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8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals

[denial of the real existence of universals]

16 ideas
The thesis of the Form of the Good (or of anything else) is verbal and vacuous [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The thesis that there is a Form either of good or indeed of anything else is verbal and vacuous.
     From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1217b20)
     A reaction: This is clear evidence for suggesting that Aristotle is a nominalist. Elsewhere his essentialism suggests otherwise, but clearly on grumpy days he thought that universals were mere verbal conventions.
Abelard was an irrealist about virtually everything apart from concrete individuals [Abelard, by King,P]
     Full Idea: Abelard was an irrealist about universals, but also about propositions, events, times other than the present, natural kinds, relations, wholes, absolute space, hylomorphic composites, and the like. The concrete individual is enough to populate the world.
     From: report of Peter Abelard (works [1135]) by Peter King - Peter Abelard 2
     A reaction: If a Nominalist claims that 'only particulars exist', this makes him an extreme nominalist, and remarkably materialistic for his time (though he accepted the soul, as well as God).
If 'animal' is wholly present in Socrates and an ass, then 'animal' is rational and irrational [Abelard, by King,P]
     Full Idea: Abelard argued that if the universal 'animal' were completely present in both Socrates and an ass, making each wholly an animal, then the same thing, animal, will be simultaneously rational and irrational, with contraries present in the whole thing.
     From: report of Peter Abelard (works [1135]) by Peter King - Peter Abelard 2
     A reaction: If we have universals for rationality and irrationality, they can distinguish the two. But we must also say that rationality is not an aspect of animal, which seems to mean that mind isn't either. What is the essence of an animal? Not reason?
A universal is not a real feature of objects, but only a thought-object in the mind [William of Ockham]
     Full Idea: I maintain that a universal is not something real that exists in a subject [of inherence], either inside or outside the mind, but that it has being only as a thought-object in the mind.
     From: William of Ockham (Ordinatio [1320], DII Qviii prima redactio)
     A reaction: [A footnote says that William later abandoned this view] I don't see a clear distinction here between having real existence in the mind, and being a thought-object in the mind. Maybe we should say 'merely' a thought-object?
Universals are single things, and only universal in what they signify [William of Ockham]
     Full Idea: Every universal is one particular thing and it is not a universal except in its signification, in its signifying many thing.
     From: William of Ockham (Summa totius logicae [1323]), quoted by Claude Panaccio - Medieval Problem of Universals 'William'
     A reaction: Sounds as if William might have liked tropes. It seems to leave the problem unanswered (the 'ostrich' problem?). How are they able to signify in this universal way, if each thing is just distinct and particular?
The only generalities or universals are names or signs [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: Nothing is general or universal besides names or signs.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (De Corpore (Elements, First Section) [1655], 2.08.05)
     A reaction: This is the perfect motto for nominalists, among which I am inclined to include myself. Hobbes had a fabulous gift for economy of phrasing. This website is dedicated to that ideal. Reality does not contain generalities (obviously!!).
All things that exist are particulars [Locke]
     Full Idea: All things that exist are particulars.
     From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 3.03.01)
     A reaction: This slogan is the essence of nominalism, the denial that universals exist as well as particulars.
Universals do not exist, but are useful inventions of the mind, involving words or ideas [Locke]
     Full Idea: General and universal belong, not to the real existence of things, but are the inventions and creatures of the understanding, made by it for its own use, and concern only signs, whether words, or ideas.
     From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], III.3.11)
     A reaction: This places Locke as a thoroughgoing nominalist. However, while the most basic question of all is said to be 'why does anything exist?', another pretty good one is 'Why do things resemble one another?'. Maybe the universal had to come first?
Universals do not have single meaning, but attach to many different particulars [Berkeley]
     Full Idea: There is no such thing as one precise and definite signification annexed to any general name, they all signifying indifferently a great number of particular ideas.
     From: George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], Intro §18)
     A reaction: The term 'red' may be assigned to a range of colours, but we also recognise the precision of 'that red'. For 'electron', or 'three', or 'straight', the particulars are indistinguishable.
No one will think of abstractions if they only have particular ideas [Berkeley]
     Full Idea: He that knows he has no other than particular ideas, will not puzzle himself in vain to find out and conceive the abstract idea annexed to any name.
     From: George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], Intro §24)
     A reaction: A nice point against universals. Maybe gods only think in particulars. One particular on its own could never suggest a universal. How are you going to spot patterns if you don't think in universals? Maths needs patterns.
Only individuals exist [Reid]
     Full Idea: Everything that really exists is an individual.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 5: Abstraction [1785], 6)
     A reaction: Locke is the probable inspiration for this nominalist affirmation. Not sure how high temperature plasma, or the oceans of the world, fit into this. On the whole I agree with him. He is mainly rejecting abstract universals.
Commitment to universals is as arbitrary or pragmatic as the adoption of a new system of bookkeeping [Quine]
     Full Idea: One's hypothesis as to there being universals is at bottom just as arbitrary or pragmatic a matter as one's adoption of a new brand of set theory or even a new system of bookkeeping.
     From: Willard Quine (Carnap and Logical Truth [1954], x)
     A reaction: This spells out clearly the strongly pragmatist vein in Quine's thinking.
There is no entity called 'redness', and that some things are red is ultimate and irreducible [Quine]
     Full Idea: There is not any entity whatever, individual or otherwise, which is named by the word 'redness'. ...That the houses and roses and sunsets are all of them red may be taken as ultimate and irreducible.
     From: Willard Quine (On What There Is [1948], p.10)
     A reaction: This seems to invite the 'ostrich' charge (Armstrong), that there is something left over that needs explaining. If the reds are ultimate and irreducible, that seems to imply that they have no relationship at all to one another.
The One over Many problem (in predication terms) deserves to be neglected (by ostriches) [Lewis]
     Full Idea: The transformed problem of One over Many (in terms of predication, rather than sameness of type) deserves our neglect. The ostrich that will not look at it is a wise bird indeed.
     From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], '1 Ov Many')
     A reaction: This is aimed at Armstrong, and defends Quine. The remark moves Ostrich Nominalism from the category of joke to the category of respectable. I think I side with Armstrong. How is predication primitive if it has two components?
The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic [Devitt]
     Full Idea: Talk of 'particulars' and 'universals' clutters the landscape without adding to our understanding. We should rest with the basic fact that a is F.
     From: Michael Devitt ('Ostrich Nominalism' or 'Mirage Realism'? [1980], p.98)
     A reaction: Ramsey was first to challenge the basic distinction. I find the approach of Quine and Devitt unsatisfactory. We abandon explanation when it is totally hopeless, but that is usually in the face of complexity. Properties are difficult but simple.
Nominalists believe that only particulars exist [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Nominalists believe that only particulars exist.
     From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.352)
     A reaction: A neat definition. Hence they deny universals. I suspect that nominalism is incoherent. Rational thought seems easy to create with universals, impossible with just particulars. Robotics is nominalist, which is why it will fail.