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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality

[how qualia relate to thoughts being about things]

12 ideas
Mental unity suggests that qualia and intentionality must connect [Brentano, by Rey]
The qualities involved in sensations are entirely intentional [Anscombe, by Armstrong]
The Twin Earth theory suggests that intentionality is independent of qualia [Jacquette on Putnam]
Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself [Searle]
Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge]
Pain has no reference or content [Kim]
The Inverted Earth example shows that phenomenal properties are not representational [Block, by Rowlands]
If qualia have no function, their attachment to thoughts is accidental [Rey]
Are qualia a type of propositional attitude? [Rey]
Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object [Crane]
Intentionality isn't reducible, because of its experiential aspect [Sturgeon]
Maybe lots of qualia lead to intentionality, rather than intentionality being basic [Gildersleve]