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23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / a. Natural virtue

[some virtue is born in us]

5 ideas
Moral virtue is not natural, because its behaviour can be changed, unlike a falling stone [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: None of the moral virtues is engendered in us by nature, since nothing that is what it is by nature can be made to behave differently by habituation. For instance, a stone, which has a natural tendency downwards, cannot be habituated to rise.
     From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1103a19)
     A reaction: Not much of an argument. Training a flower to grow up a drainpipe is not unnatural, but then the whole notion of 'unnatural' is hard to justify these days.
We are partly responsible for our own dispositions and virtues [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Our virtues are voluntary, because we ourselves are in a sense partly responsible for our dispositions.
     From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1114b21)
     A reaction: This seems half way to what we would now call existentialism. See Aristotle's other comments on natural virtue. The opposing view is Heraclitus's remark that "character is fate".
Dispositions to virtue are born in us, but without intelligence they can be harmful [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It is universally believed that we have a disposition for justice or temperance or courage from birth, but moral qualities are acquired in another way; natural dispositions are found in children and animals, but without intelligence they can be harmful.
     From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1144b04)
     A reaction: An interesting argument, supporting the idea that moral virtue is not only teachable, but has to be taught, because it has an intellectual component.
We have a natural sense of honour [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: What faculty do you mean? - Have we not a natural sense of honour? - We have.
     From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 2.10.22)
     A reaction: This seems unlikely, given the lower status that honour now has with us, compared to two hundred years ago. But there may be a natural sense of status, and of humiliation and shame.
Good animals can survive, breed, feel characteristic pleasure and pain, and contribute to the group [Hursthouse]
     Full Idea: A good social animal is well fitted for 1) individual survival, 2) continuance of its species, 3) characteristic freedom from pain and enjoyment, and 4) good characteristic functioning of its social group.
     From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.9)
     A reaction: This feels right, but brings out the characteristic conservativism of virtue theory. A squirrel which can recite Shakespeare turns out to be immoral.