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16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 4. Errors in Introspection

[misleading information that can come from introspection]

5 ideas
We can be ignorant about ourselves, for example, our desires and motives [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: We can have false beliefs, or some degree of ignorance, about our own mental lives. For example, about our own dispositions, such as not believing that we have a certain ignoble desire.
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], III p.83)
     A reaction: This idea, that we don't know ourselves, has become a commonplace of recent philosophy, but I am unconvinced. Mostly we know only too well that we harbour a base desire, and we feel a creeping sense of shame. Total ignorance is very rare.
Experiments prove that people are often unaware of their motives [Rey]
     Full Idea: Experiments have shown (Nisbett and Wilson 1977) that people's introspective knowledge is a lot less reliable than they suppose. People are sensitive to but entirely unaware of many factors that influence their social behaviour.
     From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 3.2.2)
     A reaction: This type of observation rests on an overemphasis on the conscious mind. We are not conscious of liver events, or of deep buried brain events, both of which motivate us. We should only expect introspection to reveal what is fully conscious.
Brain damage makes the unreliability of introspection obvious [Rey]
     Full Idea: The most dramatic phenomena undermining the absolute reliability of introspection are those of blindsight and "anosognosia" (unawareness of one's own brain damage).
     From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 3.2.2)
     A reaction: It might depend on what you expected introspection to reveal. If you only expected it to tell you about your consciousness, it would be unreasonable to expect knowledge of blindsight information by introspection.
When distracted we can totally misjudge our own experiences [Chalmers]
     Full Idea: If one is distracted one may make judgements about one's experiences that are quite false.
     From: David J.Chalmers (The Conscious Mind [1996], 2.5.5)
     A reaction: Of course, when one is distracted one can make mistakes about anything. This does imply that if there is indeed infallible knowledge to be had from introspection, it will at least require full concentration to achieve it. Cf Idea 8883.
Error must be possible in introspection, because error is possible in all judgements [Heil]
     Full Idea: Error, like truth, presupposes judgement. Judgements you make about your conscious states are distinct from those states. This leaves room for error.
     From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6)
     A reaction: This sounds very neat. The reply would have to be that a lot of introspection is not judgement, but direct perception of self-evident facts and truths. I agree with Heil.