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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality

[how qualia relate to thoughts being about things]

12 ideas
Mental unity suggests that qualia and intentionality must connect [Brentano, by Rey]
     Full Idea: Brentano's thesis is that all mental phenomena are intentional i.e. representational. Support for this view is that assimilating phenomenal experience to attitudes we explain the essential unity of the mind.
     From: report of Franz Brentano (Psychology from an empirical standpoint [1874]) by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind 11.5
     A reaction: Unifying intentionality and qualia in a single theory looks like a good move, but which one has priority? Evolutionary theory says priority goes to whatever produces behaviour. My intuition is that qualia are more basic - in tiny insects, say.
The qualities involved in sensations are entirely intentional [Anscombe, by Armstrong]
     Full Idea: Anscombe argued that the qualities involved in sensations are one and all intentional only (and I think this holds even for the bodily sensations).
     From: report of G.E.M. Anscombe (The Intentionality of Sensation [1965]) by David M. Armstrong - Pref to new 'Materialist Theory' p.xxii
     A reaction: Compare Harry Gildersleve's exactly opposite proposal in Idea 7272. I think I am coming round to the Anscombe view, which builds the more mysterious up from the less mysterious. Gildersleve must explain how atomic qualia arise.
The Twin Earth theory suggests that intentionality is independent of qualia [Jacquette on Putnam]
     Full Idea: Putnam's Twin Earth thought experiment suggests that two thinkers can have identical qualia, despite intending different objects on Earth and Twin Earth, and hence that qualia and intentionality must be logically independent of one another.
     From: comment on Hilary Putnam (The Meaning of 'Meaning' [1975]) by Dale Jacquette - Ontology Ch.10
     A reaction: [See Idea 4099, Idea 3208, Idea 7612 for Twin Earth]. Presumably my thought of 'the smallest prime number above 10000' would be a bit thin on qualia too. Does that make them 'logically' independent? Depends what we reduce qualia or intentionality to.
Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself [Searle]
     Full Idea: If I am conscious of a pain, the pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself.
     From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 4.1)
     A reaction: Crane quotes this to challenge it. Pain may be about apparent damage to the body. Pains are certainly informative.
Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge]
     Full Idea: Harman defended what came to be known as 'representationalism' - the view that qualitative aspects of experience are nothing other than representational aspects.
     From: report of Gilbert Harman (The Intrinsic Quality of Experience [1990]) by Tyler Burge - Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 p.459
     A reaction: Functionalists like Harman have a fairly intractable problem with the qualities of experience, and this may be clutching at straws. What does 'represent' mean? How is the representation achieved? Why that particular quale?
Pain has no reference or content [Kim]
     Full Idea: Some mental phenomena - in particular, sensations like tickles and pains - do not seem to exhibit either reference or content.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 21)
     A reaction: This could be challenged. These sensations cannot be had without a bodily location, and they give information about possible contact or damage.
The Inverted Earth example shows that phenomenal properties are not representational [Block, by Rowlands]
     Full Idea: Block's Inverted Earth example (with matching inversion of both colours and colour-language) tries to show a variation of representational properties without a variation of phenomenal properties, so that the latter are not constituted by the former.
     From: report of Ned Block (Inverted Earth [1990]) by Mark Rowlands - Externalism Ch.7
     A reaction: (The example is actually quite complex). This type of argument - a thought experiment in which qualia are held steady while everything else varies, or vice versa - seems to be the only way that we can possibly get at an assessment of the role of qualia.
If qualia have no function, their attachment to thoughts is accidental [Rey]
     Full Idea: If qualia are non-functionally defined objects, then their attachment to their role in my thought would seem to be metaphysically accidental.
     From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 11.4.2)
     A reaction: A rock at sea can cause a shipwreck without being defined as 'a shipwrecker'. It is, of course, tautological that if qualia have a 'role' in my thoughts, they must have causal powers, but 'function' is a much trickier concept.
Are qualia a type of propositional attitude? [Rey]
     Full Idea: Qualitative experience is just a particular species of propositional attitude.
     From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 11.6.1)
     A reaction: This sounds very implausible. If I hear a loud and baffling noise, is a proposition instantly involved? When a subtle change of colour occurs in the sky at sunset, is that 'propositional'? Do slugs formulate propositions when they taste garlic?
Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object [Crane]
     Full Idea: The intentional object of a pain-state is a part or region of the body, not a pain-object.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 3.24)
     A reaction: Plausible. Has anyone ever suffered from pain without some sense of what part of the body is actually in pain?
Intentionality isn't reducible, because of its experiential aspect [Sturgeon]
     Full Idea: The link between Aboutness and consciousness, plus the latter's theoretical recalcitrance, have prevented reduction of the former.
     From: Scott Sturgeon (Matters of Mind [2000], Intro)
     A reaction: I remain unconvinced that Aboutness (intentionality) has to be wholly (or even partly conscious). We are more interested in our conscious mental states, because those are the ones we can report to other people, and discuss.
Maybe lots of qualia lead to intentionality, rather than intentionality being basic [Gildersleve]
     Full Idea: A common modern reductive view of the mind is that a hierarchy of intentional systems eventually produce qualia, but it might be the other way around. The mind is 'qualia-upon-qualia', with units of minimal qualia building up into intentional thought.
     From: Harry Gildersleve (talk [2005]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: If qualia are seen as existing at the most basic level of the brain, this may well imply panpsychism. It certainly says that basic brain cells are capable of minimal experiences. The idea that thought is essentially qualitative is very intriguing.