structure for 'Objects'    |     alphabetical list of themes    |     expand these ideas

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities

[essence is different from necessary properties]

22 ideas
An 'idion' belongs uniquely to a thing, but is not part of its essence [Aristotle]
Some accidental features are permanent, unless the object perishes [Hobbes]
Nothing is essential if it is in every part, and is common to everything [Spinoza]
The complete concept of an individual includes contingent properties, as well as necessary ones [Leibniz]
A necessary feature (such as air for humans) is not therefore part of the essence [Leibniz]
Essentialist sentences are not theorems of modal logic, and can even be false [Marcus (Barcan)]
'Essentially' won't replace 'necessarily' for vacuous properties like snub-nosed or self-identical [Marcus (Barcan)]
'Is essentially' has a different meaning from 'is necessarily', as they often cannot be substituted [Marcus (Barcan)]
Jones may cease to exist without some simple property, but that doesn't make it essential [Kung]
Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker]
The essence of a thing need not include everything that is necessarily true of it [Molnar]
We should not regard essentialism as just nontrivial de re necessity [Jubien]
Essence as necessary properties produces a profusion of essential properties [Fine,K, by Lowe]
The nature of singleton Socrates has him as a member, but not vice versa [Fine,K]
It is not part of the essence of Socrates that a huge array of necessary truths should hold [Fine,K]
Metaphysical necessity is a special case of essence, not vice versa [Fine,K]
We must distinguish between the identity or essence of an object, and its necessary features [Fine,K]
We must distinguish the de dicto 'must' of propositions from the de re 'must' of essence [Simons]
Necessary truths can be two-way relational, where essential truths are one-way or intrinsic [Politis]
Essences are no use in mathematics, if all mathematical truths are necessary [Mancosu]
Unlosable properties are not the same as essential properties [Rami]
Aristotelians deny that all necessary properties are essential [Pasnau]