different 'realms' of reality [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: A tensed fact is stated by a tensed sentence while a tenseless fact is stated by a tenseless sentence, and they belong to two 'realms' of reality. That Socrates drank hemlock is in the temporal realm, while 2+2=4 is presumably in the timeless realm.
     From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], 07)
     A reaction: Put so strongly, I suddenly find sales resistance to his proposal. All my instincts favour one realm, and I take 2+2=4 to be a highly general truth about that realm. It may be a truth of any possible realm, which would distinguish it.
There is only one fact - the True [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: It can be argued that if all facts are logically equivalent, then there is only one fact - the True.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 1.1)
     A reaction: [he cites Davidson's 'Causal Relations', who cites Frege] This is the sort of bizarre stuff you end up with if you start from formal logic and work out to the world, instead of vice versa.
We may believe in atomic facts, but surely not complex disjunctive ones? [Horsten]
     Full Idea: While positive and perhaps even negative atomic facts may be unproblematic, it seems excessive to commit oneself to the existence of logically complex facts such as disjunctive facts.
     From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 02.1)
     A reaction: Presumably it is hard to deny that very complex statements involving massive disjunctions can be true or false. But why does commitment to real facts have to involve a huge ontology? The ontology is just the ingredients of the fact, isn't it?
Worldly facts are obtaining states of affairs, with constituents; conceptual facts also depend on concepts [Audi,P]
     Full Idea: The 'worldly' view of facts says they are obtaining states of affairs, individuated by their constituents and their combination. On the 'conceptual' view, facts will differ if they pick out an object or property via different concepts.
     From: Paul Audi (Clarification and Defense of Grounding [2012], 3.2)
     A reaction: Might it be that conceptual differences between facts are supervenient on worldly differences (with the worldly facts in charge)?