| 14075 | Proper name in modal contexts refer obliquely, to their usual sense [Frege, by Gibbard] |
| 10424 | A Fregean proper name has a sense determining an object, instead of a concept [Frege, by Sainsbury] |
| 18773 | People may have different senses for 'Aristotle', like 'pupil of Plato' or 'teacher of Alexander' [Frege] |
| 8448 | Any object can have many different names, each with a distinct sense [Frege] |
| 10999 | Names need a means of reidentifying their referents [Bradley, by Read] |
| 10450 | Russell admitted that even names could also be used as descriptions [Russell, by Bach] |
| 14458 | Asking 'Did Homer exist?' is employing an abbreviated description [Russell] |
| 14457 | Names are really descriptions, except for a few words like 'this' and 'that' [Russell] |
| 18941 | Names don't have a sense, but are disguised definite descriptions [Russell, by Sawyer] |
| 4945 | Russell says names are not denotations, but definite descriptions in disguise [Russell, by Kripke] |
| 18942 | Russell says a name contributes a complex of properties, rather than an object [Russell, by Sawyer] |
| 7745 | Are names descriptions, if the description is unknown, false, not special, or contains names? [McCullogh on Russell] |
| 7744 | Treat description using quantifiers, and treat proper names as descriptions [Russell, by McCullogh] |
| 5386 | Proper names are really descriptions, and can be replaced by a description in a person's mind [Russell] |
| 4946 | A name is not determined by a description, but by a cluster or family [Wittgenstein, by Kripke] |
| 10925 | Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential [Quine] |
| 9182 | Ancient names like 'Obadiah' depend on tradition, not on where the name originated [Dummett] |
| 21878 | Names have a subjective aspect, especially the role of our own name [Derrida] |
| 21889 | 'I' is the perfect name, because it denotes without description [Derrida] |
| 9175 | We may fix the reference of 'Cicero' by a description, but thereafter the name is rigid [Kripke] |
| 4951 | A bundle of qualities is a collection of abstractions, so it can't be a particular [Kripke] |
| 17031 | A name can still refer even if it satisfies none of its well-known descriptions [Kripke] |
| 7746 | We don't normally think of names as having senses (e.g. we don't give definitions of them) [Searle] |
| 7747 | How can a proper name be correlated with its object if it hasn't got a sense? [Searle] |
| 7748 | 'Aristotle' means more than just 'an object that was christened "Aristotle"' [Searle] |
| 7749 | Reference for proper names presupposes a set of uniquely referring descriptions [Searle] |
| 7750 | Proper names are logically connected with their characteristics, in a loose way [Searle] |
| 5829 | We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP] |
| 5830 | The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP] |
| 10452 | Proper names can be non-referential - even predicate as well as attributive uses [Bach] |
| 15599 | Cicero/Cicero and Cicero/Tully may differ in relationship, despite being semantically the same [Fine,K] |
| 16216 | Part of the sense of a proper name is a criterion of the thing's identity [Hawley] |
| 9455 | Maybe proper names have the content of fixing a thing's category [Bealer] |