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20045
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Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate
[Davidson]
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Full Idea:
Whenever someone does something for a reason he can be characterised as (a) having some sort of pro attitude towards action of a certain kind, and (b) believing (or knowing, perceiving, noticing, remembering) that his action is of that kind.
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From:
Donald Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes [1963], p.3-4), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 3 'The belief-'
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A reaction:
This is the earlier Davidson roughly endorsing the traditional belief-desire account of action. He is giving a reductive account of reasons. Deciding reasons were not reducible may have led him to property dualism.
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20149
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To control our actions better, make them result from our attitudes, not from circumstances
[Kekes]
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Full Idea:
We increase our control by making our actions more and more the effects of our attitudes, and less and less the effects of external forces acting on us independently of our attitudes.
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From:
John Kekes (The Human Condition [2010], 02.4)
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A reaction:
He says that the attitudes should be focused on our well-being. Attitudes may also, however, serve some exernal ideal, such as altruism or patriotism. He has built a case for 'control' being a much more important value than 'free will'.
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4325
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Must all actions be caused in part by a desire, or can a belief on its own be sufficient?
[Hursthouse]
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Full Idea:
In contemporary philosophy of action, there is a fervid debate about whether any intentional action must be prompted in part by desire, or whether it is possible to be moved to action by a belief alone.
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From:
Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Intro)
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A reaction:
I want a cool belief to be sufficient to produce an action, because it will permit at least a Kantian dimension to ethics, and make judgement central, and marginalise emotivism, which is the spawn of Satan.
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