2216 | We transfer the frequency of past observations to our future predictions [Hume] |
19142 | Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature [Davidson] |
19305 | The Gambler's Fallacy (ten blacks, so red is due) overemphasises the early part of a sequence [Harman] |
19310 | High probability premises need not imply high probability conclusions [Harman] |
7448 | Probability is statistical (behaviour of chance devices) or epistemological (belief based on evidence) [Hacking] |
7447 | Probability was fully explained between 1654 and 1812 [Hacking] |
7449 | Epistemological probability based either on logical implications or coherent judgments [Hacking] |
14281 | A thing works like formal probability if all the options sum to 100% [Edgington] |
14284 | Conclusion improbability can't exceed summed premise improbability in valid arguments [Edgington] |
13857 | Truth-functional possibilities include the irrelevant, which is a mistake [Edgington] |
6797 | Objective probability of tails measures the bias of the coin, not our beliefs about it [Bird] |
6796 | Subjective probability measures personal beliefs; objective probability measures the chance of an event happening [Bird] |
14903 | Quantum mechanics seems to imply single-case probabilities [Ladyman/Ross] |
14923 | In quantum statistics, two separate classical states of affairs are treated as one [Ladyman/Ross] |