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20. Action / D. Explaining an Action / 2. Causes of Actions

[what triggers an action and makes it inevitable]

6 ideas
If a desire leads to a satisfactory result by an odd route, the causal theory looks wrong [Chisholm]
The notion of cause is essential to acting for reasons, intentions, agency, akrasia, and free will [Davidson]
Mental states and actions need to be separate, if one is to cause the other [Stout,R]
Beliefs, desires and intentions are not events, so can't figure in causal relations [Stout,R]
In order to be causal, an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states [Stout,R]
Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall]