structure for 'Knowledge Sources'    |     alphabetical list of themes    |     unexpand these ideas

12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense

[everyday thought, treated with respect]

9 ideas
It is enough if we refute the objections and leave common opinions undisturbed [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: If we both refute the objections and leave the common opinions undisturbed, we shall have proved the case sufficiently.
     From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1145b05), quoted by Stephen Boulter - Why Medieval Philosophy Matters 3
     A reaction: This quotation is a sacred text for philosophers who place a high value on the consensus of thinking among the majority of people. I hate it when philosophers hijack an ordinary word and assign it a different meaning.
If everyone believes it, it is true [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: What everyone believes is so.
     From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1173a01)
     A reaction: Would you think me terribly unfashionable if I agreed with this? Huge numbers of people can be wrong, but if 'everyone' believes something it seems crazy to go against it.
Reid is seen as the main direct realist of the eighteenth century [Reid, by Robinson,H]
     Full Idea: Reid is often represented by modern opponents of the empiricists as the outstanding protagonist of direct or naïve realism and common sense in the eighteenth century.
     From: report of Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 2: Senses [1785]) by Howard Robinson - Perception 1.6
     A reaction: Robinson does not deny that this is Reid's view. Keith Lehrer is a great fan of Reid. Personally I think direct realism is quite clearly false, so I find myself losing interest in Reid's so-called 'common sense'.
In obscure matters the few must lead the many, but the many usually lead in common sense [Reid]
     Full Idea: In matters beyond the reach of common understanding, the many are led by the few, and willingly yield to their authority. But, in matters of common sense, the few must yield to the many, when local and temporary prejudices are removed.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 6: Judgement [1785], 4)
     A reaction: Wishful thinking in the 21st century, when the many routinely deny the authority of the expert few, and the expert few occasionally prove that the collective common sense of the many is delusional. I still sort of agree with Reid.
Many truths seem obvious, and point to universal agreement - which is what we find [Reid]
     Full Idea: There are many truths so obvious to the human faculties, that it should be expected that men should universally agree in them. And this is actually found to be the case with regard to many truths, against which we find no dissent.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 1: Preliminary [1785], 2)
     A reaction: He says that a few sceptical philosophers may disagree. This is a nice statement of his creed of common sense. I agree with him, and Aristotle observes the same fact.
There are very few really obvious truths, and not much can be proved from them [Sosa]
     Full Idea: Radical foundationalism suffers from two weaknesses: there are not so many perfectly obvious truths as Descartes thought; and if we restrict ourselves to what it truly obvious, very little supposed common sense knowledge can be proved.
     From: Ernest Sosa (The Raft and the Pyramid [1980], §3)
     A reaction: It is striking how few examples can ever be found of self-evident a priori truths. However, if there are self-evident truths about direct experience (pace Descartes), that would give us more than enough.
Commonsense realism must account for the similarity of genuine perceptions and known illusions [Lockwood]
     Full Idea: Commonsense realism has to account for the subjective similarity of the genuine perception of a green surface and the experience of, say, an after-image.
     From: Michael Lockwood (Mind, Brain and the Quantum [1989], p.142)
Apprehension is a complex intellect grasping the essence of a complex object [Holt,L]
     Full Idea: The paradigm case of apprehension is of a complex intellect confronted with a complex object, in which the intellect understands in a particular context what is 'essential' about the object.
     From: Lynn Holt (Apprehension: reason in absence of Rules [2002], 3 'Expertise')
     A reaction: My line is that this apprehension cashes out as an immediate ability to explain the object. This is an enhanced version of the rational understanding of things found in most larger animals. Holt says her account is Aristotelian.
A chief task of philosophy is making reflective sense of our common sense worldview [Thomasson]
     Full Idea: Showing how, reflectively, we can make sense of our unreflective common sense worldview is arguably one of the chief tasks of philosophy.
     From: Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], Intro)
     A reaction: Maybe. The obvious problem is that when you look at weird and remote cultures like the Aztecs, what counts as 'common sense' might be a bit different. She is talking of ordinary objects, though, where her point is reasonable.