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13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism

[knowledge varies according to points of view]

30 ideas
If God had not created honey, men would say figs are sweeter [Xenophanes]
     Full Idea: If God had not created yellow honey, men would say that figs were sweeter.
     From: Xenophanes (fragments/reports [c.530 BCE], B38), quoted by Herodian - On Peculiar Speech 41.5
Donkeys prefer chaff to gold [Heraclitus]
     Full Idea: Donkeys prefer chaff to gold.
     From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B009), quoted by Aristotle - Nicomachean Ethics 1176a07
Sea water is life-giving for fish, but not for people [Heraclitus]
     Full Idea: Sea-water is the purest and the most polluted: for fish it is drinkable and life-giving; for men, not drinkable and destructive.
     From: Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], B061), quoted by Hippolytus - Refutation of All Heresies 9.10.5
A dog seems handsome to another a dog, and even a pig to another pig [Epicharmus]
     Full Idea: Dog seems very handsome to dog, and ox to ox, and donkey very handsome to donkey, and even pig to pig.
     From: Epicharmus (comedies (frags) [c.470 BCE], B05), quoted by (who?) - where?
There is no more purely metaphysical doctrine than Protagorean relativism [Benardete,JA on Protagoras]
     Full Idea: No purer metaphysical doctrine can possibly be found than the Protagorean thesis that to be (anything at all) is to be relative ( to something or other).
     From: comment on Protagoras (fragments/reports [c.441 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.3
Man is the measure of all things - of things that are, and of things that are not [Protagoras]
     Full Idea: He began one of his books as follows: 'Man is the measure of all things - of the things that are, that they are, and of the things that are not, that they are not'.
     From: Protagoras (fragments/reports [c.441 BCE], B01), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.51
Judgements vary according to local culture and law (Mode 5) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Fifth mode: judgements vary according to local custom, law and culture (Persians marry their daughters).
     From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9
Perception varies with viewing distance and angle (Mode 7) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Seventh mode: perception varies according to viewing distance and angle (the sun, and a dove's neck).
     From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9
Perception varies with madness or disease (Mode 4) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Fourth mode: perceivers vary in their mental and physical state (such as the mad and the sick).
     From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9
Animals vary in their feelings and judgements (Mode 1) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: First mode: animals vary in their feelings and judgements (of food, for example).
     From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9
Individuals vary in responses and feelings (Mode 2) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Second mode: individual men vary in responses and feelings (heat and cold, for example).
     From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9
Objects vary according to which sense perceives them (Mode 3) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Third mode: things like an apple vary according to which sense perceives them (yellow, sweet, and fragrant).
     From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9
Perception of objects depends on surrounding conditions (Mode 6) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Sixth mode: the perception of an object depends on surrounding conditions (sunlight and lamplight).
     From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9
Perception of things depends on their size or quantity (Mode 8) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Eighth mode: perceptions of things depend on their magnitude or quantity (food and wine).
     From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9
Perception and judgement depend on comparison (Mode 10) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Tenth mode: perceptions and judgements depend on comparison (light/heavy, above/below).
     From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9
Perception is affected by expectations (Mode 9) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Ninth mode: we perceive things according to what we expect (earthquakes and sunshine).
     From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9
Bath water is too hot for some, too cold for others [Epicurus, by Plutarch]
     Full Idea: In the very same bath some treat the water as too hot, others as too cold.
     From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes 1109b
If two people disagree over taste, who is right? [Epicurus, by Plutarch]
     Full Idea: If one person says the wine is dry and the other that it is sweet, and neither errs in his sensation, how is the wine any more dry than sweet?
     From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes 1109b
When entering a dark room it is colourless, but colour gradually appears [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: On entering a dark room we see no colour, but do so after waiting a short time.
     From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]), quoted by Plutarch - 74: Reply to Colotes 1110d
Everything is perceived in relation to another thing (Mode 13) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Thirteenth mode: everything is always perceived in relation to something else.
     From: report of Agrippa (fragments/reports [c.60]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.10
How can we judge between our impressions and those of other animals, when we ourselves are involved? [Sext.Empiricus]
     Full Idea: We cannot judge between our own impressions and those of other animals, because we ourselves are involved in the dispute.
     From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], I.59)
For Kant, experience is relative to a scheme, but there are no further possible schemes [Kant, by Fogelin]
     Full Idea: For Kant, experience is relativised to a categorial framework, but there is no further relativisation, at least in any deep respect, to a plurality of possible conceptual schemes.
     From: report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.3
     A reaction: This point is enlarged nicely by Davidson, in his view that we could make no sense of a different 'conceptual scheme' (Idea 6398). Kant's resistance to speculation prevents him imagining how it might be to be an angel, or an alien, or a Hopi.
Each of our personal drives has its own perspective [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: From the standpoint of each of our fundamental drives there is a different perspectival assessment of all events and experiences.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Fragments from 1885-1886 [1886], 1[058])
     A reaction: Revealing. Perspectives are not just each individual person's viewpoint, but something more fine-grained than that. Our understanding and response are ambiguous, because we ourselves are intrinsically ambiguous. Super-relativism!
We assume causes, geometry, motion, bodies etc to live, but they haven't been proved [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: We have fixed up a world for ourselves in which we can live, with bodies, lines, planes, causes, motion and form; without these articles of faith nobody would endure life. But that does not mean they have been proved. Life is no argument.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §121)
     A reaction: It is hard to disagree. A lot of recent thought suggests that they are Hume's 'natural beliefs', like truth and induction, which simply can't be proved. 'Unprovable' does not mean 'incorrect', however.
There is only 'perspective' seeing and knowing, and so the best objectivity is multiple points of view [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective "knowing", and the more different eyes we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our "concept" of this thing, our "objectivity", be.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], III.§12)
     A reaction: A very perceptive statement of the most plausible and sophisticated version of relativism. It is hard to see how we could distinguish multiple viewpoints from pure objectivity.
The extreme view is there are only perspectives, no true beliefs, because there is no true world [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: The most extreme form of nihilism would be the view that every belief, every considering-something-true, is necessarily false because there is simply no true world. Thus: a perspectival appearance, whose origin lies in us.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §015)
     A reaction: The idea that 'there is no true world' is incomprehensible to me. But note that here Nietzsche labels this an 'extreme' view, which he may not be asserting. He likes to flirt with danger.
Saying games of truth were merely power relations would be a horrible exaggeration [Foucault]
     Full Idea: When I talk about power relations and games of truth, I am absolutely not saying that games of truth are just concealed power relations - that would be a horrible exaggeration.
     From: Michel Foucault (Ethics of the Concern for Self as Freedom [1984], p.296)
     A reaction: I take this to be a denial of the more absurd forms of relativism. I think there is an interesting convergence between this kind of continental thinking, and the social view of justification found in the later work of Alvin Goldman.
Foucault challenges knowledge in psychology and sociology, not in the basic sciences [Foucault, by Gutting]
     Full Idea: Foucault's project is to question quite specific claims to cognitive authority, made by many psychologists and social scientists. He has not problems with other domains, such as mathematics and the basic sciences.
     From: report of Michel Foucault (works [1978]) by Gary Gutting - Foucault: a very short introduction 5
     A reaction: Nowadays we describe his target as Epistemic Injustice (see book of that title by Miranda Fricker).
Ontological relativists are anti-realists, who deny that our theories carve nature at the joints [O'Grady]
     Full Idea: Ontological relativists are anti-realists in the strong sense; they hold as meaningless the view that our theories carve nature at the joints.
     From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.3)
     A reaction: This pinpoints my disagreement with such relativism, as it seems obvious to me that nature has 'joints', and that we would agree with any sensible alien about lots of things.
Radical perspectivism replaces Kant's necessary scheme with many different schemes [Fogelin]
     Full Idea: We reach radical perspectivism by replacing Kant's single, necessary categorial scheme with a plurality of competing categorial schemes.
     From: Robert Fogelin (Walking the Tightrope of Reason [2003], Ch.3)
     A reaction: It certainly looks as if Kant sent us down a slippery slope into the dafter aspects of twentieth century relativism. The best antidote I know of is Davidson's (e.g. Idea 6398). But then it seems unimaginative to say that only one scheme is possible.