| 10320 | If a genuine singular term needs a criterion of identity, we must exclude abstract nouns [Dummett, by Hale] |
| Full Idea: Dummett's best argument for excluding abstract nouns relies upon the entirely Fregean requirement that with any genuine singular term there must be associated a criterion of identity. | |
| From: report of Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973]) by Bob Hale - Abstract Objects Ch.2.II | |
| A reaction: This sounds a rather rigid test. Must the criteria be logically precise, or must you just have some vague idea of what you are talking about? |
| 10547 | Abstract objects can never be confronted, and need verbal phrases for reference [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: An abstract object can be referred to only by means of a verbal phrase, ...and no confrontation with an abstract object is possible. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14) | |
| A reaction: So does this mean that animals are incapable of entertaining abstract concepts? Some research suggests otherwise. Does a dog understand what a 'walk' is, without use of the word? Dummett disgracefully neglects animals in his theories. |
| 9872 | Abstract objects need the context principle, since they can't be encountered directly [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: To recognise that there is no objection in principle to abstract objects requires acknowledgement that some form of the context principle is correct, since abstract objects can neither be encountered nor presented. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Frege philosophy of mathematics [1991], Ch.16) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be an immensely important idea. I consider myself to be a philosopher of thought rather than a philosopher of language (Dummett's distinction, he being one of the latter). Thought connects to the world, but does it connect to abstracta? |
| 18213 | Abstract objects are only applicable to the world if they are impure, and connect to the physical [Field,H] |
| Full Idea: To be able to apply any postulated abstract entities to the physical world, we need impure abstact entities, e.g. functions that map physical objects into pure abstract objects. | |
| From: Hartry Field (Science without Numbers [1980], 1) | |
| A reaction: I am a fan of 'impure metaphysics', and this pinpoints my reason very nicely. |
| 18498 | Abstract objects wouldn't be very popular without the implicit idea of truthmakers [Heil] |
| Full Idea: It would be difficult to understand the popularity of 'abstract entities' - numbers, sets, propositions - in the absence of an implicit acknowledgement of the importance of truthmakers. | |
| From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 08.07) | |
| A reaction: I love Idea 18496, because it leads us towards a better account of modality, but dislike this one because it reveals that the truthmaking idea has led us to a very poor theory. Truthmaking is a good question, but not much of an answer? |
| 10315 | We can't believe in a 'whereabouts' because we ask 'what kind of object is it?' [Hale] |
| Full Idea: Onotological outrage at such objects as the 'whereabouts of the Prime Minister' derives from the fact that we seem beggared for any convincing answer to the question 'What kind of objects are they?' | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.2.II) | |
| A reaction: I go further and ask of any object 'what is it made of?' When I receive the answer that I am being silly, and that abstract objects are not 'made' of anything, I am tempted to become sarcastic, and say 'thank you - that makes it much clearer'. |
| 8915 | How we refer to abstractions is much less clear than how we refer to other things [Rosen] |
| Full Idea: It is unclear how we manage to refer determinately to abstract entities in a sense in which it is not unclear how we manage to refer determinately to other things. | |
| From: Gideon Rosen (Abstract Objects [2001], 'Way of Ex') | |
| A reaction: This is where problems of abstraction overlap with problems about reference in language. Can we have a 'baptism' account of each abstraction (even very large numbers)? Will descriptions do it? Do abstractions collapse into particulars when we refer? |