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23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism

[there are no rules, so we must attend to details]

17 ideas
It is not universals we must perceive for virtue, but particulars, seen as intrinsically good [Aristotle, by Achtenberg]
     Full Idea: Aristotle believes cognition of particulars is more important for virtue than cognition of universals, ..and I would add that it is cognition not just of particulars, but of their value, that is, perception of them as good or beautiful.
     From: report of Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE]) by Deborah Achtenberg - Cognition of Value in Aristotle's Ethics Intro
     A reaction: This gets quickly to the heart of the problem, which is what fact about the particular is perceived which makes it good. Utilitarians are queueing up to answer this question. Interesting, though.
Actions concern particular cases, and rules must fit the cases, not the other way round [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: When we are discussing actions, although general statements have a wider application, particular statements are closer to the truth. This is because actions are concerned with particular facts, and theories must be brought into harmony with these.
     From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1107a29)
     A reaction: This implies criticism of Kant's whole theory, suggesting that there cannot be a universal law for most given situations. I take Aristotle's view to be (in modern terms) that a key virtue is sensitivity, taken as acute awareness of detail in a situation.
We cannot properly judge by rules, because blame depends on perception of particulars [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It is not easy to define by rule how, and how far, a person may go wrong before he incurs blame; because this depends upon particular circumstances, and the decision lies with our perception.
     From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1126b04)
     A reaction: This is a key objection to Kantian approaches to morality. Aristotle does not flatly deny the role of rules (indeed, he is a great endorser of the law), but this shows why virtues of character are a better guide than rules can ever be.
All human ills result from failure to apply preconceptions to particular cases [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: The cause of all human ills is that people are incapable of applying their general preconceptions to particular cases.
     From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 4.01.42)
     A reaction: I'm not sure whether 'preconceptions' is meant pejoratively (as unthinking, and opposed to true principles). This sounds like modern particularism (e.g. Jonathan Dancy) to the letter.
Moralities extravagantly address themselves to 'all', by falsely generalising [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: All moralities are baroque and unreasonable ...because they address themselves to 'all', because they generalise where one must not generalise.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §198)
     A reaction: 'Particularism' is a recent label, but one finds passing remarks from many earlier philosophers which support that approach to ethics. No one was ever more opposed to strict moral rules than Nietzsche.
No two actions are the same [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: There neither are nor can be actions which are the same.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §335)
Moral generalisation is wrong, because we should evaluate individual acts [Nietzsche, by Foot]
     Full Idea: Nietzsche believed that moral generalisation was impossible because the proper subject of evaluation was, instead, a person's individual act.
     From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (Works (refs to 8 vol Colli and Montinari) [1885]) by Philippa Foot - Nietzsche's Immoralism p.155
     A reaction: This suggests a different type of particularism, focusing on the particular decision, rather than on the details of the situation. Presumable no two moral decisions are ever sufficiently the same to be compared. But a lie is a lie.
I see the need to pay a debt in a particular instance, and any instance will do [Prichard]
     Full Idea: How can I be brought to see the truth of the principle of paying a debt except in connection with a particular instance? For this purpose any instance will do. If I cannot see that I ought to pay this debt, I shall not see that I ought to a debt.
     From: H.A. Prichard (What is the Basis of Moral Obligation? [1925])
     A reaction: This isn't quite particularism, which would (I think) say that the degree of obligation will never be quite the same in any two situations, and so one instance will not suffice to understand the duty.
The complexities of life make it almost impossible to assess morality from a universal viewpoint [Prichard]
     Full Idea: Owing to the complication of human relations, the problem of what one ought to do from the point of view of life as a whole is one of intense difficulty.
     From: H.A. Prichard (What is the Basis of Moral Obligation? [1925])
     A reaction: I suspect that the difficulty is not the problems engendered by complexity, but that there is no answer available from the most objective point of view. Morality simply is a matter of how daily life is conducted, with medium-term goals only.
The mistake is to think we can prove what can only be seen directly in moral thinking [Prichard]
     Full Idea: Moral Philosophy rests on the mistake of supposing the possibility of proving what can only be apprehended directly by an act of moral thinking.
     From: H.A. Prichard (Does moral phil rest on a mistake? [1912])
     A reaction: This is a beginning of the rebellion against the Enlightenment Project in ethics, which is why Prichard has become popular. At bottom he is offering intuition ('direct moral thinking'), which is a frustratingly thin concept.
Prima facie duties rest self-evidently on particular circumstance [Ross]
     Full Idea: There is nothing arbitrary about the prima facie duties; each rests on a definite circumstance which cannot seriously be held to be without moral significance.
     From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §II)
     A reaction: He goes on to list the duties. Some of these duties will inevitably arise if we acknowledge both the rightness of keeping contracts, and the desirability of increasing general happiness.
The ground for an attitude is not a thing's 'goodness', but its concrete characteristics [Ewing]
     Full Idea: The ground for an attitude lies not in some other ethical concept, goodness, but in the concrete, factual characteristics of what we pronounce good. ...We shall not be better off if we interpolate an indefinable characteristic of goodness besides.
     From: A.C. Ewing (The Definition of Good [1948], p.172), quoted by Francesco Orsi - Value Theory 1.4
     A reaction: This is a forerunner of Scanlon's Buck-Passing theory of the source of value (in other properties). I approve of this approach. If I say 'actually this very strong cheese is really good', I'm not adding goodness to the cheese.
If I attend properly I will have no choices [Murdoch]
     Full Idea: If I attend properly I will have no choices, and this is the ultimate condition to be aimed at.
     From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], I)
     A reaction: I take it this is an expression of what we now call Particularism. It is not just that every moral situation is subtly morally different, but that the particulars of the situation will lead directly to moral choices (in a 'healthy' agent).
Particularism gives no guidance for the future [Nussbaum]
     Full Idea: Situation ethics offers no guidance for the future.
     From: Martha Nussbaum (Creating Capabilities [2011], 8)
     A reaction: Not sure if Situation Ethics is the same as Particularism. Jonathan Danby famously champions the latter.
Maybe the particularist moral thought of women is better than the impartial public thinking of men [Kymlicka]
     Full Idea: There is a significant strand of contemporary feminism which argues that we should take seriously women's different morality. ...The particularistic thought women employ is a better morality than the impartial thought men employ in the public sphere.
     From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 7.3)
     A reaction: I had taken Particularism to be an offshoot of virtue theory, as promulgated by Jonathan Dancy. Evidently the influence of feminism is strong. Personally I think the world would be a better place if it was run by women.
Virtue theory can have lots of rules, as long as they are grounded in virtues and in facts [Zagzebski]
     Full Idea: A pure virtue theory can have as many rules as you like as long as they are understood as grounded in the virtuous motivations and understanding of the nonmoral facts that virtuous agents possess.
     From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], II 6.1)
     A reaction: It is important, I think, to see that a virtue theorist does not have to be a particularist.
Any strict ranking of virtues or rules gets abandoned when faced with particular cases [Hursthouse]
     Full Idea: Any codification ranking the virtues, like any codification ranking the rules, is bound to come up against cases where we will want to change the rankings.
     From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.2)
     A reaction: This seems right, and yet it feels like a slippery slope. Am I supposed to be virtuous and wise, but have no principles? Infinite flexibility can lead straight to wickedness. Even the wise need something to hang on to.